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Vl

Defendant/Appellant Sandy G. Kellin ("Kellin"), through counsel respectfully
submits this Brief.

PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS
There are no prior or related appeals.

JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§78A-5-102 (2014). A final judgment was entered by the district court on June 20, 2014
(the "Judgment"). (Attachment A). Kellin timely filed a Notice of Appeal on July 18,
20 14 in accordance with Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(Attachment B). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. §78A-4-103(2) (2014) .

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
a.

Issue: Whether the Court etTed in finding that Plaintiff/Appellee

"American West" met its burden of proof with respect to Unit 402 when American West's
appraised fair market value did not consider the highest and best use of Unit 402 as oneeighth fractionalized shares, particularly when the Court determined that such appraisal
'\vas not entirely satisfactory to the Court, and left several questions unanswered."
Standard of review: This Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for

correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's decision. See Martin v. Lauder,
2010 UT App 216, 1 4, 239 P.3d 519; Valley Colour v. Beuchert Builders, 944 P.2d 361,
363 (Utah 1997); Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App. 37,

1

1 5,

107 P.3d 693. It " has long

been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be predicated upon and find
support in the findings of fact. " Id. (quoting Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,436 (Utah
1993)).

Preservation of Issue for Appeal: This issue was preserved for appeal during the
bench trial held on February 11 , 2014. (See Bench Trial Transcript at R. 2314) . This
issue was further preserved for appeal by Judge Shaughnessy's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated April 6, 2014. (Attachment C). This issue was also preserved
for appeal by Kellin's Opposition to Summary Judgment dated August 30, 2013. (R. 7071507).
b.

Issue: Whether the Court erred in granting judgment to American West with

respect to Unit 302 when the court found that: (i) American \Vest had the burden of proof,
(ii) American West "failed to meet its burden of proof," and (iii) the only evidence of fair
market value introduced by American West was an appraisal by American West's expert
witness which the Court found was ''entirely lacking in the foundation and ... flatly
contradicts the very USPAP principles he insists must be applied," and was "simply not
credible. "

Standard of review: This Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court s decision. See Martin v. Lauder,
2010 UT App 216,

~

4, 239 P.3d 519; Valley Colour v. Beuchert Builders, 944 P.2d 361 ,

363 (Utah 1997); Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App. 37,

~

5, 107 P.3d 693 . It "has long

been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be predicated upon and find
2

support in the findings of fact." Id. (quoting Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah
1993)).
Preservation of Issue for Appeal: This issue was preserved for appeal during the
bench trial held on February 11, 2014. (See Bench Trial Transcript at R. 2314). This
issue was further preserved for appeal by Judge Shaughnessy's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated April 6, 2014. (Attachment C) . This issue was also preserved
for appeal by Kellin's Opposition to Summary Judgment dated August 30, 2013. (R. 7071507).
c.

Issue: Whether the Court erred in relying upon the testimony of

American West's

expert witness, Kevin Weed, to determine the fair market value of

Unit.s 302 and 402 and calculate a deficiency after determining that Mr. Weed's opinions
"were not entirely satisfactory," "left several questions unanswered," contained an
"analytical error," were "entirely lacking in [sic] foundation and flatly contradicts the
very USP AP principles he insists must be applied," and ·were "simply not credible particularly given his criticism of [Kellin's expert] for doing the same thing."
Standard of review: This Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for

correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's decision. See J\1artin v. Lauder,
2010 UT App 216, ~ 4, 239 P.3d 519; Valley Colour v. Beuchert Builders, 944 P.2d 361 ,
363 (Utah 1997); Ke ene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App. 37,

~

5, 107 P.3d 693. It " has long

been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be predicated upon and find

,.,
.)

support in the findings of fact." Id. (quoting Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 , 436 (Utah
1993 )).
Preservation of Issue for Appeal: This issue was preserved for appeal during the
bench trial held on February 11, 2014. (See Bench Trial Transcript at R. 2314). This
issue was further preserved for appeal by Judge Shaughnessy's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated April 6, 2014. (Attachment C).
d.

Issue: Whether the Court erred in using the amount of American \.Vest's

credit bid to determine the fair market value of Unit 302 and calculate a deficiency after
finding the testimony of American West's appraiser, Kevin Weed, to be problematic and
simply not credible.
Standard of review: This Court reviews the trial court' s legal conclusions for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court' s decision. See Martin v. Lauder,
2010 UT App 216, 14,239 P.3d 519; Valley Colour v. Beuchert Builders, 944 P.2d 361 ,
363 (Utah 1997); Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App. 37,

~

5, 107 P .3d 693. It "has long

been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be predicated upon and find
support in the findings of fact. " Id. (quoting Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah
1993)).
Preservation of Issue for Appeal: This issue was preserved for appeal during the
bench trial held on February 11 , 2014. (See Bench Trial Transcript at R. 2314). This
issue was further preserved for appeal by Judge Shaughnessy ' s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated April 6, 2014 . (Attachment C).
4

e.

Issue: Whether the Court erred in disregarding the opinion of Kellin 's

expert witness regarding the fair market value of the fractional shares in the Units when
determining the existence and amount of a deficiency.
Standard of review: This Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for

con-ectness, granting no deference to the trial court's decision. See Jvfartin v. Lauder,
2010 UT App 216,

,r 4,239 P.3d 519;

Valley Colour v. Beuchert Builders, 944 P.2d 361,

363 (Utah 1997); Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App . 37,

,r

5, 107 P.3d 693. It "has long

been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be predicated upon and find
support in the findings of fact. " Id. (quoting Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah
1993)).
Preservation of Issue for Appeal: This issue was preserved for appeal during the

bench trial held on February 11, 2014. (See Bench Trial Transcript at R. 2314). This
issue was further preserved for appeal by Judge Shaughnessy's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated April 6, 2014. (Attachment C). .
f.

Issue: \,Vhether the Court erred in determining fair market value without

considering the value of the fractional shares in the Units based on the Court's en-oneous
finding that Kellin's and AmericanWest's appraisers agreed that the highest and best use
of Units 302 and 402 was as residential condominium units.
Standard of review:

The appellate court " reviews the district court's factual

findings for clear en-or and review[s] its legal conclusions for correctness." Housekeeper

v. State, 2008 UT 78,

,r

18, 197 P.3d 636.

5

Preservation of Issue for Appeal : This issue was preserved for appeal during the
bench trial held on Febrnary 11 , 2014. (See Bench Trial Transcript at R. 2314). This
issue was further preserved for appeal by Judge Shaughnessy ' s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated April 6, 2014. (Attachment C).

g.

Issue : Whether the trial court erred in finding that American West met its

burden of proof when ArnericanWest's appraiser appraised the value of the full fee
interest of the Units subject to fractionalization and fa iled to properly analyze or " develop
an opinion of highest and best use," because he was prevented from doing so by his
client s scope of work, particularly when Kellin's appraiser specifically testified that the
highest and best use of the properties was as fractionalized shares in residential
condominium units and the evidence showed that American West utilized the value of the
fractional shares in agreeing to loan money to Kellin and throughout the life of the loans,
including reducing the outstanding principal amount owed on the loans upon the sale of a
fractional share.

Standard of review: This Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court' s decision. See Jvfartin v. Lauder,
2010 UT App 216, 14, 239 P.3d 519; Valley Colour v. Beuchert Builders, 944 P.2d 361,
363 (Utah 1997); Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App. 37,

~

5, 107 P.3d 693. It "has long

been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be predicated upon and find
support in the findings of fact. " Id. (quoting Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 43 1, 436 (Utah
1993)).

6

Preservation of Issue for Appeal: This issue was preserved for appeal during the
bench trial held on February 11 , 2014 . (See Bench Trial Transcript at R. 2314). This
issue was further preserved for appeal by Judge Shaughnessy's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated April 6, 2014. (Attachment C). This issue was also preserved
for appeal by Kellin's Opposition to Summary Judgment dated August 30, 2013. (R. 7071507).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This matter arises out of a deficiency action brought by American West Bank
CAmericanWest") pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-32 (2011) (Attachment D) (the
"Deficiency Statute"), against Sandy Kellin ("Kellin") and Brent Bryson ("Bryson")
follmving the non-judicial foreclosure of three fractionalized condominium units
(referred to individually herein as "Unit 302", "Unit 402 " and "Unit 502'') located in the
Red Stag Lodge, in Park City, Utah. (R. 148-262). Units 302, 402 and 502 were each
fractionalized into separate one-eighth shares and the appraised value relied upon by
American West in granting the loans was based on the value of the one-eighth shares.
Kellin owned Unit 302, Bryson and Kellin jointly owned Unit 402, and Bryson owned
Unit 502. Prior to the foreclosure of Unit 302, Ke llin sold a one-eighth interest to a third
party; accordingly, American \Vest foreclosed on Unit 502, Unit 402, and a seventheighth interest in Unit 302 . Prior to trial, Bryson was dismissed from the case after
entering into a settlement agreement with American \Vest.
7

Accordingly, at trial the

deficiency action solely addressed Kellin's responsibility for any claimed deficiency
associated with his seven-eighths interest in Unit 302 and his responsibility for one-half
of any deficiency associated with Unit 402 (Units 302 and 402 are referred to herein as
the "Units").
Kellin asserted before the trial court that the fractional value of the one-eighth
shares should be used to determine the existence and extent of any deficiency.
AmericanWest asserted that the whole value of the units should be used to determine fair
market value and the deficiency amount.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

At the conclusion of discovery, on August 2, 2013, American West filed a Motion
for Declaratory Relief and for Summary Judgment against Kellin. (R. 438-443). After
American West's summary judgment motion was fully briefed, the court conducted a
hearing on December 16, 2013. (R. 1551). Subsequent to the hearing, the trial court
entered partial summary judgment in favor of American West, concluding that the issue of
the fair market value of the Units was the only disputed issue of material fact remaining.
(R. 1692, 1801-1806). On February 11 , 2014, a bench trial was held with respect to fair
market value.

(R. 1550).

Following the bench trial, the trial court entered a final

judgment awarding American West money damages, attorneys ' fees, legal expenses,
costs, and post-judgment interest. (R. 2287-89). On July 18, 2014, Kellin timely filed
his Notice of Appeal. (R. 2290-91).

8

C.

Disposition in the Trial Court.

American West argued before the trial court that a deficiency existed with respect
to both Units 302 and 402 because the amount of the debt exceeded the fair market value
of a seven-eighths interest in Unit 302 and the full value of Unit 402 on the dates of their
respective foreclosure sales. (R. 1877-78). AmericanWest's valuation disregarded the
fractionalized value of the one-eighth shares in the Units and treated the Units as typical
single residential condominium units. American West argued and presented evidence that
because it foreclosed on a fee simple interest in the Units instead of foreclosing on
fractional shares in the Units, the value of the fractional shares should be ignored in
determining the fair market value of the Units.
Conversely, Kellin argued and presented evidence that the fair market value of the
fractiona l shares in the Units should be considered in determining the fair market value of
the Units because: (i) the parties each treated the Units as fractionalized properties
throughout the life of the loans; (ii) the Units were designed - to be sold as eight individual
shares; and (iii) the highest and best use of the Units was as fractional shares in the
condominium units. Kellin presented evidence that when the fair market value of the
fractional shares in the Units is considered, there is no deficiency.
At trial, the parties each presented evidence regarding the fair market value of the
Units on the date of the foreclosure sales. American West presented the expert testimony
of a certified residential real estate appraiser, Mr. Kevin Weed. In tum, Kellin presented
the expert testimony of ce1iified residential real estate appraiser, Mr. Rob Hunt. Kellin
9

also presented testimony of the Unit mvners, Kellin and Bryson. After considering the
evidence, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law determining
that although experts for both parties failed to properly apply USPAP principles in
performing the appraisals, American West was entitled to a deficiency of $209,726.65
"vith respect to Kellin's interest in Unit 402 and $380,776.79 with respect to Kellin's
seven-eighth's interest in Unit 302; together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees . (R.
1919-36).
D.

Statement of Facts.
(i) Background.

Bryson and Kellin jointly purchased Unit 402 and Kellin separately purchased
Unit 302 in Red Stag Lodge as investment properties for the purpose of selling fractional
shares in the Units. (R. 2314, pgs. 128: 17- 129:2). Unit 302 was purchased on October
16, 2007, for approximately $1,400,000.00 . (R. 2314, pg. 141:15-17). Unit 402 was
purchased on November 19, 2007, for approximately $1,200,000.00 (R. 1920, 2314, pg.
141 :9-14).
Like all other Units located in the Red Stag Lodge, the Units were each
fractionalized into eight separate shares. (R. 719) . American West was one of Red Stag
Lodge's "preferred" lenders for fractional financing . Id.

Pursuant to the agreement

between Plaintiff and Kel lin, when each fractional share was sold, American West was to
receive a portion of the sales proceeds and would release a one-eighth interest in the
property. (R. at 719-20). The loans for the purchase of the Units were based ';upon a

-IO

fractional ownership wherein the loan was patterned similar to what a subdivision loan
would be in that they had to put a down payment down. It was a short- term note, which
would allow for partial releases, very similar to what a subdivision would be." (R. at
720).
In 2008, Kellin sold a 1/8 interest in Unit 302 to Benna USA, LLC . Id. In turn,
and in accordance vvith the agreement between Kellin and American West regarding the
fractional ized nature of the Units, American West directed the trustee of the Unit 302 trust
deed to execute and have recorded a deed of partial reconveyance in August of 2008 with
respect to Unit 302, partially reconveying "the trust deed in the amount of
$1 ,200,000.00," and providing that ::lender shall have no claim against said 1/8 interest as
before mentioned in the recorded Deed of Tmst." (R. 721 ). In connection with a partial
reconveyance of the trust deed, American \,Vest reduced the loan amount by $242,563.26.

Id.
From the outset, when Bryson and Kellin app li ed for loans to purchase Units 302
and 402, AmericanWest acknowledged that the "primary source" for repayment of the
loans for the Units was to be from the sale of "fractional shares of units" and a secondary
source for repaying the loans was to be through "rental income from the Units."

(R.

722). In 2008, American West hired Robert Hunt (" Mr. Hunt") to perform appraisals of
Units 302, 402, and 502 in conjunction with certain Change in Terms Agreements with
respect to the loans. Id. Pursuant to the scope of work as directed by American West, Mr.
Hunt was instructed to apprai se the value of a one-eighth fraction. Id. As instructed by
11

American West, Mr. Hunt did perform fractional appraisals of the value of one-eighth
fractional shares in each of the Units. Id. The one-eighth shares in Unit 302 were valued
at $210,000 .00 and the one-eighth shares in Unit 402 were valued at $220,000.00 per
share. (R. 858, 887).
The Units in Red Stag Lodge were intended to be fractional ownership wherein
buyers would "own one-eighth of a beautiful, fully furnished condominium at the Red
Stag Lodge and enjoy 6 weeks of usage throughout the year." (R. 723). As of January of
2009, American West valued Unit 302 at $220,000 per share of the seven unsold shares
with a total appraised value of $1,015,000.00 and valued Unit 402 at $220 000 per share
of the eight unsold shares with a total appraised value of $1,160,000.00. Id. As of March
of 2009, American West admitted in writing that the value of Unit 402 exceeded
$1,100,000.00 (maximum loan amount of $935,000 .00 with 85% of appraisal discounted
loan-to-value) and that the property was being marketed in fractional shares. Id. As of
March of 2009, American West admitted in writing that the value of Unit 302 was at least
$962,500 (maximum loan amount of $818,125 .00 with 85% of appraisal discounted loanto-value) and that the property was being marketed in fractional shares. Id.
As evidenced by AmericanWest's Loan Officer, Mike McDonald, and Credit
Administrator, Tim Conklin, the loans were "for fractional shared ownership in Deer
Valley." (R. 724). Throughout the term of the loans, American West valued the units
based on the cumulative values of each fractional share. Id. The Covenants Codes and
Restrictions ';CCR's" encumbering the Units and recorded on April 13, 2007, and which
12

predate Plaintiffs' Deeds of Trust against the Units and the date the foreclosure sale was
held, explicitly and at length detail the fractional ownership program governing the Units.
(R. 724-25).

In April of 2009, (before the Change in Terms Agreements were executed),
"American West considered loaning money to qualified borrowers of fractional interests
in Units 302 or 402" .

(R. 725).

Thereafter, AmericanWest "never discontinued

financing the purchase of fractional interests in Units 302, 402 and 502." Id. When the
Unit 302 and Unit 402 Promissory Notes were executed, American\.Vest knew that Kellin
intended to sell those units in fractional shares. Id. At the time American West financed
the purchases of Units 302 and 402, American \.Vest knew that the Units were being
marketed as fractional ownership properties.

(R. 725-26).

When American \.Vest

analyzed whether to grant approval of loans for properties that were going to be
fractionalized, and in determining the value of such properties, American West's credit
administrator would take into consideration "whether or not it can be sold, can be
fractionalized." (R. 726). In the Bank's own Highlights of Key Findings, an internal
bank document used in analyzing the Unit 302 and 402 loans, AmericanWest stated that
"updated appraisals have been obtained that value these units as individual shares. Each
condo has been fractionalized into 8 shares." Id. The discounted bulk value of the shares
was approved by Mike Mollahan in the Bank's loan appraisal department to be $137,000
per share (or $1,096,000 with respect to Unit 402 and $959,000 with respect to Unit 302).

Id.
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AmericanWest obtained several appraisals of the Units that acknowledge and
account for the fractional nature of the Units. Id.

According to the underwriter for

American West's commercial loan department, the primary source for repaying the loans
was intended to be the "fractional shares of the units" and the intent was "to sell oneeighth shares of the unit, and the primary source of repayment, how the borrower hoped
to be able to repay the loan and how the bank expected to be the primary source was
through the net proceeds of the sale of each fractional share." (R. 727). American West's
Vice President testified that the "ability to sell fractional shares was taken into
consideration as a repayment source" because the plan for all property financed by
American West at Red Stag Lodge was to retire a portion of the loan with the sale of each
fractional share. (R. 728).
Shalee Johansen, the realtor that represented Kellin, sold several fractional shares
in the Red Stag Lodge within the space of a year and a half, including one share in Unit
302 and two to three fractional shares in the penthouse. Id. At least two of the fractional
shares vvere cash transactions and one or two were financed by a bank in Draper, Utah.

Id. At least 5 to 10 other potential purchasers expressed interest in buying a fractional
share.

Id.

Most of these potential purchasers contacted American West to discuss

financing, including terms, deposits, down payments, and interest rates. Id. At least two
of the potential purchasers submitted applications to ArnericanWest to purchase
fractional shares in Red Stag Lodge and were pre-qualified for financing, but the
financing was never finalized. Id. The original loan documents for the purchase of the
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Units were set up as construction loans which would allow the bank to provide a partial
release of American West's security interest in each parcel in the way that AmericanWest
,vould issue a partial release with respect to the sale of each parcel in a subdivision. (R.
729).
As of March 3, 2009, American West's Watch Loan Report (a document used by
American West to internally review loan status) indicated that Unit 302 was worth
$1,470,000, based on seven fractional shares at $2 10,000 per share, together with a bulk
value of the seven shares in Unit 302 at $960,000.00. (R. 729). American West's Watch
Loan Report did not value Units 302 or 402 as individual, whole-unit condominiums,
only as shares. Id. As of March 3, 2009, American West's Watch Loan Report provided
that Unit 402 was worth $1,680,000, based on eight fractiona l shares at $220,000 per
share, together with a bulk value of the eight shares in Unit 402 at $1,100,000.00. Id. As
of September 5, 2009, American \.Vest's Watch Loan Report showed a market value for
Unit 402 of $1 ,760,000, based on eight shares at $220,000.00 per share, together with a
discounted bulk sale value of the eight fractions at $1.16M.

(R. 729-30).

As of

December 1, 2009, American\,Vest's Watch Loan Report showed a market value for Unit
302 of $1 ,540,000, based on seven shares at $220,000.00, together with a discounted bulk
sale value of Unit 302's seven fractions at $1.015M. (R. 730). As of December 1, 2009,
American West's Watch Loan Report showed a market value fo r Unit 402 of $1,760,000,
based on eight shares at $220,000.00 per share, together with a discounted bulk sale value
of the eight fractions at $ 1.l6M. Id. As of January of2009 (when the loans were being
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modified according to change in tenns agreements) Units 302 and 402 were valued by
the bank at $137,000 per fractional share for a total estimated value of between $962,500
and $ 1. lM. Id. As of May 15, 2009, the bank valued the fractional shares in Units 302
and 402 at $145 ,000 and estimated the value of Unit 402 to be $1 , 160,000 and estimated
the value of a seven-eighth' s interest in Unit 302 to be worth $1,015,000. Id.
In March of 2011 , Kellin and Bryson hired Mr. Hunt to perform fractional
appraisals of Units 302, 402, and 502 as of the dates of their respective foreclosure sales.
(R. 722). Mr. Hunt appraised each fractional share in Unit 302 as being worth $150,000
as of the date of the foreclosure sale on January 11 , 2011. (R. 723). Mr. Hunt appraised
each fractional share in Unit 402 as being worth $157,000 as of the date of the
foreclosure sale on September 16, 2010. Id. Mr. Hunt's scope of work for Kellin and
Bryson was the same as the scope of work he had been hired to do for American West
from 2008 through 2009. (R. 2314, pg. 156:4-12, 158:12-159:4).
(ii)

The Trial Court's Summary Judgment Ruling.

On December 16, 2013 , a hearing was held to consider the summary judgment
motion filed by American West. (R. 1692). The trial court judge entered partial summary
judgment in favor of American \Vest, holding that the bank was entitled to a "declaration
as to the validity of the loan, the amounts outstanding under the loan at the time of the
foreclosure, the priority of the trustee sale process, the fact that the bank complied with
all of the requirements under the trust deed statute in terms of providing notice of the sale
and that the bank complied with the stah1te in terms of conducting the sale." (R. 1692,
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pg. 3 :4-21).

However, the court determined that a disputed issue of material fact

remained "on the question of the fair market value of the property at the time of sale." Id.
The trial court further held that detennining fair market value included determining
whether there was a "difference between the fair market value of a condominium unit that
is subject to being so.Id in fractional interest versus not being sold in fractional interest."
(R. 1692, pg. 4: 1-10).

(iii)

The Trial Court's Bench Trial and Decision.
a. Opening Arguments

A bench trial was held on February 11, 2014, for the purpose of determining the
fair market value of the Units as of the time of the respective trustee sales. (R. 2314, pg.
5: 1-6).

During the bench trial, the lower comt and counsel for American West

acknowledged that AmericanWest had the burden of proof.

(R. 2314, pg. 5:13-24).

Counsel for American West stated that American West would meet its burden of proof
through its expert Kevin Weed ("Nlr. Weed"), a certified residential appraiser who would
testify, "that he complied with Utah Code and the corresponding provisions of USPAP,
which are the regulations that govern how appraisals are prepared." (R. 2314, pgs . 5:216:4). Kellin 's counsel stated that the evidence would show that Kevin Weed failed to
find the highest and best use of the Units and his failure to do so made his entire appraisal
not credible, and that without a "credible opinion as to value, they have no claim for
deficiency."

(R. 2314, pg. 8: 14-25).

Counsel for Kellin further stated that Kellin's

expert witness, Mr. Hunt, wou ld testify that he had appropriately taken into consideration
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market conditions in determining that the value of each of the one-eighth shares of Unit
302 was $150,000.00 as of the foreclosure date and that the one-eighth shares of Unit 402
were worth $157,000. (R. 2314, pg. 11:10-24).
b. Testimony of Kevin Weed

Mr. Weed testified that the scope of the work that he was given by counsel for
American West was to appraise the fee simple value of Units 302 and 402, with the ability
to be fractionalized, but that he did not consider the value of the fractions in the Units.
(R. 2314, pg. 15-18, 99-100).

In other words, AmericanWest asked Mr. 'Need, "to

prepare an appraisal as to the single unit fee simple interests," of Units 302 and 402,
subjection to fractionalization. (R. 231 4, 64:3-5). Mr. Weed did not analyze the value of
the fractions within his scope of work. (R. 231 4, pg. 100: 1-6). Mr. Weed acknowledged
that the '-,;basic principle of highest and best use is you look to see what in the property
that you're appraising has the greatest opportunity to maximize value." (R. 2314, pg.
64:19-22). Mr. 'Need also testified that there was "no market" for one-eighth fractional
shares at the time that Units 302 and 402 were foreclosed because "there was no evidence
of sales," of one-eighth shares, even though there were other fractional sales such as sales
of one-quarter shares. (R. 2314, pgs. 29:16-24, 69:16-70:10). Mr. Weed further testified
that it was possible that there was a market for fractional shares of one-half and onequarter interests, but no market for one-eighth shares. (R. 2314, pg. 30: 10-14).

In determining the value of Unit 402, Mr. Weed determined that the market
approach was the most competent and reliable approach and he identified what he
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classified to be seven comparable sales of whole units that had the ability to be
fractionalized. (R. 2314, pgs. 17:10-23, 20:6-14).

Of these comparable sales, one was a

bank-owned property sold by AmericanWest in Red Stag Lodge and others were
properties in the Park City area, such as units in Black Bear Lodge in upper Deer Valley
and Glenfiddich in lower Deer Valley. (R. 2314, pgs. 20-28, 45 , 120); see also Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2B (Attachment E). In analyzing these properties, rvlr. Weed "made a number of
adjustments - - numeric adjustments that is the function of making [the comparables]
equal to the subject."

(R. 2314, pg. 21:5-8).

Mr. Weed testified that while the

"comparable" units he used in determining fair market value were subject to
fractionalization, there \.Vas no market for eighth share units when Units 302 and 402
were foreclosed because there was no evidence of any sales of one-eighth shares during
the timeframe of the foreclosures.

(R. 2314, pgs. 29:16-24, 69:9- 15). In addition to

looking at seven comparable properties that closed prior to the foreclosures of Units 302
and 402, rvlr. Weed included "four additional sales" that occurred within Red Stag Lodge
after the foreclosures, in supplemental addenda to the appraisals. (R. 2314, pgs. 31:1132: 12, 51: 15-52:5) (se e Plaintiffs Exhibits 2B and lB Attachments E and F). All of
these Red Stag units were bank sales controlled by American West. (R. 2314, pg. 33:124). The court noted that it was "problematic" that Mr. Weed relied on sales within the
subject property "by the party who's seeking to recover the deficiency." (R. 2314, pgs.
33: 14-34: 13).
Based on his analysis, Mr. Weed det rmined that the value of Unit 402, as of the
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date of foreclosure on September 16, 2010, was $580,000.00. (R. 2314, pg. 40:15-24).
With respect to the appraisal of Unit 302, Mr. Weed also selected what he
classified to be seven comparable sales with "full fee simple fonn of ownership." (R.
2314, pg. 43:8-22); see also Plaintiffs Exhibit 1B (Attachment F). He testified that his
scope of work was to " appraise the fair market value of seven-eighths interest in Unit 3 02
as of the effective date of January 11 , 2011 ." (R. 2314, pgs. 43:8-44:3). In analyzing the
value of a seven-eighths interest in Unit 302, Mr. Weed looked at "comparable" whole
units subject to fractionalization, including bank-owned properties sold by American West
in Red Stag Lodge and sales of other properties in the Park City area, such as units in
Black Bear Lodge in upper Deer Valley and Glenfiddich in lower Deer Valley. (R. 2314,
pgs. 45-56).
Mr. Weed testified that it would be improper under USPAP Standard Rule 1-4 to
appraise a one-eighth interest in a property subject to fractionalization and then "times
that by a multiple." (R. 2314, pgs. 46:5-47:19). He stated that according to USPAP, "in
developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must collect, verify, and analyze all
information necessary for credible assignment results. When analyzing the assemblage
of various estates or component parts of the property an appraiser must analyze the effect
on value, if any, of the assemblage," and "refrain from valuing the whole solely by
adding together the individual values of the various estates or component parts," because
"although the value of the whole may be equal to the sum of the separate estates or parts,
it also may be greater or less than the sum of such estates or parts." (R. 2314, pgs. 46:520

47:19) (reading USPAP, Standard Number Rule 1-4 with comment). Therefore, "the
value of the whole must be tested by reference to appropriate data and supported by an
appropriate analysis of such data." (R. 2314, pg. 47:3 - 10) (reading comment to Standard
Number Rule 1-4).
Accordingly, Mr. Weed concluded that " it would be improper to appraise" the
values of the Units based " upon an appraisal of a one-eighth interest times some
multiple."

(R. 2314, pg. 122:13-16).

Mr. Weed further testified that in applying

Standard Rule 1-4 to fractionalized properties, an appraiser should perfonn a highest and
best use analysis to determine 'vvhat will bring the greatest return to the property," and so
when there is a market for both fractional shares and whole units an appraiser should
"perfonn an appraisal on both." (R. 2314, pgs. 123:12-124:25). But, according to Mr.
Weed, an appraiser is to "refrain from appraising an individual one-eighth interest and
basing ... value of the whole solely on that process." (R. 2314, pg. 125:17-21).
Based on his analysis, Mr. Weed concluded that the value of a seven-eighths
interest in Unit 302 as of the date of foreclosure on January 11, 2011 was $538,125. (R.
2314, pg. 56:20-24).
Nlr. Weed arrived at this value by determining that the "whole, eight-eighths"
value was $615,000, and then reducing that figure "by an eighth to - - arrive at the
538,000, reflecting the seven-eighths ownership ." (R. 2314, pgs. 57:4-9, 263:11 -24). At
one point, Mr. Weed testified that this analysis was conducted in "conformance with
USPAP," but when questioned by the Court, he admitted that this approach was not
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covered or allowed by USPAP.

Id.

Nevertheless, Mr. Weed testified that it was

appropriate to value Unit 302 as a who le and then subtract the value of a one-eighth share
in the Unit because "when I have the majority - - I have seven-eighths already to work
with ... that's different than starting with an eighth and trying to make it an eight-eighths
out of that.' (R. 2314, pg. 101:1 -4).

Mr. Weed also testified that the Park City "market in general declined 30 percent
from its top to bottom," from 2007 until September of 2010. (R. 2314, pg. 82:14-25).
Yet, Mr. Weed's appraisals of the Units on the dates of foreclosure were approximately
60 percent below the original sales price in October of 2007. (R. 2314, pg. 84:20-85:5).

Mr. Weed testified that the value of the Units declined more than the rest of Park City
because the Red Stag Lodge was abandoned.

(R. 2314, pg. 85:6-9).

However, Mr.

Weed's appraisals said nothing about Red Stag Lodge being abandoned. (R. 2314, pg.
88:9-20) . Instead, the appraisals indicated that the Red Stag Lodge was a very good
property, good location, with good amenities, good vievvs, and good ski in/out access. Id.
On cross-examination, Mr. Weed clarified that the scope of his assignment, as
provided by American West, 'was to look at full fee subject to fractionalization, not the
fractionalization only.' (R. 23 14, pg. 92: 1-3). He also testified that he analyzed the full
fee subject to fractionalization and not the value of the fractions because of "an absence
of demand" and because there "was no market for eighth share in the Park City market in
general," including lower Deer Valley where the Red Stag Lodge is located. (R. 2314,
pgs . 89:11 -23, 92:4-15). Notwithstanding this testimony, Mr. Weed acknowledged that a
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one-eighth fractional share in Unit 401 in the Red Stag Lodge sold in March of 2011, or
within two months of the Unit 302 foreclosure sale, followed by a sale of a one-eighth
fractional sale in Unit 401 in August of 2011, two one-eighth fractional shares in
December of 20 11 , and a one-eighth fractional share in May of 2012 . (R. 2314, pg. 91:716). Mr. \,Veed further acknowledged that the one-eighth fractional shares in the Red
Stage Lodge so ld "sooner than the fee simple units" that were included in the addendum
of his appraisal. (R. 2314, pgs. 91:21-92 :3 ). But that he did not analyze the value of the
fractional sales in his analysis because he did not "consider that there was a fractional
market." (R. 2314, pg. 100:3-6).

c. Testimony of Robert Hunt
In 2008 and 2009, Mr. Hunt was asked by American West to perform appraisals of
the values of one-eighth fractional shares in the Units in conjunction with proposed loan
transactions. (R. 2314, pgs. 156-58). Mr. Hunt testified that he is governed by USPAP in
his practice as an appraiser. (R. 2314, pg. I 57 :6-22). Mr. Hunt further testified that the
scope of work assigned by American West for the appraisals in 2008 and 2009 was the
same scope of work as when he performed appraisals for Mr. Kellin in 2011, i.e., valuing _
the units as an eighth share and including any and all approaches that were necessary to
develop credible value conclusions, which in this case turned out to be the sales
comparison approach.

(R. 23 14, pgs. 158:12 -24, 189:24-1 90:7) .

In fact, Mr. Hunt

testified that he did not think that " any of the bank appraisals [he] ever did for
American West of Red Stag Units," were for whole units, because he was always asked to
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appraise the value of the fractional shares. (R. 2314, pg. 161:17-24).
With respect to the appraisal he performed for Kellin in 2011 of Unit 302, Mr.
Hunt used one-fourth fractional units in the Grand Summit Hotel in The Canyons. (R.
2314, pg. 165:11-25). Mr. Hunt determined that these comparable properties were the
best indicator of value. (R. 2314, pg. 166:5-24). Mr. Hunt further determined that the
highest and best use of Units 302 and 402 was as fractional properties. (R. 2314, pg.
170: 17-20). He also testified that at the time of the foreclosure of Units 302 and 402
there "was definitely a market for fractional share units, as indicated by the fact that there
I

were fractional sales that were in existence at the time," albeit the market was a "soft
market." (R. 2314, pgs. 172: 14-173: 18). Mr. Hunt indicated that he factored in that soft
market when detennining the value of a one-eighth share in each Unit as of the date of
foreclosure . (R. 2314, pg. 173:13- 18). Mr. Hunt determined that the value of a oneeighth share in Unit 302 was $150,000.00 and in Unit 402 was $157,000 as of the date of
each respective foreclosure sale, but he did not provide an opinion as to the whole value
of each unit. (R. 2314, pgs. 174:8-175:7, 185:5 -1 4). Mr. Hunt, did testify, however, that
,:typically and historically, you' 11 find that dividing up real estate and selling it off as
smaller pieces typically yields higher revenue," and that with respect to Units 302 and
402, the "one-eighth shares would [result in] higher return on the investment than a single
share - - or a single fee-simple property. " (R. 2314, pgs. 178:14-19, 186:4-16).

Mr. Hunt testified that Mr. Weed ' s methodology in valuing Unit 302, 1.e., by
valuing the unit as a whole and then subtracting the value of a one-eighth share in the
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unit, was no different than Mr. Hunt's "decision to [separately] value each share." (R.
2314, pg. 187:5-9). Mr. Hunt also testified that "how the bank decided to sell [a unit] on
the steps of the courthouse does not necessarily mean that they're selling it at market
value," and that his " assignment was to appraise [the fractional shares] at market value."
(R. 2314, pgs. 193:22-194:4).

Finally, Mr. Hunt testified that although he used

comparable properties from Grand Summit Hotel at The Canyons that were one-quarter
shares, he was not required to make an adjustment because the one-quarter shares at
Grand Summit Hotel were comparable to one-eighth shares at Red Stag Lodge. (R. 2314,
pg. 219:3-21). Despite Mr. Weed's testimony to the contrary, Mr. Hunt testified that at
the time of the foreclosure sales there "was a market for fractional interests." (R. 2314,
pg. 229: 1-4). He also stated that an appraiser should avoid using distressed sales for
comparison purposes when other comparable sales are available. (R. 2314, pgs. 241 :814).
Like Mr. Weed's testimony about the decline in the market, Mr. Hunt also testified
that the Park City Real Estate Market dropped between 20 and 40% from 2007 to
September of2010 and began to rebound. (R. 163:25-164:8).
d. Testimony of Brent Bryson and Sandy Kellin

At trial, Bryson and Kellin testified regarding the history and values of the Units,
because it is "relevant evidence to determine who's most credible when you look at value
of the property at the time of initial purchase and what the bank valued the property for
and - - at the time of sale. '

(R. 2314, 127:9-22). Brent Bryson testified that Unit 402

was purchased for approximately $1.2 million.

(R. 2314, pg. 130:23-131:6).

Sandy

Kellin testified that Unit 402 was purchased for approximately $1.4 million. (R. 2314,
pg. 141: 15-17). Mr. Kellin further testified that he sold the one-eighth share in Unit 302
for around $230,000 in 2008, and that he was aware of the sale of other fractional shares
in the penthouse at Red Stag Lodge.

(R. 23 14, pgs. 142- 150).

The court was also

provided with the opinion testimony of Bryson and Kellin "concerning the value of the
units." (R. 1931).
e. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The trial court entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law on April 6,
2014.

(Attachment C; see also R. 1919-1936).

The Court found that each of the

"condominium units at Red Stag Lodge, including Units 302 and 402, are subject to 1/8
fractional ownership, in accordance vvith condominium restrictions and conditions set
forth as a matter of record." (R. 1924,

il 27).

The Court found that Kellin and Bryson

purchased, and pledged as collateral for the loans, "a fee simple interest in condominium
units that lawfully could be fractionalized in 1/8 shares, with the ability to market and sell
those fractional interests." Id. The Court fo und that because Kellin and Brent Bryson
had not sold any shares in Unit 402 at the time of foreclosure, that the trustee sold and
"the bank, by virtue of its credit bid acquired fee simple ownership of Unit 402 at the
September 16 sale." (R. 1924,

,r 28).

With ,:respect to Unit 302, however, Kellin sold to

a third party a 1/8 interest in the unit after he purchased it and prior to the foreclosure. "
(R. 1925,

~

29). Kellin ' s sale of a 1/8 interest in the unit was approved by American West
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and American West "partially released its trust deed to accommodate the closing of that
transaction." Id.

Therefore, the Court found that "at the time of foreclosure Kellin

owned a 7/8 interest in Unit 302," and at the foreclosure sale, "the trustee sold a 7/8
interest in that unit which the bank purchased by virtue of its credit bid. Id.
The Court reviewed UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1 -32 and its statutory definition of fair
market value. (R. 1924,

~

30). The Court noted that pursuant to Utah case law, fair

market value is defined "as the amount at which property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and
both having a reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." (R. 1925-26,

~

31) (noting

that the "Utah Court of Appeals has held that the fair market value of the property to be
determined under the foregoing section is the market value of the property interests that
are actually foreclosed and the court should not disregard existing encumbrances on the
property"). Id.
Discussing the expe1i testimony from the trial, the court noted that both experts
agreed they were required to comply with USPAP. (R. 1926,

~

34). The Court found and

concluded that the "fair market value of Unit 302 and Unit 402 at the time of the
foreclosure sales should be determined based on the comparable sales approach." (R.
1927, 136) . The Court stated that both experts testified that the "highest and best use of
Units 302 and 402 was as residential condominium units. " (R. 1927,

~

37). Analyzing

the methodo logy used by the experts, the Court noted that, with respect to Unit 402, Mr.
Weed appraised its full fair market value. (R. 1928, ~39). But, with respect to Unit 302,
27

Mr. Weed calculated the full fair market value of the unit and then 'made an arithmetic
adjustment to that amount to account for the fact that what was sold was not a .fe·e simple
interest but instead a 7/ 8 interest in that unit." Id. Mr. Hunt instead, calculated the fair
market value of the 1/8 fractional shares in each unit. (R. 1928, ,I 40).
The Court adopted USP AP Rule 1-4, and held that an appraiser should refrain
from appraising a whole interest in property by appraising parts and then adding those
parts together. (R. 1928, ,I 41). The Court held that "because Mr. Hunt did not offer an
opinion on the fair market value of the property that changed hands in the trustee's sale,
his opinion is of little assistance in making the determination required by UTAH CODE
ANN.§ 57-1-32.' (R. 1929, ,I 42) . The Com1 further concluded that although Mr. Hunt
did not opine that the value of Units 3 02 and 402 could be determined by multiplying the
fair market value of each fractional share by the number of fractions in each unit, that the
Court was also precluded from simply "multiply[ing] by 8 (or by 7) a fair market value of
a 1/8 interest to determine the fair market value of what was conveyed at the trustee's
sales." (R. 1929, ,I 43 - R. 1930, ,I 44) .
The Court then found that the only other evidence that Kellin offered regarding
fair market value were the opinions of Brent Bryson and Kellin regarding the value of the
units. (R. 1931 , 145). The court disregarded this opinion testimony because "they have
an obvious stake in the outcome of this question, ' and accordingly their testimony was
'"not particularly helpful in arriving at fair market value. " Id.
With respect to Mr. Weed ' s testimony as to the value of Unit 402, the Court noted
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that Mr. Weed's opinion of value of $580,000 was "obviously dramatically less than the
unit was w01ih prior to the real estate collapse." (R. 193 1, 1 46). The Court then stated
that Mr. Weed 's "appraisal of Unit 402 was not entirely satisfactory to the court, and left
several questions unanswered." Id. However, the Court stated that because it believed

Mr. Weed's testimony to be the "most reliable information that was presented to the court
at trial," that hjs testimony was the "best indication of the fair market value of Unit 402
as of September 16, 2010." Id. The court found that although the court had concerns
about Mr. Weed's appraisal, these concerns were "ameliorated by the fact that the credit
bid AmericanWest made at the trustee's sale ($625,000] exceeded Mr. Weed's
calculation of the fair market value," and that Kellin was entitled to the benefit of that
greater amount. Id. Accordingly, the Court determined that: (i) the total indebtedness on
the date of the foreclosure sale was $1,044,4 53.33; (ii) that Kellin was entitled to deduct
the credit bid in the amount of $625,000, which left a deficiency of $419,453.30; and (iii)
that Kellin was responsible for one-half of that amount due to American West's settlement
with Brent Bryson. Id.
With respect to Unit 302, the Court stated that the value of a 7/8 interest "was
more problematic and neither party's expert addressed the issue adequately." (R. 1932,

iI 47) . The Court stated that it could not multiply Mr. Hunt's $157,000 value for a oneeighth share by 7 to arrive at fair market value. (R. 1932, ~48). But, the court also
concluded that "Mr. Weed ... makes the exact same analytical error," by calculating the
fai r market value of a fee simple interest in Unit 302 to be $615,000 and then dividing
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that amount by " 8 ($76,875), and then subtract[ing] this amount from $615,000 to arrive
at a fair market value of $538, 125." (R. 1932,

,r

49). In other words, Mr. Weed did

"precisely what he criticized Kellin and Mr. Hunt of doing, and precisely what USP AP
forbids," by assuming "that a 1/8 interest in Unit 302 is worth exactly 1/8 of what he
calculates to be the fair market value of the whole unit." Id. The Court specifically noted
that Mr. Weed "was unable to identify any USPAP principle, or any generally-accepted
principle used in the industry, that would justify making an adjustment in this manner,"
and that the adjustment was made based solely on "common sense." (R. 1933 ,

,r

50).

Accordingly, the Court found that "Mr. Weed's opinion is entirely lacking in the
foundation and it flatly contradicts the very USP AP principles he insists must be
applied," and that "this portion of Mr. \Veed's opinion is simply not credible particularly given his criticism of Mr. Hunt for doing the same thing." Id.
Based on the problems with Mr. Weed's testimony, the Court determined that
while American West had provided credible evidence of the value of a fee simple interest
in Unit 302 ($615,000), American West had not "put forward credible evidence of the fair
market value of a 7/8 interest in Unit 402." · (R. 1933,

~

51). Emphasizing again that

AmericanWest ,:has the burden of proof," the Court stated that :'if the bank wanted an
offset in any amount less than the fair market value of the entire unit, it was obligated to
come forward with admissible evidence of that amount." (R. 1933-34,

,r 52).

According

to the Court, since American West "failed to meet its burden of proof to show how much
less a 7/8 interest is worth, Kellin is entitled to a credit in the only amount the bank did
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offer - the value of a fee simple interest, $615,000." (R. 1934,

1 52).

Thus, the Court

concluded that the total indebtedness on Unit 302 as of the date of foreclosure was
$995,776.79, and that Mr. Weed's appraisal of $615,000 should be deducted from that
amount to arrive at a deficiency of$380,776.79. (R. 1934, 153).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment
were erroneous because even though AmericanWest, Kellin, and the court acknowledged
that AmericanWest had the burden of proof to establish the existence and amount of any
deficiency, Judge Shaughnessy inconsistently ruled in favor of American West while
simultaneously holding that ArnericanWest failed to meet its burden of proof. During
opening arguments, AmericanWest's counsel specifically told the Court that it would
meet its burden of p.r;oof through its expert, Mr. \Need, who would testify that "he
complied with Utah Code and the corresponding provisions of USPAP."

Judge

Shaughnessy's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law -recognized that Mr. Weed's
testimony with respect to Unit 402 was unsatisfactory, left 'several unanswered
questions,' and that his testimony with respect to Unit 302 contained "analytical errors,'
did "precisely what USP AP forbids."

In fact, the trial court found portions of lVlr.

Weed's opinion to not be credible because it "entirely lack[ed] in the foundation," and
"flatly contradicts the very USP AP principles he insists must be applied." And the trial
comt specifically recognized, that at least with respect to Unit 302, American West " failed
to meet its burden of proof to show how much ... a 7/8 interest is worth." A paiiy cannot
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prevail on its claims when it fails to meet its burden of proof and the testimony from its
only witness and expert is found to be not credible.

Mr. Weed's credibility was further damaged by his admission that the scope of
work given him by AmericanWest was to "prepare an appraisal as to the single unit fee
simple interests."

Because it was outside of his scope of work, Mr. Weed never

perf01med any analysis of the value of the fractional shares in the Units, nor their highest
and best use.

In analyzing fair market value, an expert is required to identify and

determine highest and best use. Instead, rvfr. Weed simply performed the analysis that
American West asked him to perform. Since Mr. Weed did not evaluate the value of the
fractions of the Units, but only analyzed the whole value of the Units, Mr. Weed' s
analysis was incomplete, unreliable, and artificially depressed. From the outset of the
loans, American West knew that the highest and best use of the Units was as
fractionalized properties and that selling fractions vvould reap the highest fair market
value. That is the reason all of American West's ·appraisals· and internal documents (preforeclosure) considered the individual value of the fractions and calculated their
aggregate value. The scope of work assigned to rvfr. Weed completely changed the way
AmericanWest and Kellin treated the collateral from the inception of the loans.
Mr. Weed was not asked to consider the highest and best use of the properties as
fractional shares when determining fair market value on the foreclosure dates for one
self-serving reason: doing so would have destroyed American West's deficiency action.
However, when determining fair market value, an expert and the trial court are required
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to "take into consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might in reason
be applied." Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359, 369, 69 S. Ct.
114 (U.S. 1948). Unquestionably, the Units were adapted to being sold as fractional
shares, with one share of Unit 302 already being sold prior to foreclosure. In addition,

Mr. Weed s valuations of the Units at one-third to one-half of their original value was
undermined by his own testimony, and that of Kellin's expert, that the real estate values
in Park City dropped approximately 30% during the relevant time frame.
The couti erred by settling on American West's slightly higher credit bid as the
measuring stick for fair market value with respect to Unit 402.

Pursuant to the

Deficiency Statute, neither a third party's purchase price nor a bank's credit bid is
subtracted from the amount of indebtedness to determine a deficiency. Instead, the trial
court is required to find the fair market value based on competent and reliable evidence.
Since no such testimony was presented, the trial court should have found that
American West failed to prove a deficiency with respect to Unit 402 rather than
incorporating an arbitrary credit bid into the court's calculation of a deficiency.
The court further erred by settling on AmericanWest's full unit value for Unit 302
after finding that Mr. Weed's valuation method for a 7/8 share in Unit 302 lacked in
foundation, contradicted USPAP principles, and was not credible. Rather than using Mr.
Weed 's valuation of a property interest that did not exist (i.e . a whole unit value for Unit
302)~ the trial court should have found that because Mr. Weed did not provide any
competent and credible evidence of the value of a 718th interest in Unit 302,
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American West failed to prove a deficiency with respect to that 718th interest.
Because the trial court erred by determining the existence and amount of a
deficiency with respect to the Units, despite the fact that American West failed to meet its
burden of proof, the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final
Judgment should be reversed and vacated.

ARGUlVIENT

I.

AMERICANWEST HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH THE
EXISTENCE AND THE AMOUNT OF ANY DEFICIENCY WITH
REASONABLE CERTAINTY.
In an action for a deficiency on a note secured by a trust deed, the Creditor has the

burden of proof in establishing value. See Salt Lake Valley Loan & Trust Co. v.
jvfilfspaugh, 54 P. 893, 894 (Utah 1898); R&R Industrial Park, LLC v. The Utah Property
and Casualty Ins. Guaranty Assoc., 2008 UT 80,

,r

49, 199 P.3d 917 (the "plaintiff

usually has the burden of proof regarding damages"); Carlson Distributing Co. v. Salt
Lake Brewing Co. , 2004 UT App. 27,

reasonable certainty").

,r

19, 86 P.3d 120 (damages "must be proven with

In Millspaugh, the court framed the question on appeal of a

deficiency judgment as "whether the burden was upon the (creditor] or [debtors] to show
the value of the lot at the time it was released and sold." Millspaugh , 54 P. 893, 894.
Answering this question, the Court held that "the pa11y having the burden of proof is the
party who, if no proof is offered, will be defeated in the action." Id. Thus, the creditor,
to establish the existence and the amount of any deficiency, has the "burden of proof in
establishing the value of the land." Id.; Eichman v. J & J Building Co. , 582 A.2d 182,
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186 (Conn. 1990) (holding, in an action for a deficiency judgment, that "whenever the
existence of any fact is necessary in order that a party may make out his case ... the
burden is on such party to show the existence of such fact," and stating that "this rule is
derived from the traditional principle that in a civil case ' [t]he general burden of proof
rests upon the plaintiff").
During the trial, both parties and the trial court acknowledged and agreed that
American West had the burden of proof to establish its case. (R. 2314, pgs. 5-8).
American West stated that it would meet its burden of proof through Mr. Weed, vvho
would testify that "he complied with Utah Code and the corresponding provisions of
USP AP, vvhich are the regulations that govern how appraisals are prepared." (R. 2314,
pgs. 5-6). Accordingly, there is no dispute that America West had the burden of proof to
establish the existence and amount of its claimed deficiency with reasonable certainty.

II.

THE COURT ERRED BY AWARDING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
AMERICANWEST DESPITE AMERICAN\-VEST'S FAILURE TO MEET
ITS BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE AND
AMOUNT OF ANY DEFICIENCY.
A party cannot prevail on its claims when it fails to meet its burden of proof. See

Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1984) (holding that the trial court was
"correct in finding that defendant did not establish adverse possession" when the
defendant "failed to carry his burden of proof of showing that he paid taxes on the
disputed property prior in time to plaintiffs for seven consecutive years"); Provo City v.

Jacobsen, 217 P.2d 577, 579 (Utah 1950) (affirming the trial court's decision that "since
the plaintiffs have the burden of proof," and had failed to '~estab lish [its claims] by a
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preponderance of the evidence," the plaintiffs' claims must fail); Klinge v. Southern Pac.
Co., 57 P.2d 367, 382 (Utah 1936) (holding that "the burden of proof remains with the
plaintiff at all times, and if he fails to sustain such burden ... he must fail in his recovery").
When a lower body fails to hold a party to its burden of proof, the decision is
subject to reversal by the appellate court. Bank of Salt Lake v. Corp. of the President of

the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 534 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975)
(reversing judgment entered by trial court in favor of bank because the "Bank bore the
burden of proof," and " it failed in its proof'); Comm. of Consumer Services v. Public

Service Comm 'n of Utah, 2003 UT 29,

1 15, 75 P.3d 481

(reversing the order of the UPS

approving a gas rate increase because the Commission's analysis failed "to hold Questar
Gas to its burden of proof' by failing to "find the necessary substantial evidence in
support of the proposed rate increase in the record"). And the trial court should not
substitute its own judgment to fill in evidentiary gaps when a plaintiff fails to meet its
burden of proof. Grasteit v. Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 290 P. 764, 766 (Utah 1930)
("failure to sustain a burden of proof cannot be remedied by a fin~ing based upon guess,
conjecture, or surmise"); Eichman v. J & J Building Co., 582 A.2d 182, 186 (Conn. 1990)
("implicit in the purpose of the [deficiency] statute is the initial prerequisite that the
plaintiff provide the court with sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she is entitled to a
deficiency judgment").
Moreover, a party vvho does not have the burden of proof is not required to
provide any evidence supporting a ruling in their favor when the party with the burden of
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proof does not meet its burden. See Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 589, f.n. 5 (Utah
1982) (reversing and remanding plaintiffs judgment when plaintiffs "failed to carry their
burden of proof," and holding that it was '"not necessary for the [defendants J to offer
evidence or counter-affidavits in order for the court to rule for the defendants as a matter
of law").

A.

THE COURT ERRED BY GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
AMERICANWEST WITH RESPECT TO UNIT 402 WHEN
AMERICANvVEST FAILED TO lVIEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF
TO ESTABLISH THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF UNIT 402 ON
THE DATE OF FORECLOSURE.

AmericanWest's expert and only witness, Kevin Weed testified that he followed
USP AP principles in appraising the values of Units 302 and 402. (R. 2314, pgs. 5-6, 1415, 46-47). Mr. Weed testified that while the "comparable" units he used in determining
fair market value were subject to fractionalization, there was no market for eighth share
units when Unit 402 was foreclosed because there was no evidence of any sales of oneeighth shares, even though there were several sales of one-quarter fractions. Mr. Weed
further testified that he did not analyze the value of the fractional shares of the Units
because his scope of work, as assigned by American West, was to "prepare an appraisal as
to the single unit fee simple interests," of Units 302 and 402, subject to fractionalization.
Based on this scope of work, Mr. Weed proceeded to conclude that the value of Unit 402
was $580,000.00 on the foreclosure date, September 16, 2010.

Mr. Weed ' s valuation of Unit 402 at less than half its original value in 2009 flies
directly in the face of his own testimony that the drop in the Park City real estate market
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during the relevant time frame was approximately 30%.

Even the trial court

acknowledged that this $580,000 value was "obviously dramatically less than the unit
was worth prior to the real estate collapse," and found that Mr. Weed's "appraisal of Unit
402 was not entirely satisfactory to the court, and left several questions unanswered." (R.
1931 146). Despite these concerns, the Court concluded that since American West had
entered a credit bid of $625,000.00, which "exceeded Mr. Weed 's calculation of the fair
market value," the Court was allowed to treat the higher credit bid as the fair market
value when calculating the deficiency.
The court erred in several respects. First, the court erred by relying upon expert
testimony that the court found was unsatisfactory and left "several unanswered
questions," especially when Mr. Weed's appraised value of $580,000.00 was "obviously
a dramatic decline" from the original purchase price of $1.2 million and significantly
exceeded the 3 0% drop in the real estate market during the relevant timeframe, as both
experts testified.

(R. 2314, pgs . 82, 163-64). 1

A court should reject an expert's

testimony when the court determines that an expert's testimony is not credible and lacks
adequate evidentiary support. See Green v. Schuylkill County Board of Assessment, 730
A.2d 1017, 1022 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1999) (a fact-finder's determination of fair market

Mr. Weed's credibility was further damaged by his inc lusion of four distressed sales
conducted by American West within Red Stage Lodge. (R. 31:19-32:8; R. 242 :10-243:5)
(Mr. Hunt testified that "bank-owned sales don ' t typically set the market,' nor even
necessarily "indicate a trend"); (R. 33:8-34 :13) (the trial cmui recognized that
considering "sales by the party who s seeking to recover the deficiency," is problematic
because ,:banks have a whole host of reasons .. .why they may want to get properties off
their books") .
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value "must be supported by expert testimony found to be credible"); In re Iridium

Operating LLC, 373 B.R. 283, 350 (S.D.N.Y 2007) ("a court should reject an expert's
conclusions when there is 'an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered"') (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997));

Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Board of Property Assessment, 652 A.2d 1306, 1312 (Pa.
1993) (stating that the trial court has the duty to consider "competent and credible
evidence, and to make a detennination as to fair market value based upon the competent
and credible evidence presented"); In re Appeal of the City of Pittsburgh, 541 A.2d 40, 41
(Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1988) (a trial judge is required to "arrive at a valuation based on the

credibility of [the expert] opinions") (emphasis added); Eichman v. J & J Building Co.,
582 A.2d 182, 186 (Conn . 1990) (the trier of fact is only "privileged to adopt whatever
testimony he reasonably believes to be credible"); Reik v. Jansson , 2007 Mass. LCR
Lexis 121, *22 (Oct. 11 , 2007) (giving no weight to "plaintiffs' expert opinions" when
such "opinions [were] not credible") (Attachment G).
Since the expert testimony was not credible, American West failed to meet its
burden of proof with respect to the existence of any deficiency. See Snyder Family Trust

v. Adams Co. Bd. of Equalization, 835 P.2d 579, 581 -82 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (affinning
a valuation order because \Vhen an expert witness ' testimony "was not credible, the
taxpayer failed to meet its burden of proof'); Scheidelman v. Comm 'r, 2013 Tax Ct.
Memo LEXIS 18, 20 (T.C. 2013) ("because we cannot accept petitioners' testimony as
credible, the burden of proof did not shift") (Attachment H). The trial court should have
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rejected American West's claim for a deficiency with respect to Unit 402 stnce
American West failed to meet its burden of proof.

B.

THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
AMERICANWEST WITH RESPECT TO UNIT 402 WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT A CREDIT BID MAY BE USED AS
EVIDENCE OF FAIR MARKET VALUE.

Although the trial court had serious concerns with Mr. ·w eed's appraisal, the trial
court appeared to find comfort in the fact "that the credit bid American West
made .. .exceeded Mr. West ' s calculation of the fair market value."

However, using

AmericanWest's purchase price as the measuring stick for determining a deficiency
constitutes reversible error. Following foreclosure, the Deficiency Statute, "provides the
exclusive procedure for obtaining" recovery of the remaining balance due. Machock v.

Fink, 2006 UT 30,
1985)) .

,r

10, 137 P.3d 779 (citing Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Utah

The Deficiency Statute limits any deficiency to the amount by which the

" indebtedness ... exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale."
UTAH CODE ANN. §57- 1-32. Fair market value is "the amount at which property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a wiUing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts."

Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Jordanelle Dev., LLC, 2010 UT App. 385,

,r 7,

237 P.3d

411; Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481,489 (Utah 1979) (the " accepted
formula for determining fair market value is what would a purchaser willing to buy, but
not required to do so, pay; and what would a seller willing to sell, but not required to do,
ask") .
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By statutory definition, fair market value is not the amount that AmericanWest
was vvilling to pay to purchase its own collateral. After finding Mr. Weed's testimony to
lack credibility, the trial court erred by arbitrarily using American West ' s purchase price
to represent fair market value for purposes of calculating a deficiency. See In re !Blvf
Credit Corp., 731 S.E.2d 444, 450-51 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that it would be error

to " cobble together" and adopt an approach that was not " actually developed by any
witness, expert or otherwise"); In re Appeal of the City of Pittsburgh , 541 A.2d 40, 41
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) ("function of the trial judge ... is not to independently value the
property himself but to weigh the conflicting testimony and values expressed by the
competing experts and arrive at a valuation based on the credibili-ty of their opinions,"
and since the "trial judge is not an expert in valuing property," he is not "free to substitute
his own opinion for that of the experts") (emphasis added) . In sum, a judge is not entitled
to substitute his judgment as to fair market value when the record lacks credible evidence
to support that figure. Eichman v. J & J Building Co., 582 A.2d 182, 186 (Conn. 1990)
(the "trier may not decide an issue which is wholly unsupported by the evidence")
(quoting New Haven Savings Bank v. West Haven Sound Development, 459 A.2d 999
(Conn. 1983)). Fair market value on the date of foreclosure should not be measured by
the amount of a purchaser' s bid, but can only be based upon the price that a willing seller
and buyer would agree to as of the date of sale, with neither being under any compulsion.
The trial court erred by failing to base fair market value on any credible opinion offered
by American West ' s expert.
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C.

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR
AMERICAN WEST '\iVITH RESPECT TO UNITS 302 AND 402
BECAUSE FAIR lYIARKET VALUE WAS NOT BASED ON
HIGHEST AND BEST USE OF THE UNITS.

The Court erred by failing to base the fair market value of Units 302 and 402 on
highest and best use of the Unit. Pursuant to Standard 1.3 of USP AP, in determining fair
market value, an appraiser is required to " [d] eve lop an opinion of the highest and best use
of the real estate." (R. 73 8). "Intrinsically linked to the determination of fair market
value is a determination of the highest and best use." Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United

States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 156 (Cl. Ct. 1990); Olson v. United States 292 U.S . 246, 255, 54
S. Ct. 704 (1934) (a "property owner is entitled to have fair market value based on the
'highest and best use' of the property"); see also City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, 1
22, 28 P.3d 697 (Utah 2001) (value "is based on the highest and best use"). Highest and
best use is "defined as the most probable and legal use of a property, which is physically
possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and results in the highest value."

In re Orion Refining Corp. 424 B.R. 156, 162 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010). This "highest
value" standard aligns with Machock's recognition that the Deficiency Stah1te protects
the debtor, not the creditor. See lvlachock v. Fink, 2004 UT App 376, -J 7.
The Court erred by concluding that American West's expert and Kellin' s expert
agreed on the highest and best use of the Units. (See R. 1927) (stating that "both Mr.
Weed and Mr. Hunt testified that the highest and best use of Units 302 and 402 was as
residential condominium units"). While both American West's expert and Kellin's expert
agreed that the Units were residential in nature, they disagreed on the highest and best use
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of the Units . Mr. Weed testified that the highest and best use of the units was "full fee
interest subject to fractionalization," and was " not fractionalization." (R. 2314, pgs. 5758, 94). Mr. Hunt, on the other hand, testified that the highest and best use of the Units
was as fractionalized shares. (R. 2314, pgs. 196-97). Hovvever, as Mr. Weed's testimony
made clear, he never actually performed an analysis of the highest and best use of the
Units because he valued the Units based on the scope of work given him by
American West, which was " full fee interest subject to fractionalization ." See (R. 2314,
pgs. 14-15, 43-44, 63-64, 99-100). Mr. Weed testified that he based his appraisals on the
scope of work as assigned by his client, Ray Quinney & Nebeker, and his assignment
with respect to the Units was to " appraise the value of that property interest that was
foreclosed." (R. 2314, pgs. 14-15). In fact, Mr. Weed never even calculated or looked at
the value of the fractions in the Units, because his "scope of work was to value at a fee
simple," and because he " didn't consider that there was a fractional market." (See R.
pgs. 99-100). Mr. Weed ' s testimony that he did not perform an analysis of the value of
the Units because there was no "fractional market" to consider, simply belies the
evidence. Mr. Weed acknowledged that there were both sales of shares of one-fourth
shares in the Park City area in the months leading up to the foreclosures and sales of oneeighth shares shortly after the foreclosures. (R. 2314, pgs. 69-70, 91-94, 104-105).
Not only did the trial court eff by concluding that the experts agreed on highest
and best use, but the trial court compounded its error by adopting the testimony of Mr.
Weed, despite Mr. Weed's failure to ever properly analyze highest and best use because
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of the scope of work. As stated above, USP AP requires an expert to "develop an opinion
of highest and best use" when calculating fair market value.

It is only logical that

developing an opinion of highest and best use should not be based on the scope of work
given by the client, but should be based on sound and independent appraisal principles
and analysis. This is especially true when counsel for American West promised the trial
court that American West would "meet its burden of proof today by calling Kevin Weed,"
who would take the stand, and testify "that he complied with Utah Code and the
corresponding provisions of USP AP, which ·are the regulations that govern how
appraisals are prepared ... and will indicate that he went through the various requirements
of USP AP and satisfied the standards by defining the scope of work by complying with
the rules." (R. 2314, pgs. 5-6). The evidence shows that Mr. Weed did not perform any
analysis to develop an opinion as to highest and best use, but merely did what
American West told him to do.

An " expert loses usefulness to the Court and loses

credibility when giving testimony tainted by overzealous · advocacy." Scheide/man v.

Comm 'r, 2013 Tax Ct. Memo Lexis 18, *20 (T.C. Jan. 16, 2013) (Attachment I). As
shown below, the trial court specifically concluded that Mr. Weed was the only expert
who violated USP AP. Thus, it was error for the court to rely upon Mr. Weed 's testimony
to conclude that American West was entitled to a deficiency judgment as to Unit 402.
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D.

THE COURT ERRED BY GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
AMERICAt'l'WEST WITH RESPECT TO A 718TH INTEREST IN
UNIT 302 WHEN AMERICANWEST FAILED TO MEET ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH THE FAIR MARKET
VALUE OF SUCH INTEREST.

All of the above analysis is equally applicable and hereby specifically incorporated
with respect to Unit 302. The only difference is that according to the trial court, Mr.
Weed 's testimony with respect to Unit 302 was "even more problematic and neither
party's expert addressed the issue adequately." (R. 1932) (emphasis added). The trial
court concluded that Mr. Weed made an "analytical error," by arriving at a "fair market
value of a fee simple interest in Unit 302, as of January 11 , 2011, in the amount of
$615,000, and then accounting "for the fact that only a 7/8 interest was conveyed," by
dividing $615,000 by 8 ($76,875), and then subtracting "this amount from $615,000 to
arrive at a fair market value of $538,125." (R. 1932). In other words, Mr. Weed never
did any market analysis with respect to the actual value of a 1/8 share, nor the actual
value of a 7/ 8 share in Unit 302, and in so doing, "Mr. Weed [did] precisely what he
criticized Kellin and Mr. Hunt of doing, and precisely what USP AP forbids." Id.
Not only was this valuation method even more problematic than Mr. 'Need 's
analysis of Unit 402, but the court found this valuation method to not be credible:

Mr. Weed was unable to identify any USPAP principle, or any
generally-accepted principle used in the industry, that would justify making
an adjustment in this manner. He simply made this adjustment based on
'common sense.' Of course, Kellin's request that the court multiply rather
than divide is also perfectly reasonable if one applies a 'common sense'
test. Thus, while both approaches are sound as a matter of math, neither
has any value beyond this. The portion of Mr. Weed's opinion is entirely
lacking in the foundation and it flatly contradicts the very USP AP
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principles he insists must be applied. Finally and perhaps, most important,
this portion of Mr. Weed' s opinion is simply not credible - particularly
given his criticism of Mr. Hunt for doing the same thLng.
(R. I 933) (emphasis added). In fact, the trial court specifically stated that American West
';failed to meet its burden of proof to show much less [than the whole unit] a 7/8 interest
is worth." (R. 1934,

~

52). But, American West's burden was not simply to show how

much less than a whole unit the 7/8 interest was worth, its burden was to show how much
the 7/8 interest was worth, considering its highest and best use. As acknowledged by the
trial court, Mr. Weed failed to do so in any credible way. After concluding that Mr.
\iVeed's testimony was not credible because of his valuation method, the court committed
reversible error by using American West's value of a fee simple interest in Unit 302 as the
measuring stick for determining a deficiency.
As explained in detail above with respect to Unit 402, the trial court should not
have inserted its own judgment when American West failed to meet its burden of proof
with respect to establishing the existence and amount of a deficiency.

Since

American West did not present any credible evidence of the fair market value of the seven
shares in Unit 302 that were foreclosed on January 11 2011 the Court should have
rejected Mr. Weed ' s testimony, determined that American West did not meet its burden of
proof, and refused to enter a deficiency judgment.
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III.

THE COURT ERRED BY ADOPTING AMERICANWEST'S PROPOSED
CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT AN APPRAISER WAS REQUIRED TO
APPRAISE THE FULL FEE INTEREST OF THE UNITS SINCE
Al\'IERICANWEST FORECLOSED ON THE FULL FEE INTEREST OF
UNIT 402 Al~ A SEVEN-EIGHTHS INTEREST IN UNIT 302.
The scope of work as assigned by Ray Quinney & Nebeker, and the appraisal

method used by Mr. Weed, completely changed the way AmericanWest and Kellin
treated the collateral from the outset and ignored the highest and best use of the property
as acknowledged by American West throughout the loan. (R. 73 9). The reason appears
obvious: by valuing the units as whole units, rather than considering the fractional values
of each share in the Units, AmericanWest deflated the actual fair market value and
created a false appearance of a deficiency where none actually existed .

Id. When the

fractionalized value of the shares is properly applied, no deficiency remains. Id.
American West asserted to the trial court that the appraiser was required to
"appraise the subject property in the manner that it was foreclosed ." (R. 2314, pg. 6);

(see also R. 1743-44) (citing Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Jordanelle Dev., LLC, 2010
UT App. 385, , 7, 247 P.3d 411, for the proposition that " fair market value must be based
solely on the property interest that was actually sold."). In the trial court's conclusions of
law, the trial court appeared to adopt American West's reasoning.

(R. 1926,

~

32)

(finding that " the Utah Court of Appeals has h~ld that the fair market value of the
property ... is the market value of the property interests that are actually foreclosed and the
court should not disregard . existing encumbrances

on

the property").

Kellin

acknowledges that Capital Assets wou ld preclude an appraiser and the trial court from
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disregarding the effect of existing encumbrances on the value of a foreclosed property.
But in this case, the effect of existing encumbrances on value was not at issue. Instead,
the issue was highest and best use of the property.
When determining fair market value, the expert and the trial court should ''tak[ e]
into consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might in reason be
applied." Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hy dro, 335 U.S. 359, 369, 69 S. Ct. 114
(U.S. 1948); Green v. Schuylkill County Board of Assessment, 772 A.2d 419, 425 , f.n. 6
(Pa. Commonw. Ct. 2001) (quoting Buhl Found. v. Board of Property Assessment of

Allegheny Co., 180 A.2d 900, 902 (Pa. 1962)); In re Orion Refining Corp., 424 B.R. 156,
162 (Banlcr. D. Del. 2010) (highest and best use for purposes of determining fair market
value considers the " most probable and legal use of a property, which is physically
possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and results in the highest value").
Here not only was the property adapted to use as fractional shares, but it had already been
applied that way, as evidenced by the prior sale of a one-eighth share in Unit 302. From
the outset both parties were aware that the Units were fractionalized properties, the loans
from American West were designed for American \Vest to receive a portion of the sale
proceeds of each one-eighth fractional share and for a proportionate amount of the loans
to be satisfied, the CCR' s detailed the fractional ownership, and the primary source for
repayment of the loans, was from the sale of fractional shares.

(R. 736).

Kellin's

Opposition to American \Vest's Summary Judgment Motion outlined the evidence
showing that both parties were aware .that the Units were adapted to the sale of fractional
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shares, and specifically designed to be sold that way. (R. 707-1507).
Ne_ither the Court nor Mr. Weed was limited to assessing only the full fee simple
interest of the Units when calculating fair market value. 2 While Mr. Hunt may have been
limited by USPAP to refrain from simply adding up the value of the fractions in
determining fair market value, the trial court acknowledged that Mr. Hunt did not do so.
(R. 1929-33). Mr. Hunt testified that on the date of the respective foreclosure sales, the

one-eighth shares in Unit 302 were worth $150,000 and the one-eighth shares in Unit 402
were worth $157,000. (R. 2314, pg. 190).

When a1Tiving at these values, Mr. Hunt

accounted for the soft fractional share market. (R. 2314, pg. 173). Since the shares were
"fungible," and were worth the same " regardless of what eighth share you sold," the
Court was not precluded from relying upon Mr. Hunt's testimony with respect to fair
market value of the shares in the Units and adding up those values to determine fair
market value or as further evidence of the lack of credibility of Mr. Weed's severely
depressed appraisal figures. Id.

2

Judge Keith Kelly of the Third District Court recognized in a similar deficiency action
brought by American West against the owner of another Unit in Red Stag Lodge that the
value of the fractional shares could be appropriately valued and considered in
determining fair market value. (R. 1257-1283). In that case, the court noted that
American West urged the Court to "not consider the fact that there are fractional interests
in the prope1iy" and "wishes to have the Court apply a bulk sale that does not reflect that
the property had the capability of being sold in one-eighth fractional interest in the
property. But despite that position by the bank, the bank's own appraiser in each of the
appraisals values the individual fractional shares and even does a - an income-based
analysis based upon the fractional values of those fractional shares." (R. 1264-65, 1274).
Ultimately, the court considered the fractionalized nature of the properties, together with
their ability to gamer rental income, and determined that the properties had a fair market
value on October 27, 2009, "between 1.2 million and $1.3 million." (R. 1280).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Kellin requests that this Court render the following
conclusions:
1.

Judge Shaughnessy' s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that

detennined the amount of a deficiency despite finding that American West's expert
witness testimony was not credible and did not meet American \Vest's burden of proof,
constitutes reversible error and is REVERSED; and
2.

Judge Shaughnessy's Final Judgment dated June 20, 2014, in favor of

American West constitutes reversible error, and is REVERSED and VACATED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of November, 2014.

WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C.

~IJ1'/JJ
S. BROOK MILLARD
GREGORY D. MARCHANT
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant

so

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of UTAH R. APP. P. 24,
containing 13,981 words and 1,089 lines.
DATED this 20 th day ofNovember, 2014.

S. Brook Millard
Gregory D. Marchant
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I hereby certify that on the 20th day of November, 2014, I served a copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S.
Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C.
c/o Steven \V. Call
Jonathan A. Dibble
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
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ATTACHMENT A ·

The Order of Court is
Dated: June 20, 2014
12:08:18 PM

Jonathan A. Dibble (0881)
Steven W. Call (5260)
AJ Green (14661)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt L ake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Facsimile: (8 01) 532-7543
Email: jdibb1e@.rqn.com
Email: scall@rqn.com
Email: ajgree11@rqn.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff American West Bank

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMl\lilT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICANWEST BANK, formerly known
as Far West Bank,

[propesed]

FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

AGAINST BANDY G. KELLIN

BRENT BRYSON, an individual and
SANDY G. KELLIN, an individual,
Defendant.

Civil No. 100501018

Hon. Todd M . Shaughnessy

June 20, 2014 12:08 PM

1 of 3

On February 11, 2014, a trial was held before the Court on the deficiency claims alleged
against Defendant Sandy G. Kellin ("Defendant Kellin") by American West Banlc which previously
did business in Utah as Far West Bank ("American West"). American West was represented by
Jonathan A. Dibble and Steven W. Call of Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. Defendant Kellin was
represented by Brook Millard of Wrona, Gordon & Dubois, PC.
The Court having considered its prior ruling of partial summary judgment and declaratory
relief in favor of AmericanWest, the evidence presented at trial on February 11, 2014, the Findings
and Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the Court on April 7, 2014, the Court's Order entered
on May 27, 2014, the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees filed by Plaintiffs counsel, and the Verified
Memorandum of Costs and Legal Expenses filed by American West Bank, and for cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
l. Pursuant to AmericanWest's Second Claim for Relief, a money judgment is made in favor of
American West against Defendant Kellin in the amount of $369,875.49 as of April 15, 2014,
plus per diem interest in the amount of $121.42 thereafter through the entry of this
Judgment;
2. Pursuant to American West's Third Claim for Relief, a money judgment is made in favor of
American West against Defendant Kellin in the amount of $640,311.71, as of April 15 2014
plus per diem interest in the amount of $218.28 thereafter through the entry of this
Judgment;
3. Pursuant to American West's Second and Third Claims for Relief, judgment is made in favor
of American West against Defendant Kellin in the amount of $168,597.49 for reasonable
attorneys' fees based upon Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 and the loan documents made between
the parties in compliance with Utah Code Ann.§ 15-l-4(2)(a) (no objection having been

June 20, 2014 12:08 PM
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lodged thereto) ;
4. Pursuant American West's Second and Third Claims for Relief Md Rule 54(b) oHhe Utfth
Rules of Civil Prneedure judgment is made in favor of AmericanWest against Defendant
Kellin in the amount of $24,497.57 in legal expenses and costs (no objection having been
lodged thereto);
·5. This judgment shall accrue post-judgment interest at the default rate of twenty-one percent
(21 %) per annum until paid based on the loan documents made between the parties in
compliance with Utah Code Ann § 15-l-4(2)(a);

6. This judgment shftl+- may be augmented by reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by
American West in enforcing this Judgment pursuant to the terms of the loan documents made
between the parties with the amount and reasonableness of those fees to be determined in
compliance with Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as allowed by order of the
court, with notice to defendant at defendant's last known address;

7. This Judgment is ecrtified final as to all claims and all parties pursuant to within the meaning
of Rule 54(a) Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court ho...-i:ti.g detct'fl'lit1ed
that there is no reason why the enfureemcnt of this Judgment should be delayed bceause the
claims against Defendant Bryson ·,vere settled and disrni3sed and there are no remaining
claims to be oojudieated against Defendant Kcllifl; and

8. This Judgment is final

fl8

to the matlefs ruled upon and shall be entered by the elerk of court

without unrca.sonable delay. No further or additional paper is necessary.

-----------------------------------END OF DO ClJlVfENT----------------------------
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June 20, 2014 12:08 PM

3 of 3
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SUM:111·1
w

JUL 18 2014
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WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C.
S. Brook Millard (#7415)
Gregory D. Marchant (#11372)
11650 South State Street, #103
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone: (80 1) 676-5252
Facsimile: (801) 676-5262
Attorneys for Sandy G. Kellin

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICANWEST BANK, formerly
known as FAR WEST BANK,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
Case No. 100501018
Judge Todd M. Schaughnessy

V.

BRENT BRYSON and SANDY G.
KELLIN,

Defendants.

Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, that Defendant Sandy G. Kellin, through counsel, S. Brook Millard and Gregory D.
Marchant of Wrona Gordon & DuBois, P.C., appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, the final order
and judgment of Honorable Todd M. Schaughnessy entered in this matter on June 20, 2014.
The appeal is taken from the District Court's entire order and judgment.
DATED this 18 th dayoffoly, 2014.

WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C.

Isl S. Brook Millard
S. Brook Millard
Gregory D. Marchant
Attorney for Defendant Sandy G. Kellin

00229G

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that on this 18 th day of July, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be delivered via Utah State Bar electronic filing system and/or via United
States first class mail or email to the following:
Jonathan A. Dibble
Steven W. Call
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385

/s/ Gwen Mortensen
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FILED D
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By

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICANWEST BANK, formerly
known as FAR WEST BANK,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
Case No. 100501018

vs.
BRENT BRYSON and SANDY KELLIN,

Judge Todd Shaughnessy

Defendants.

On February 22, 2014, trial was held on all remaining issues in this matter. Plaintiff
AmericanWest Bank ("AmericanWest")

was present and represented by Jonathan A.

Dibble and Steven W. Call of Ray Quinney and Nebeker. Defendant Sandy G. Kellin
("Kellin") was present and represented by Brook Millard of the Wrona Law Firm. The
parties were directed to file by February 28, 2014, written summations along with proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a proposed form of judgment.
The court previously granted partial summary judgment in favor of AmericanWest
on all issues in this deficiency action, other than the fair market value of the property in
question at the time of the trustee's sales, and the trial was limited to that issue. The court,
having now heard all the evidence, arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing,
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hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this deficiency brought

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32, Utah Const. art. VIII, § 5 and Utah Code Ann. §
78A-5-102.
2.

Venue is proper in the Third District Court in and for Summit County, State of

Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 788-3-301 and § 788-3-304 because the two
condominium units which were foreclosed , Unit 302 and Unit 402 at the Red Stag Lodge
("Unit 302" and "Unit 402") are situated in Summit County, Utah.
3.

The Court has personal jurisdiction of the parties pursuant to their

appearances in the case and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 788-3-205(1) and (4).
The Unit 402 Loan Transaction
4.

On November 19, 2007, Defendants Kellin and Bryson, on the one hand, and

AmericanWest, on the other hand, entered into a Business Loan Agreement (the "Unit 402
Agreement") to finance the purchase of Unit 402.
5.

Bryson and Kell in made, executed and delivered to AmericanWest a

Promissory Note dated November 19, 2007, in the amount of $958 ,000.00 (the "Unit 402
Note").
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The Unit 402 Note was secured by a Deed of Trust (the "Unit 402 Trust

Deed") conveyed by Bryson and Kellin , as trustors, in favor of AmericanWest, as
beneficiary, encumbering Unit 402.
7.

The Unit 402 Trust Deed was recorded with the Summit County Recorder on

November 30, 2007, as Entry No. 831694.
8.

Between December 2008 and May 2009, Kell in and Bryson, on the one

hand, and AmericanWest, on the other hand, entered into various Change in Terms
Agreements and related agreements pursuant to which AmericanWest agreed, among
other things , to extend the maturity date of the Unit 402 Loan , ultimately until May 15,
2012.
9.

Defendants Kellin and Bryson defaulted under the terms and conditions of

the Unit 402 Agreement, Unit 402 Note and Unit 402 Trust Deed, as amended, by failing to
timely make payments under the Unit 402 Note.
10.

Thereafter, American West foreclosed its interest in Unit 402 in accordance with

the tenns and conditions In the Unit 402 Trust Deed and pursuant to Utah law. The
Successor Trustee under the Unit 402 Trust Deed conducted a Trustee's Sale of Unit 402 at
approximately 2: 15 p.m. on Thursday, September 16, 2010.
11.

Kellin and Bryson were provided notice of the trustee's sale and had an

opportunity to bid. They did not do so. Neither Kellin nor Bryson lodged any objection to the
manner in which the sale was conducted.

ni
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12.

At the foregoing foreclosure sale AmericanWest purchased Unit 402 as the

highest bidder with a credit bid of $625,000.00.

A Trustee's Deed relating to Unit 402 was

executed by the Successor Trustee on September 17, 2010, and recorded on September 20,
2010, in the official records of Summit County, State of Utah.
13.

As of the date of the Trustee's Sale of Unit 402, the amount due and owing to

AmericanWest under the Unit 402 Loan was $1,044,453.33, including all accrued and unpaid
interest, late fees, costs and expenses of sale, trustee's fees and attorneys' fees . .
The Unit 302 Loan Transaction
14.

On May 15, 2009, Defendant Kellin and AmericanWest entered into a

Business Loan Agreement (the "Unit 302 Agreement") to finance the purchase of Unit 302.
15.

In connection with the Unit 302 Agreement, Kellin made, executed and

delivered to AmericanWest a Promissory Note dated October 16, 2007, in the amount of
$1,120,000.00 (the "Unit 302 Note").
16.

The Unit 302 Note was secured by a Deed of Trust (the "Unit 302 Trust

Deed") conveyed by Kellin, as trustor, in favor of AmericanWest, as beneficiary,
encumbering Unit 302.
17.

The Unit 302 Trust Deed was recorded with the Summit County Recorder on

October 26, 2007 as Entry No. 00829147.
18.

Kellin defaulted under the terms and conditions of the Unit 302 Agreement,

Unit 302 Note and Unit 302 Trust Deed by failing to timely make payments under the Note.

On] 07 0
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Thereafter, American West foreclosed ·its interest in Unit 302 in accordance with

the terms and conditions in the Unit 302 Trust Deed and pursuant to Utah law.
20.

The Successor Trustee under the Unit 302 Trust Deed conducted a Trustee's

Sale of Unit 302 at approximately 2:00 p.m. on January 11 , 2011 .
21.

Kellin was provided notice of the trustee's sale and had an opportunity to bid.

He did not do so. Kellin did not lodge any objection to the manner in which the sale was
conducted.
22.

At the foregoing foreclosure sale AmericanWest purchased Unit 302 as the

highest bidder with a cred it bid of $455,000.00.
23.

The Trustee's Deed relating to Unit 302, which was executed by the Successor

Trustee on January 11, 2011, was recorded on January 12, 2011 , in the official records of
Summit County,· State of Utah.
24.

As of the date of the Trustee's Sale of Unit 302, the amount due and owing to

AmericanWest under the Loan was $995,776.79, including all accrued and unpaid interest,
late fees, costs and expenses of sale, trustee's fees and attorneys' fees.
The Deficiency Action
25.

After Unit 402 was foreclosed, AmericanWest timely filed a deficiency

complaint in this action on December 2, 2010.

On March 22 , 2011, American West timely

filed an amended compla int which also sought a deficiency on the Unit 302 Note.

AMERICANWEST BANK vs BRYSON
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Americawest and Defendant Bryson have fully settled and compromised the

claims between them through a written settlement agreement.

Under paragraph 8 of the

settlement agreement, AmericanWest has agreed to reduce the principal amount of the
deficiency by 50% but without any reduction for attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by
AmericanWest relating to the 402 Note and Trust Deed.
27.

Each of the condominium units at Red Stag Lodge, Including Units 302 and

402, are subject to 1/8 fractional ownership, in accordance with condominium restrictions and
conditions set forth as a matter of public record. What Kellin and Bryson purchased, and what
they pledged as collateral for the loans, was a fee simple interest in condominium units that
lawfully could be fractionalized in

1/8 shares, with the ability to market and sell those

fractional interests. The ability to fractionalize the units was an attribute of the units at Red
Stag, and the rights and obligations associated with ownership of a fractional share were
matters of public record at all relevant times.
28.

At the time of the September 16, 2010, foreclosure sale, Kellin and Bryson

owned a fee simple interest in Unit 402 - a fee simple interest that, as noted, was subject to
being fractionalized into 1/8 shares. Kellin and Bryson had not, at the time of the foreclosure
of the trust deed and subsequent sale, sold any fractional interests in that unit. Thus, the
trustee put up for bid a fee simple interest in Unit 402 (subject to that unit being fractionalized
by the owner) and the bank, by virtue of its credit bid, acquired fee simple ownership of Unit
402 at the September 16 sale.

n -·l t1~
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29.

With respect to Unit 302, however, Kellin sold to a third party a 1/8 interest in

the unit after he purchased it and prior to the foreclosure. He did so with the bank's written
consent, and the bank partially released its trust deed to accommodate the closing of that
transaction. Thus, at the time of the foreclosure Kellin owned a 7/8 interest in Unit 302. At the
January 11, 2011, trustee's sale, the trustee sold a 7/8 interest in that unit which the bank
purchased by virtue of its credit bid.

30.

At issue in this case is the fair market value the property interests that were

sold at the two trustee's sales; or, more particularly, "the fair market value of the property at
the date of sale" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. That section states:

At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as
provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced
to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security, and in that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed, the.· amount for which the property
was sold, and the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. Before
rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value of the property at the
date of sale. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which
the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including
trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the
date of the sale. In any action brought under this section, the prevailing party shall
be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred.
31.

Utah law defines fair market value as "the amount at which property would

change hands between a willing buyer and

a willing seller, neither being under any

compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts."
Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Jordanel/e Dev., LLC, 247 P.3d 411, 413 (Utah Ct. App.

r·n ·i ·-,.....,r
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2010); accord, Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481 , 489 (Utah 1979) ("The
accepted formula for detem,ining fair market value is what would a purchaser willing to
buy, but not required to do so, pay; and what would a seller willing to sell, but not required
to do, ask.").
32.

The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the fair market value of the property

to be determined under the foregoing section is the market value of the property interests
that are actually foreclosed and the court should not disregard existing encumbrances on
the property. See Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Jordanelle Dev., LLC, 247 P.3d 411, 413
(Utah Ct. App. 2010).
33.

AmericanWest presented expert testimony concerning the fair market value of

the units from Kevin Weed, a state certified real estate appraiser with significant background
in valuing property in Summit County. Kellin presented expert testimony from Robert Hunt,
also a state certified real estate appraiser with significant background and experience in
valuing property in Summit County. The court also received in evidence the appraisal reports
from both experts. Kellin also presented testimony regarding value from Kellin himself and
from Bryson.
34.

Both experts agreed that they were required to comply with the Unifom,

Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"), promulgated by the Appraisal
Foundation. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2g-403 states:

·n1 , _:., . u,.
0'L,_~

AMERICANWEST BANK vs BRYSON
100501018

Page 9 of 17

( 1)( a) A person licensed, certified, or registered under this
chapter shall comply with:
(i) generally accepted standards of professional
appraisal practice; and
(ii) generally accepted ethical rules to be observed by
a real estate appraiser.
(b) Subject to the other provisions of this Subsection (1 ),
generally accepted standards of professional appraisal
practice are evidenced by the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice promulgated by the
Appraisal Foundation.
35.

Both Mr. Weed and Mr. Hunt purported to apply USPAP standards to the

appraisals performed by them and both testified they were bound by such standards in
rendering expert testimony on the value of real property interests.
36.

In performing their appraisals Mr. Weed and Mr. Hunt both testified that

neither the cost approach nor the income approach is appropriate to determine the fair
market value of Unit 302 and Unit 402 or any interests therein. Rather, both testified that
the proper methodology to determine fair market value of the units or any interest therein
should be based upon the "comparable sales approach." The court finds and concludes
that the fair market value of Unit 302 and Unit 402 at the time of the foreclosure sales
should be determined based on the comparable sales approach.
37.

Both Mr. Weed and Mr. Hunt testified that the highest and best use of Units

302 and 402 was as residential condominium units, and the court finds that this is the
highest and best use of the property at issue.
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Mr. Weed and Mr. Hunt both used the comparable sales approach in their

appraisals. The difference in the appraisals in this case arises from the fact that Mr. Weed
and Mr. Hunt appraised the value of two different things.
39.

Mr. Weed appraised the fair market value of a fee simple interest in Unit 402 as

of September 16, 201 0; Mr. Weed also appraised the fair market value of a fee simple
interest in Unit 302 as of January 1, 2011, and then made an arithmetic adjustment to that
amount in order to account for the fact that what was sold was not a fee simple interest but
instead a 7/8 interest in that unit.
40.

Mr. Hunt, in contrast, calculated the fair market value of a 1/8 interest in Unit

402 as of September 16, 2010; he also calculated the fair market value of a 1/8 interest in
Unit 302 as of January 1, 2011.
41.

USPAP Standards Rule 1-4, which addresses how real property is to be

appraised provides, in part, that an appraiser should refrain from appraising a whole
interest in property by appraising parts and then adding those parts together:
In developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must collect, verify,
and analyze all information necessary for credible assignment results.

( e) When analyzing the assemblage of the various estates or component
parts of a property, an appraiser must analyze the effect on value, if any,
of the assemblage. An appraiser must refrain from valuing the whole
solely by adding together the individual values of the various estates or
component parts.
Comment: Although the value of the whole may be equal to the sum of
the separate estates or parts, it also may be greater than or less than the
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sum of such estates or parts. Therefore, the value of the whole must be
tested by reference to appropriate data and supported by an appropriate
analysis of such data.
UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE, U-20 (2014-2015 ed.)

42.

Because Mr. Hunt did not offer an opinion on the fair market value of the

property that changed hands in the trustee's sale, his opinion is of little assistance in
making the determination required by Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. Mr. Hunt calculated what
he opined was the fair market value of a 1/8 interest in each of the units as of the dates of
the two trustee's sales. Presumably because he is bound by USPAP 1-4(e), Mr. Hunt did
not go the next step and offer an opinion that the value of Unit 402 as of September 16,
2010, could be determined by multiplying by 8 what he determined to be the fair market
value of a 1/8 interest as of September 16 ($150,000). Mr. Hunt likewise did not opine that
the fair market value of Unit 302 could be ~etermined -by multiplying by 7 what he
determined to be the fair market value of a 1/8 interest as o'f January 11, 2011 ($157,000).
Kellin's counsel, however, argues the court should make the fair market value calculation
by doing just that. However, Kellin offers no authority to support the proposition that this
court can take a fair market value calculation of some estate less than the whole,
purportedly determined in accordance with USPAP, and then arrive at a fair market value
determination by an arithmetic adjustment that USPAP expressly disallows.
43.

For the very reasons set forth in USPAP Standard 1-4(e), the fair market value

of these condominium units as of a given date cannot be determined simply by aggregating

AMERICANWEST BANK vs BRYSON
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the value of the estates or component parts. "[TJhe value of the whole may be equal to the
sum of the separate estates or parts, it also may be greater than or less than the sum of
such estates or parts. Therefore, the value of the whole must be tested by reference to
appropriate data and supported by an appropriate analysis of such data."
44.

That is not to say the value of a 1/8 interest could never be relevant to the

value of the entire estate. On the contrary, the court can envision a valuation arrived at by
determining the value of a 1/8 interest, the amount of time a reasonably prudent investor
would have to hold the property to sell such interests, the carrying and sales costs such an
investor would incur, a reasonable profit, etc, all discounted to a net present value as of the
date of the foreclosure. That would perhaps be an entirely legitimate way an expert could go
about detennining the fair market value of the units. However, Mr. Hunt did not undertake
that analysis ( and it is not clear he has the qualifications necessary to do so) and Kellin did
not offer testimony from any other expert who could offer such an opinion. 1 The court cannot,
consistent with USPAP and basic principles of economics, simply multiply by 8 (or by 7) a fair
market value of a 1/8 interest to determine the fair market value of what was conveyed at the
trustee's sales.

1
Kellin makes much of the fact that the bank, in deciding to make the loans, relied not on appraisals
of fee interests in the condominiums but rather did appraisals of the values of 1/8 interests. However, what
the bank may have done years earlier in the course of determining whether the make a loan on these units and whether the bank's due diligence that in regard was adequate - has little bearing on the fair market
value at the time of the trustee's sale because, as everyone acknowledged, the real estate market imploded
in ways virtually no one could have anticipated. Additionally, the bank could very well have done an
investment/ cash flow analysis explained above in deciding to make the loan. However, no expert offered
such an analysis at trial and the court certainly cannot come up with one on its own.
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The only other evidence Kellin offered was his personal opinion, and the

opinion of co-defendant Bryson , concerning the value of the units. Messrs. Kellin and Bryson
have an obvious stake in the outcome of this question and their opinions have to be viewed
in that light. Accordingly, they are not particularly helpful in arriving at fair market value.
46.

The court is therefore left with the opinions of AmericanWest's expert, Mr.

Weed. Mr. Weed opined that the fair market value of Unit 402 as of September 16, 2010,
was $580,000. This obviously is dramatically less than the unit was worth prior to the real
estate collapse and Mr. Weed offered his explanations for the decline in value. Although Mr.
Weed's appraisal of Unit 402 was not entirely satisfactory to the court, and left several
questions unanswered, the court finds it to be the best indication of the fair market value of
Unit 402 as of September 16, 2010, and the most reliable infonnation that was presented to
the court at trial. Some of the court's concerns about Mr. Weed's appraisal are ameliorated
by the fact that the credit bid AmericanWest made at the trusfee's sale exceeded Mr. Weed's
calculatlon of the fair market value, and Kellin is entitled to the benefit of the greater amount.
Therefore, the court finds, with respect to Unit 402, that the total indebtedness as of
September 16, 2010, was $1,044,453.33; Kellin is entitled to a credit of $625,000, leaving a
deficiency of $419,453.30. As the court understands the settlement between AmericanWest
and Bryson, that amount must be reduced by 50% to arrive at the deficiency owed by Kellin,
which would be $209,726.65. AmericanWest also is entitled to interest, costs, and attorneys'
fees relative to this amount.
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The fair market value of a 7/8 interest in Unit 302 as of January 11, 2011, is

more problematic and neither party's expert addressed the issue adequately.
48.

As discussed above, Mr. Hunt opines that a 1/8 interest was worth $157,000

on January 11, 2011, and Kellin's counsel invites the court to multiply this amount by 7 to
arrive at the fair market value. For the same reasons described above, the court cannot do
so. Once again, as stated in USPAP, "the value of the whole may be equal to the sum of
the separate estates or parts, it also may be greater than or less than the sum of such
estates or parts. Therefore, the value of the whole must be tested by reference to
appropriate data and supported by an appropriate analysis of such data."
49.

Mr. Weed, for his part, makes the exact same analytical error. Mr. Weed

opines that the fair market value of a fee simple interest in Unit 302, as of January 11, 2011,
was $615,000. Then, he accounts for the fact that only a 7/8 interest ·was conveyed as
follows: He divides $615,000 by 8 ($76,875), and then subtracts this amount from $615,000
to arrive at a fair market value of $538,125. In other.words, Mr. Weed assumes that a 1/8
interest in Unit 302 is worth exactly 1/8 of what he calculates to be the fair market value of the
whole unit. In so doing, Mr. Weed has done precisely what he criticized Kellin and Mr. Hunt of
doing, and precisely what USPAP forbids. Once again, as stated in USPAP, '~he value of
the whole may be equal to the sum of the separate estates or parts, it also may be greater
than or less than the sum of such estates or parts. Therefore, the value of the whole must
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be tested by reference to appropriate data and supported by an appropriate analysis of
such data."

50.

Mr. Weed was unable to identify any USPAP principle, or any generally-

accepted principle used in the industry, that would justify making an adjustment in this
manner. He simply made this adjustment based on "common sense." Of course, Kellin's
request that the court multiply rather than divide is also perfectly reasonable if one applies a
"common sense" test. Thus, while both approaches are sound as a matter of math, neither
has any value beyond this. This portion of Mr. Weed's opinion is entirely lacking in the
foundation and it flatly contradicts the very USPAP principles he insists must be applied.
Finally, and perhaps most important, this portion of Mr. Weed's opinion is simply not credible
- particularly given his criticism of Mr. Hunt for doing the same thing.

51.

For all of the reasons discussed in connection with Unit 402, the court finds that

Kellin has not put forward a credible alternative valuation ofa 7/8 interest in Unit 302 as ·of
January 11, 2011. AmericanWest, on the other hand, has presented credible evidence of the
value of a fee simple interest (subject to fractionalization) in Unit 302, as of January 11, 2011 .
That value is $615,000. But the property to be valued is not a fee simple interest (subject to
fractionalization). It is a 7/8 interest in Unit 402 . AmericanWest has not put forward credible
evidence of the fair market value of a 7/8 interest in Unit 402.
52.

AmericanWest has the burden of proof. If the bank wanted an offset in any

amount l'ess than the fair market value of the entire unit, it was obligated to come forward
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with admissible evidence of that amount. AmericanWest failed to do so. Because
AmericanWest fa iled to meet its burden of proof to show how much less a 7/8 interest is
worth, Kellin is entitled to a credit in the only amount the bank did offer - the value of a fee
simple interest, $615,000. 2

53.

The total indebtedness on the Unit 302 Loan as of January 11 , 2011 , was

$995,776.79. That amount, less the credit of $615,000, leaves a deficiency of $380,776.79.
AmericanWest also is entitled to interest, costs, and attorneys' fees relative to this amount.
54.

The Court finds that AmericanWest should be awarded reasonable attorneys'

fees against Kellin pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 and the loan documents, and
AmericanWest shou ld file an affidavit for attorneys' fees in compliance with Rule 73 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and serve the same upon Kellin 's counsel.
55.

. There is a dispute between the parties concerning the amount of outstanding

interest. ln addition, the court's ruling with respect to Unit 302 requires that interest amounts
be re-calculated. For that reason, the court directs the parties to meet and confer in good
faith regarding the manner for calculating and the amount of the outstanding interest to see if
they can agree. If not, AmericanWest should file along with the proposed judgment discussed
below a supplemental memorandum on the interest issue. That memorandum is due within

2 No party presen ted any evidence that a 7/8 Interest in Unit 402 was worth more than a fee simple Interest
in that unit. Thus, wh ile the USPAP standard quoted by the parties and referred to above states that the
whole "may be greater than or less than the sum of [its] parts", there is no credible evidence to suggest that
the value of a 7/8 interest exceeds the value of the whole unit. For th is reason , Mr. Weed 's calculation of the
fair market value of the entire fee estate represents the absolu te outer limit of the fair market value of the 7/8
interest that actually was conveyed.
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14 days. Kellin will have 10 days to respond. Both parties papers should include a description
of the manner in which they contend interest should be calculated, and also a per diem
interest amount from the date of the trustee's sales forward. AmericanWest must file a
Request to Submit for Decision when briefing is complete. The court will rule on the interest
issue, if there is one, based on the papers.
56.

AmericanWest is directed to prepare a Final Judgment consistent with the

foregoing and serve it on counsel for Kellin within 7 days. The parties must meet and confer
in good faith and attempt to resolve any issues concerning the fom, of judgment. That
judgment should reflect that all claims against all parties have been fully and finally
resolved and will be the final order of the court.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2014.
DISTRICT COURT
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a

At any time within three months after any sale of property under trust deed as provided in
Sections 57-1-23, 57- 1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be comn:ienced to recover the balance _
due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in that action the
comp laint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was secured by the trust
deed, the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market value of the property at
the date of sa le. Before rendering judgment, the court shal l find the fair market value of the
property at the date of sale. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by
wh ich the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including
trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the
sale. In any action brought under t his section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred .
HISTORY: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch. 68, § 4; 2001, ch. 236, § 13.
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fois report form is dasigm1,j to ;aport an app;ais2l of a unii in a comlomini~m p;;Jjec' o; a condominium unit in a plannad
unit devslopmsnt (F>UD). This raport fmm is noi designa,j to report an appraisal oi a manufactured hom:; or ;;. unit in a
cooperative project
Tnls apprais3! rap □rt is subject to the following scops of wor',e, intended usa, intended user, definition of marlGt value,
statement of assumptions and limiting conditions, and c;r'Jficstions. Moaificafions, ad□1tions, or deletions to the intended
use, intended user, definrJon oi mar\:at valua, or assumptions and limiting c□ncirJons are not permitJ:3d_ The appraiser may
e:pand tJ1e scope of work to include any additional rasearch or anaiysis neca3sa;y tiased on ihe complexity of ihis appraisal
assignment Modifications or deletions to the cert/icatlons am also not pemiil:ted. Howeve;, additional certifications that de
not constitute mati;iial altaralions io this appraisal raport, such as ihoss requirad by law or those ralalad to the appraiser's
continuing education -oi msrnberohip in an apprarsal organization, are permitted.
SCOPE OF WORK: The scope of work for ihis appraisal is delined by the complexity of this appraisal assignmant and tie
reporting raquiP-ments of a1is appraisal raport torm, including the following ciafinition at market valm:, statement or
assumptions and limili~g com:fitions, and certificstions. The ap praissr must, at a minimum: (1) perform a complete· visual
inspeciion of the interior and e;:terior araas of the subject unit, (2) inspect and 2naly-.c2 the condominium project, (3) inspect
the neighborhood, (4) inspect each of ihe comparable sales from al least tha strae~ (5) r%earch, verify, and ar.al~-ze dara
fmm reliable pubiic and/or private sources, and (6) report his o; her analysis, opinions, and conciusions in this appraisal
raport
INTENDED USE: The intended use of this appraisal r.port is ior the lender/ciient to evaluaia the property that is L'ls
sub ject oi this appraisal ior a mortgage finance transaction.
INTENDED USER.: Tna iniendad user oi this appraisal raport is me lander/client

MARKc1 VALUE: The most probabla price which a property 5hould bring in a competitive and open markat under all
conortions P-quisiie to a iair sale, tha buyer and seller, each acting prudenlly, knowledgeably and assuming the price is not
affaci3d by undue stimulus. lmplicii in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a spacified date and the passing oi
trJ;:; from sailer lo buyer under conditions whereby: (1) buy!lr and sellai are typically molivai3d; (2) both partJas are well
ir.fom,ed or well advised, and aach acting in what he or she considers his or her own best interest; (3) a reasonable time is
allowed lor exposure in the open rna!'~et; (4) payment is made in terms of cash in U. S. dollars or in terms of financial
arnngameni. comparable ther::to: and (5) the price represent;; t'le normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by
special or cre:tive financing or sale5 concessions• gf]lnt2d by 211yane ass□ciared wit'1 the ,ala.
+ Adjustmeras to t'1s comp3rables must be made ior special or creative fin;;ncing or sales concessions. Mo adjustments are
n=cessi!!)' ior those cost; which are normally paid by sellero; as a result of tradrJon or law in a mark,i area; these costs aro
readily identifiable since th: sell;;; pays ihese co5ts in virtually all sales transactions. Special or cr:aiive financing
adjustr;ient.s can be made to !he cor.ipe!rable property by comparisons to financing t:r;;is offered by a third party instiiutional
lender that is not alr.ady invol•1ed in me prop;;rzy or transaction. Any adjustment should not be calcuL~ted on a mechanic:il
dollar ior dollar cost or the financing or concassion but the dcnar amount of any adjustmcrit should appr,:r.:imata tile mar'~et's
reaction to t'1e financing or concassions based on tile appraiser's judgment.

STATEMENT OF ASSUivlPTIONS AND LIMITJNG CONDITIONS: The apprais~r's car'Jiication in this report is
subject to U1e following assumptions am! limiilng condifions:

i. The appraiser will not be responsible ior ma.'ters of a legal nature that affact eiiher L'le property being appraised or the
ti1Je to i~ except for ini'or,nation 1hat ha or she became aware of during the research involved in peri~rmlng this appraisal.
Tne appraiser assumes that the title is good and mar~1;rable and will not render any opinions about the title.
2. Ti1a appraiser h~s provided a sketch in U1is appraisal report to show the approxlrnate dimensions of the improvement>.
Toe sl<etch is included only to assist the reader in visualizing th2 prop:rtf and under:;randing U1e appraiser':; detarmirnilion
of its size.

3. The appraiser has examined the avaHable fiacd maps that are provided by Ui'e Federal Emerg;;m;y Managem~nl Agency
(or other data sources) and has notad in this appraisal report whet'ler any portion oi the ,ub)ect site is located 1n an
identified Speci2l Flood Hazard ma. Because the appraiser is not a sur,eyor, he or she rnaf:es no guarantees, expross or
implied, regarding t/lls detenninan □ n.
4. Tne appraiser will not give testimony or appear in court because he or she mads an appraisal of the property in question,
unless specific arrangements to do so ha•1e been made be1or::hand, or as otherNiso required by 12.w.
5. The appiaiser has notad in this appraisal ra_oort any adverse conditions {such as needed repairs, dateMoration, the
piesam:;, oi hazardous w:ms, to;;ic substances, etc.) obser,ed during ti'1e Inspection of ihe sut,ject propert1 or that ha or
she became awa;~ oi during the rasearch involved in performing this appraisal. Unless otherwise st!ted in U1is appraisal
rapor'~ the appraiser has no knowledge of any hidd:n or unappa;ai>i physical d2flci2ncies or _adverse conditions of the
propsrty (such as, bul not limited to, needed repai;s, deterioralion, the pres3nce oi hazardous waste;, toxic substances,
ad'lerse envimnmental conditions, etc.) that would rnake the prop:rt/ l:ss valuable, and has assumed that L'lere ara no
such conditions a~d makes no guara~tees or wa11anties, express or impiied. Tne 3ppr:.iser will not be responsible for a,1y
such conditions that do eKist or for any engineering or testing L'.a! might be requiP.d iD discover whather sucn conditions
e,cisl Because the appraiser is not an expert in the field of environmental harards, this appraisal report must not be
consid;;;ad as an environmental asses3r.1,mt or 1he propert>;.
5. Toe apprai,;;r has basad his ur her apprais2l report and valuation cc;nclusion for an appraisal lh3t is suoisct m
saiisiactary compl;tion, repai,5, or alt:1r2tions on ihe assumption that U1e completion, rap2ir:s, or all3rations of the subject
prnperty will be performed in a professi;;n;;I r..anner.

Freddie Mac Rim, 465 Mar,:h 2005
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F=i- W~"i. Sa:-Jc
fi1' # SLCS 1 ill-K
A?PRAISS9'S CERTIFlG.!!;_f:ON: Tile Appiaissr csrtifi:S and agi:es that
1. I h2.V2, at a minimum, develop::d a, d rapaiiad ;,:5 :ppr:is2l in accorGanc~ wifri tl~ scope Di
ti"Js app;a1s2.I raport

war.,

requirament; st5.tzd ·m

2. I pe;fonn:d a compleE 1.~sual inspection of the inErior a,1d e:d:rior aP-a; of t'ie ;ubjact pr::iperty. I rapoit:d tile cona1ti!:m
of the improvement; in factu3l, specific rerrns. I ldentifi=d 3nd report~ the physic2l dencier.cies !hat cou!d :free! !he livabITity,
soundness, or strucillral mgr;t,; of tha property.
3. I performed this epp~sa in accardnr.ce wm1 !he r.qui;;ments of !ile Uniform Stmdarcts ai Pruiessional Appraisal
Pr2.ciice that were a!!optecl and promulgated by the Appraisal Siandards Board of The .~ppraisal Foundation and ti'lat wero in
pl21;a ai the time this appraisal iaport wa; prap;;;ed.

4. I developed my opinion of t'1e rna,"i(et vaiue of the real property thai: is the subject oi this report based on ihe sales
comparison approach to value . I have adequate comparabie martrat dara to develop a reflabla sales compa;ison approach
for lhls appraisal assignrnenl I iurther certify ir..a! I considered the co;;t and ir.clm'.e apprn;:ch!!s to value but did not develop
them. unless olhar,vise inaica~d in lhis r2port
5. I raseerched, verified, anaiy-<Ed, and raporced on any current agreement for sale for the subject property, any orranng lor
;ala ci the subj2et property in the twelve months prior to the effective d"ie oi this appraisal, and tlle prior sales of the subject
propaty for a minimum of tmie year. prior io the eftective d2te or mis app;aisal, Uiilass omerwise indicated in !his report.

6. I resaarched, verified, ar.a!y,..ed, and reported on t'1e prior sales of the cornpar.ible sales for a mh,irnum of one ye=!' prior
to the data of sale oi the comparable sale, unles s othmvis;; indic.ated in t'1i, report
7. I selected and used co,,1p;;rable sales that

al:!

loc:ationally, physically, and functionaly tile most similar to t'la subject prop2rt>;.

B. I have not used comparable sales that were the result oi combining a land sala wiih Lie contract purchase price of a home that
has been built or will be bunt en the tand.
9. I have reported adjustments to the comparable sales lh:t reilect the mar.-ret's r:aciion tD ~"le differences betwe,m U1e subject
property and tha comparable s2les.

10. r verified, from a oisinta;osted sour.;e, all iniarm.tion in tills ropc,i tic! wa; provi ded by parti::.> who have
the sals or fin2J1cing Gi ma subiect µroperty.

2

financial interest in

11. I have i'..nowledge md :Xperience in appraising this type oi property in t'lis r.:aiket ilP-3..
i 2. I a;n aw;'Je of, 2J1d have :ccess ii::, t'le necessa;y and 2flpropriate public and priv;;ie data sources, such 2s multiple irsting
s e!'Jices, tax assessr.1ent racords, public 1211d rocords and oi;'ler such da,"a scur-.es for the arsa in which tho pr::ip:::ty is loc;;t;c.
13, I obtained lhe infomiaiion, estimates, and opinions furnished by otller ~._rijes and et.pressed in mis appr:isal r3port irom
raiable sources that I betteve to be true and correct

14. I have taken into consideP-i:icm me ;actors that have an impact on value w;m 8-Specl to the subject neighborhood, S!lbject
p;operi:y, a11d llle proximity oi the subject property to adverse influences in lhs deve!opmant oi my opinion oi mar'i<a val~e. I
!",ave noted in this appraisal report any adv,;r3c conditions (such as, but not iimited ro, neacled repairs, deterioration, the
pesance oi haardcus v12sras, tc;cic substance;, adver.;a environmental cono1tion,, etc.) observed during the inspection of me
subjec' pmpeIT'/ or mat I bacarm aware of during the research invol'P.d in performing mis appraisal I have considered these
ad'l:!rse conditions in my analysis of the prup:rty value, and ha·,e reported on the effect oi !he condi'Jons on U1e value ,md
mar!,etabilil'; of the subject property.
15. I have not knowi,1,;ilY wit';hel!l c!f1/ si9nlfic3nt inforr..ation rrorn this appraisal report and, to me bast of my knowiedg3, ell
st;lemenis and infoimation in this appraisal report are true and comet
15. I statad in this appraisal report my own peraon.il, unbi2Sed, and protessior.al analysis, opinions, and conclusions, which
aro subject only to ~ie assumptiar.s 2nEI fimiting c □ nditiar.s in this appraisal report

17. I t-.ave no pra sent or prospettiv: int:!f=St in ttia proparty L'lat is L'le subjact of U1i:; r:;>of1➔ a,1d I ha•ie no pi3ser.t DI'
prospectiv: peGor.21 inte;est or bic.S with r2spect to the p2fiicip;nts in the transaction. ! clid not base, ailhar partially or
cornpleraly, my analysis and/or opinion of r,;ari<et value in this appraisal report on the rJce , colm, refigion, sex, age, man131
st:tus, handic-a_o, famirial s!alus, o; nafamal origi~ or ailhei the prospective ov-,nar. or occupants of the subject property o; of ihe
present owner,; or occupants of :ne piO!)erti: s in ~'le vicinity of the subject pr-Jj)ertf or on any oiher basis prohibited by 0 \1'.
1 B. My employm;11t andior compensation fo; performing L'lis appraisal or any future or arii:icipated appr:isals w: ; not

1

t

I

l

Ii

I
!
r

com:iition~d ;;n aiiy agri:emenr er undeGtmoi ng, writi!n or otharMisa, t'lat I would report (or pr,sant analysis supporting) a
pr,dateiTilin3d specific value, a predetermined rnir;I/Tlurn v=:lue, a range or oif3ction in valua, a vai~e l~at ra•,or; t:;;; cau?- er
3fT'J party, or tha attainment oi a specific resuit or occur.once oi a specific S'Jbsaquent event {such as =;Jpr:JVal oi a ~ndir,g
mortgage 1□ 3.fl appiicaiian).

1':!. I parsona!!y prap;;rad all concfusicr.s a;id oµinions about L'1e i:al e,tote that we~ set roit'l in ttiis appraisal raport II I
relied on significant real property apprais;;.J ?Ssistan~ irom any individual or ir.cfaridua!s in til:; parforr.;anc~ of thi; apprai; ..I
Di the prepa;;;\ion of this apµ1=isa! raport. I hav: named such individual(,) and c!sclos;id tile specific tasks perform:d in L'lis
appr;isal r:port. I Cff's'P; tr.al any in □1Vidual so narnad i, qualified to per.mm tho tasks. I have not authari2zd an1•or,a ta make
a change lo 2ny ilem in this appraisal i=:pmt tteraf,Jrs, ?;fly ch2iige iiiCd~ to this apprai:;i is uiiautno;iz3ct and I will t:k= nc
responsibility for il
20. I identified tile lend2r/client in t'1is appraisal report who i, L'i: individual, Of[;3fliiatian, or agent toJr the organi'!a "on Lat
orderad and will receive this app,:iisal P-port.
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21 . Ths !a;idar/ciient rn~y disclos; o; distribura mis appraisal raport to: ihe born)'.'/!!:~ anc;tli;;; ~n~; at tile r~uest oi the
borrnwar. the mortgagee or its succe:sson and ~ssigns; mortgage insurers; gov::rnment spohsored enterpr!sas; other
s-::conciary mai';<at p.:fJc:P,an~ !Eta coll::ction or raporJng seNicas; pmfu.ssional appraisai organizations; any dep:rtrnsnt.
3gancy, or insin.1mentalit-J of th; Unirad Str.h!s; and any state, L'1e Dlstrict cf Columbia, Dr ot,er ju;isdictior.s; wi'thout having to
oiltain ihe appraiser'; or supervisor/ appraiser's (,f applicable) cons;;nt Such conssnt must be obtained befcrs this 2ppralsal
report rnay be di.sclcsed or cfstributad ID any other pa.-ty 0ncluding, but nut limit-'..a to, tt.e iJUblic through advertising, pubfic
rnlaiiors, news, sales, or other m.oia).
I ;;m 2wa.~ !hat ar.y dis~lcsure or distribution of this appraisal report by me or the lender/cfient may be subject to C'!itain
laws and ragulations_ Fur'Jier, I sm also subj3ct to !he provisions of the Uniform Standarc!s of Praiessiona.l Apprai;aJ Practice
that pertain to disclosUIG or aistribution by me.

7?

23. Tha borrower, another lencie; at ihe request oi !he borrower, the mortgagee or its success!lrs 3ild assigns, mortgage
in~ur;r,, govemmerJ sponsored er.isiµpses, and other secondary merkel p3r1icipanti m2Y rely on this appraisal report as part
oi any mor",gage finance transac1ion ihat involves any one or mare or these parties.

24_ If mis appraisal repmt wa; lransmitted as an "3!ectronic rocoro" containing my "slactronic signaiure, " as those terms are
ds,;ined in applicable federal and/or state laws (ex.r.iuciing audio and vidza racording;), or a facsimne transmission oi !his
appraisal r~port containing a copy or representation oi my sigr.ature, tile 3ppraisal report shaO be as efiec!ive, en:□ri:e3ble and
V3lid as if a i,aper var;;ion of thi, appraisal report were delivered coniaining my original hand written signaillre.
25. Any intmtior.a or neglig~ITI rnisreprasentaiion(s) contained in !his appr:isal P-port may P-Sult in civii iiabiiity and/or
criminal penalties inclucfmg, but not limited to, tine or irnpiison~nt or botll under the provisions of Title 1S, Uni~d St!tes
Code, Secfion 1001 , et seq_, or sir.;ilar siate laws.
SUPERV!SDRY APPRAISER 'S CER.TlFICAT!pN: The Supervisory Appraiser cer'Jfies snd 3grees -tha!:
1. I dirac;Jy supervised tile appra,ser for this appraisal assignmen~ have read the appraisal report, and ~ ;es wiU1 th, appraiser';
analysis, opinions, stit;rrn;nls, conclusions, and tlle appraiser's certiilca.tion.

2- I w·.,ept full resporsibility for the cantenis cf ihis appraisal raport including, but not lirniisd ta, the appraiser's an;;lysi3, opinions,
stttaments., conclusions, and the appraiser's cer'u'ficaiion.

3. Tne appraiser identified ir, ihis appraisal repo;!: is ari.her a ,ui>-contractor or an employ~ of tile sup,rvisor/ appraiser (or the
appraisal firm), is quarmed to perform !his appr:isal, and is acc:eptable lo perform this 3ppr.isal und2r ihe appflcalllo ~te law.

4. 1ilis appraisal report corr.plies wiU1 the Uniform Standards of Profussior.al Apprais2.l ?ractlce that we;a adopted and
p;omulgat,d by ihe AppGisal Stmda,-cs Bm;rd of Tne Appraisal foundation and that wei! in piace at th:l lime this apprais?!
raport was prepeied.
5. If tnis appraisaf rapi:-;1 was rr:3:nsmitad as an cl~ctronic 8cord'' containing rny "alactrc-nic sjgnaru;s,·' as Llcs-s tem:s :J"'?
detinad in appiical>le federal andior st.ta l2ws (exciuding audio and •1id30 racordL1gs) , or 3 f:csirnila transmission of this
appraisal report containing a cop)' or reprasent.aiion of my sigr.atuf'!, the appraisal report shaIT be as effective, eniorceable Yid
•,aiid as if a paper ~rsion of this appraisal report were cieiivered containing my original h211d written signaiuP-.
11

APPRAISER
Signature

Name

,

SUPERVISORY APPRAlSEH (ONLY IF REQUIRED)

~

Signature
Mama
Compm'f N2IT1e
Company Address

K~a1'!!

N'ame

Comp211y
ib::ortACl!Jraioal Serlic:a. LLC
Com~y Address P.O. Box 980032. ?91'~ Cir,. UT 84098
T::iephone Number .,,rao=1'-'lc.,3,.,22=--<!5:li-"-=a'--- - - - - - - - -t.'Ti2d .~d!.!Bss k~vi.r-..w~edlar:?Sortaoor;i3olcor.1
Date oi S'ignaturo and Report .:.o~s12='~.-2~0~1~
1________
Effec:iive Date i;f Appr2isal ~0~91~1~5~12=0~1~0_ _ _ __ _ _ _ __
Stat: Ccriification # _,5_"-~7=2~5<!0-C
-=--=R".o~o' - - - -- - - - - - or State License #
or Oilier ____________ State# ______
SG~ ~UT,_,__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

s~e ______________________

Expiration Oat~ oi Certific;:tion or Lic'!nse

SUBJECT PROPE.;;lY

E.-.:-piGfion O~c of Cer.ific~Oon or Licer.sa

O

O

ADDRESS DF PRDPER1Y AP?R,,i.lSED

D

Par'~ Ci!v. UT B4060

APPRAISED VALUE OF SUBJECT PRDPEP.TY S

Telephone Number
EmailAdci853
Date oi Sign2ture
Stata Certification #
or Stat:~ License #

550.DDu

Did not inspsct subject property
Did inspect a::rarior of subj~-:! property from str.!et
DaE of Inspection
Die inspect interior an!l ~xterior of ;ubject property
Dale of lr.spection

LENDEP✓ CUENT

Na,Tie
Comp3ny N::.r.,e Pav a~n, ::v 3i1d N3b~k~r? .C.
Comp311y Address 35 nu!h S:31;, St Suit;, 1400. ? .O. Bao ~5355.
S3lt Lak:- C\tv. UT a4 i 4.5
Ema?. Address

COMP ARA3LE SALES
D!d nct !n.;pact ext.eri1Jr of c0mp2.r2ble sales from strn~
□ Did inspect e;:ct:rioi of compar3ble sal.:5 frnm street
Oat, of lr.spc!Clion

O
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I Ci!'/

I L~ru!li

Pant Ciiv
Rav Q!Jh:Bv :nd Nat>ak:r ?.C.

C•:iUn'IV Suii1r.1it

p~a;-;d thls rgport l!.:iing WinTotal, A la M;:,d:, Appra?S3J Soft\uar~ Using this :»o~.N:li:: th! =~s:r C?n :fr:::
ih: sign=1!u2 using sa~.1[}' opticn
pasS'.·10rd protar:iiof"_ Tna :ppr5isat solsly eur.buE ~is p:!55\'JCiC. ff thh rapcrt is
derivar3d ~lact"unicaJty it is c::mv~rtad iiilo ?DF' F'.:>rm,;i which C3nnot be ch3ng~ or alt:ed by Ll: iccaiver.

T.'1:? apprai~

vr.~,

Cliant
foa Lancer/Cfianl named on Iha fronl of this appraisal report is the Cli,ml
Ap-praisar Intended Us~r aad Us:
The L,,r,der/Clianl is 1ha lnl:nd;,d U;er of lhis appraisal Th2 appraiser has not identified 2ny olh2r lnranded UseG. Should a
i:Jom:,w,;,r or any o~'i;;r third party choose lo ~ly on this appraisal, !hey e:n only do ,; ;o within L'le ~P= ai Wof, agr,--2d upon
:::nd d:Jin::3t;::d b:tv-leen the Apprais:r and Cfi.ent for U,2 lnrend;d Use of lhls r~ort. It is fur'u'l:r nctad that si.Tlply b;i:aus:? a

bor.cwer or third part'/ rn2y re~lve 2 ccpy ai w~r:port.. il doe::. nol mean that tt,e borrower or third party is

=11

lntend:d Usct 2.:.

ihis !::Im is defined in thls report
foe lnlended Use of ms raport is io es6mal : U,e ;air mar~t value for the subject as of □ 9nc/20i0. This Intended Use is
rubjad: to the Scope of Work (as oulfined), puipcse of appGisal1 appiais·3 l raport iorrn rap,:Jrting raquir~m2nts 1 and Dafinition vf
Ma1bt Value:
Scopa of Work
Tne appraiser pefior.ned ~ physical inspec6on as del!ne,;1ed above o~ !he effecOve data of the appraisal. Basad upon 5@grmient from :he client tha FNMA 1073 FoTm vias used to rc;:mrt the appraJs3I re.3uUs. Ta,e square footage was taken from
m:asuring U,e houae ;llld/or rloor plans. In the case of Boor plans the squarg iootag:? was v~rifi:d through physic~1
measurament and/or appraisal skei.::h sc~·ar~.

NoB la lntend~d Us:r 3nd/or R:=der of !his P-port.. further _clarific2tion of Scope of V./or.< Included in this i2pcit

Tr-ls appraisal is bas~d on an \nt~rior and exferioi lnsp~tion and 6 p rep.crro for iha sole and exciu:ir..r: U53 vf t7g 3pprais2f"3
ciient io 35Si::;t with: tha mortgage lending d9cision.
Tnis report Is noi: E '"home in.sp.ection..• A p rofessional hom: inspection has nol b:en performed by the =!ppral.5~ on the subject
property. TM appi'3.Sal ir.5pec6on parform2d by lhe appi"3is~r ts iOr fu3 pur;>cs:?S of d::t2iTi1ir1ing a value conclusion for L~2
prope;ty through iG mar=~3.~ ch3J"3ct:risfics (ll:m 2 In attached caitificstion). Tjj ~ appr3i3er perfoiill=d a visual insp~c:tian of the
acc._~sibl:i and .:2c'i1y ob.se.rw·able areas oi the subject Scuttle~ and attics we::: not "iew~d. Snow ,;ov~d rt:iofu ar; not
;;adily ob;;;ivable. Ti,is report cannot be rafied upon lo di;dose condition; anrllor .j;:efects in the ;ubjecl property. In sdciitbn,
the =?Xt~rior ilnlsh (i.:! . stl..lCCO, 111aod, a.nd/o rvin),i. etc.) app~ to be in good c::>nditicn. however, lh~ appra~r is not qualrn;:.d b
d:t~ probl: ii1.=: VlrJ..::h m2'J 1nclud:! maisru~ build up, mo!d 1 p~per ciP-ir.ag:, 3;c. A prof3$ional homz inspaction !Jr
:U1vironm~nar ir.sp.eciion is racommandgd to 3ddJ=SS :5Uch mafur.;. ~'1.e appralser made a visual roof irdpec:tbn rrorn t:,;?
ground only, and 3pps.ar.:: to b2 in geed condiUon, but vras unabl: lo del=nnine the amount cf depr~da5on of ~1,2 roof. No sigr.s
o'f cuntng o; miS3ing pi~ war-3 no~d howev~ a µroias5ional roof inspection and caitificafion would b: r:commend~d to
address such matt~rs. Tna appr:iiser is not a horn~ inspector. and does net guar:ntae L~at tlle subject i s ~ of defed:5, n::,r
should this raport b2 ran2d !.lpm1 to disc!ose any conditions present in th3 subject property. The appr,frser performs 3i1
i~-pe-:tion of th~ visible and ar.c: 0 ssio1a 3ra_35 onfy. Mold, le:ti p2int, radon and ::;b~s:os i.~su~s ar: b~yond th:! seep::: of L'1is
::ppGisaJ inspacUorL A prof253ional horn~ or :nvironm:!nt:31 li1:specfion is P-COmrne.."Jded to add~s such matt~.

Sale:; in thee ; ub)act projac:t -;ubsaquent to 3ff2dive dae.
FCMLS ~988072:
FCMLS #98675'11:
?CMLS #9965435:
PCMLS ;/g9864BS:

2550 Deer V;;ngy Dr #201 Sold
2550 Deer Vall;,y Dr t302 Sold
2550 Dsar Valley Dr §502 Sold
2550 D2ar Valley Dr #402 Sold

on
on
on
on

04/29/2011
04/15/2!11 i
03/30/2011
03/02/2011

ior $470,000
for $475,000
ior S475.000
ior M75,000

=

Jack N 3}son is iicansed 3ppraiser =ind is qt.:alifi:!'d to p.:r'Jclpaa in the pr~paration of reports. H: asSSG in ih~ physical
insp:!C.lon of the Subjccl prJperty induo-ing rnea?suring, taking photos, 1nspec5ng tha comp5Gbis TT!Jm ~e str-2et aild taking
pholos of the cornparabies. aasisting in frle 53lection ci c::iiilp:=r:rbl~. 3ild :i,rar ing th: all da1::i i.,m th~ r:port. He also
participates In making adjuslmen~.
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Plaintiffs Exhibit 1B

Ir.Agin Fil! Na SLC915JJ-Xj ?30~ # 1)

Far W'!s.t Bank
rile# SLC9153J-K
Tr~ ouroosg al Ira; summa,y anoGl;al 1e0an Is lo p1ovldi Ill! snder/c1ienl wilh an accullle, and adiouale~/ suonortad, oolnlon ol Ill, ma1i<E! va~J1 ol Iha subJ:cl prooerty.
· ?1m;t,1 Addms 2550 Daer Vale•, Drive Ees:
Unll # 302
Clly Par.< Citv
Sllll UT
Zio Codi 8'1050
8,JiiOW!! NIA
Owner ar Ptib.lt R~otd Br;?nl Br-1sol'\. S2rtdv i<effin
CounlY Sur,,mil
L!oal Dmrtonon UNIT 302 RED STAG LODGE COHDOivllNIUM
R.E. ram s 6.263.S0
• Assessor; Pare~ # RSLC-302
Tax Year 2010
Ci!IISUS Tm\ 9944.00
· · Prolecl N.ml Red Slao Lodoa
P~~se # 1
Mao Ralmr.ca 4 lc20
HCA S 800
0 pel'/e.1 Q(] oer 1r.onlh
l};c!l'Jal!l ~ Own,r l I Tel"i3nl [ J 1/acan\
So,cial A;;a;;;r.enl; ; I.YA
" P1ooe!!Y Alt;hls AooraJsad Ix] ,:e Slmole
Lmet.cid iY.l 0lh:r fdescrtbel Fracllonal (7181
• A;slonmenl Tyo: I l Purchm Tranmllon l J Rannanc: Transacllon I,,<:] Olher fdmrlbe) As:;at Valu3tion
Lmd:r/CU:nt R3V Quinnav and Nebel<ar P.C.
Address 36 south State SL Suita 1400. P.O. Box 45385 Salt Laka Cltv. UT 8J 145
!s th? subecl ornoerty currenUV oN!!,d !or sale o, hls il been ott=P.d tor sale tn lh! ~Yclve rronlhs crier lo t~e eI1ecti1e d,!, o! this aoorai;al?
lxl Yes fl No
~ R,oort d,la sourcefsl used, oHerino !lfic:(sl. and da!efsl.
PCMLS ~9971869 raoor1s that a iracllonat shars, for the subiect nst!!d on 10/01/?00i for
i= $319,000 and was withdras•m after 101 DOM.
I O did O did not analyZ! \he comracl lor ; ala tor the subjecl purchase lransacll□ n. Explain Ire results ol lhe an1~sls ol lhe conlrilcl tor , ale or why lhe analysis was not

nciividual Condomin1um Unit Appraisal Repori

n

n

cm1orm~d.
Dale or Con~acl

ls lh: orooer.v ;,l!:r ti"~ o'lmer of public record? [ ] Y,s I J No Data Sourcefsl
or downpaymenl assislance, elc.J 10 be paid uy any pany on ueh,!1 ol ine borrower?
: . II Yes, reoort tl",e lolal dollar amour.I and describe lhl llerru lo be oald.
Conlracl Price ;

□ YcS OMO

~ I; there any nnanclal mlsl,nce poan cnarges , sale cor.:mlons, iitt

~- - -- - - -- -- -- - - -- -- - -- - - - -- -- -------1
Nole: Race and the ra cial composition ol lh aneighborhood are not apprai; al factors.

~ R;;_{;{€~~\r~·N~l9tib):i[ri0.0~.Ctia@ct~n;

~:;-~!~}-~?..~1:t:t;:~~ Cciffd0rhi01Ufn'•Ui1ll~QUSjhf'(r~·n~S:1:?:iJ.~~~~~~1·f!i~~C~i"i.QOrij_iriiUITI!rt6·u~SiifQ1 ~t~Siiit:hfiiCH[sf~~~

n

· ·t01:a1icr.-1=-J:UrtJan=-=l~·su·our!Jan - ·1 Rural ·· IProomv_Values I I lncP..asing
S!abl~-. : ~ _DecfirJno : L.-PRICE: · - AGE - 0n~Unil •· - • --75-l'.
_ Sul:1-1/o f l Ov:r 75:\. -IX] 25--75~
l lkld,:r 25:s I 0amar.d/Suonlv
Shomo, • f l in Balrnci IXl O•ier 5u~□IY I ; (DOOi
(yrs]
2-4 U;ul
O~
: 8~1/lh [ l Raold
I I Slab!e
Xl Slow
I Martelino Time I I Und::r 3 rnths I I 3-6 m!hs IXl O,,:r 5 :nils I 260 Low
0 MUIU-farn!!V
0~
N~!ohborhood 9ounrjarles The nelohborhcod boundaries lr.cluda ,11 of lhe Lower Dear Vallav rasort.
I 3.000+ Hloh
25 C □mm:rcial
5 :I
I 500 Pred. 1o Other
20 ~,
/lc!Qhbort.ood D;scrtoUon Toa sublect is located in Lower Da~r VaDeY and has excaltenl access to the Dear Vatlev S:d Resort (Basa lodoinol.

n

:ihoooir.o. re;stauranls and all othier car.sumer servic~s. Fre~•11a•1 access is also lccalad within r~2.son.abl2: oroximitv as weU as Old Town ?:Jr'.< cir,.
~

M,;1\,1 Cond\Uon; Onciudlno ;uooort ior lte abo·1e wnc!uslonsl

Th!! marke t in !he: ?Jik Citv 3r:?a ha:i been In ded!ne from lha Summ~r c{ 2007 wilh invcnlcr1

de:=~as!nc ar.d sh,c,•,yin:, s::::ns cf slc!l::nltinc in lh: '!a3I S,C.1BO davs.. No unusual ,byv Cowns. disc::Yrils. ot _;;:ncessi.:iis" w::1 _ ..o,aa IUl .111\.:re tS often \ne!yCed.

Ry s~h:;io in 3-12 mcntns ilcwever ii is not unc:Jmm~ rcr ~roo~rUe:s simllai Lo :.ubi2ct Lo rem<!in on tt., mark~ tn ~)'.U!S cf iO mcr.U-s
S\z? Aver!!□ e
Demltv Averaoe
l/lew Mlns.Res □ rt
Zlmlno Ctmmcatlon RD
Zoning D,mi □Uon RasidenLiof-RD /Rasort Develcomantl
Z!lruno Como9ar.ca IX1 L,oal l L,0111Jonconic;rrJno - □ o ill! rnnino P.au!allons oeITTil ribulllllno to currem d,nsil'I? IXl Yes
No

- P~danUal !Jrcoerti'!.5 at:! ~
iooograohv Ste ~o S loo9

: ,mmc

r

lolliro r 7 IP:oal fd:scribel
1, 's tire hlohest ;nd □,st us, of suhj:et oroomy as !moro'lad lor a; orooo;,d oe:- plar~ aad ,o,cilication;) th, prmrl m'

n

1 No

,

Utilities

• :l!<:lrtc:IY

Public cu-..,r!d,sc:iba)
Ix)
I I

Pub"c
Waler

[;.:J

IXl Yes

rl

No UIla. d;scn"ba

Ott-,n, lm010•1em,nts - Tvo,
SU<:cl A3ohan

or~, r ldmribel
I_ j

Public

Pri•,at~

IX]

fl
icMA Smlal i'lood Hamd Area I I Yes \XI 1/o F2AA Aced Zone X
FcMA M,Q # 49043C0938C
Ar, !re i!llliU;s and off-slla lmorovemenh; lvolcal ii)( lhi mirkal m ; ?
lxl Ye. f 7 No II No, descnbe
~ >1, there any adrn,e s11! ccn1ttloill or ex1:nul laclor; (em1r~ms. encroachmer.ls. :!l'lironrrer...ir conditions, land uses, ~c.)?

n

fl

FcMA Mao D!le 3/161201E

[ J Yes

l;,;J No II Yes, descr:be

No 3dverse ~a~-3ments. encr:>achments or oU:3:r r,~aal.ivsi condillor.s n'.::l:!d. Howg:'J:!f , the 300P-is2r did not cond 1Jc! an fn-d:?ulh ravJ::w oi

,;; Dala ;oun::lsl lor orolecl lnlor.nauon
_ ?10),ct DmrioUon O 0etact~d

MLS C□ untv records .

O Ro'N or Townl!ouse O Garden

O High-iii;~ 0

[X) Nld-Ri.ie

0lt.;r Id.scribe)

_: ~=i:_G~Jl~·tatI;1¥~riPUi:iii=i·:.~1:S;.~.Airiir31DasCTIPllonf ·:t1;tg:::·:;:l:::::.sutll=~t.P..faiS!~jf1:l;;~t)l~!::;;--::~::;uP.icJ~rj;C_drriol:~a:~~'. Tfi~T,;.~,S;Tlf:P..!Q1ectJiifOmPi~~;;-~rr:
#olSlones 5
IE.der!orWalls
Wd,Sln l #olUntts
; ol E!~1alors 1
I Rao! SUl1ace
.Asoh
I# al Uruls Comole\ed
IX1 Exi;tlno
Prooos!d I lo.al# Parklno
17
Ii! ol Urlls For Sal:
Unrlei Construction
I ?.alto f;oac~u;Jls) 1.5-1
I,;! al Uni\s Sold
I,! YrnBull
2002
ITvoe
Cando I# o! Urltsilent,d
11 ENecliie Age 4 Eff
I Guest ?ar:<ing
Ade~. ( # of Owner Occupied Unil;
Pro\ect Primarv 0ccuoancy 17 Prindo~ Residm: 2 lxl Sacond Home or Rem; tional
;: !; n-~d2•1e!om/b!lfld!! lo control or lh, Horn.."Own:rs' A;;oc!aflon (HOAI? IXJ Y:s I 1No

"" n

n

t,

111 l#olPham
I, 1 I# al Unll;

I 11
I1
I 11
IUnkn
IUnkn

11
h1

I# ol Units !01 Sa\2
I# ol l!nU; Sold
!Unknl#ol Ur,tsAern,d
IUnkn l # al Owne1 □c:upl,d Unlls
I l ienanl

0oas any slnole imit\' (Iha same lndi,ldual. lnvesior orouo. corom\ion. clc.l own m~re than 1D~ ol lr.e10131 units In lheoroiecl1
-.. n
,
.1
,,.
'?

IXl Yes

#olFlann:!l?hms
# ol Planned unns
# al /Jnlls lor S,I!
# of L'rrl\; Sold
#o!Urrlt; Rent:d
# ol 0-11r..!f Occupied Units

n

No

IN/A
IN/A
IN/A
IN/A
!NIA
IN/A

II Yes, 0escrlbe

• Tne develoc2r owns mer~ Ulan 10% .

'.J

\

-

~ Wis !he orolect mated bv Olecon·1ar,lun ol exi; llm1bulldinofsl into , condorrJrnum?

lxl Yes

n No II Yes. descf.!Je ill, orioiml m and ~al: cl corr1!fllon.

·~ T n~ R~d Stao Lodoe \.vas buHl In 2002 as a small Eu~oe3n stvle luxurv condo/hole\ with 11 sgoarale unils.

;;.. Al: th~ unils. common ~!;iii?nts, aud r=cr:aticn l!cill~:i comatel:! Onc~Jdlna anv ol.:.nn~d r&.:.blnlatlon ror a coMorrJ;1lum DJtr/~~slon)?

Is !he~ anv comrn~rcl~I ;oat~ inili! orcJ~cl?

Freddie Mac Fo:.n 455 March 2005

n YlS

rXl Y:s r l Ho ~ No, d~scrib:

IXl No II Yis. descn"b, ;nd lndicat, lh, overall oerc~aoe o1 \h! corr.meic!al som.

P3g:

cf 5
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IM;ln Ria l•lo. SLC9153J-KI p,9,
i=ar Wes t Bank

l.l
l ii{J'l'!IDIJa
. ' I l.;On,
~ dom,rmrn1 ll ilif.. ,..,ppi3iS8
IRepor

11

#21

Fila# SLC9153J-K

Descrtbe lhe condlllon ol th9 prolecl and ora!:i'/ ol cons!ruclion. Toa oroiecl aooe3.ra lo b3 well maintained and cor.strucled usina ·•ve.rv oood aualitv• buildbo

~ matarlals and wor'.-<man:;hl □ . Proiact d-:!nsitv. unii mix and rnar(c!::!I ao □ eal aooear to be -c?xc2ll::mt.

f,.

!,

Describe lhe common ,!em,nls and rnmallonal Jaclfitiis.

E;:::arci3~ room. 33!.Jna. staam room elsiv.ator accordino lo amenities !ist9d,

·~

Au. an 1 common :l~ments leisad lo orby lhe Homecwn~s· Aiisocia!ian? I l '/as /Xl No II Yes, describe lhe ;,nlal lerms and oollo,~.

0

'"

~

Is lhe nroleel subiecl lo a orour.d rent?

f

l 'les [~ No II'/,;, S

Are lhe oarklao racililles adeou,le lor !he oroi,cl size and i1oe?

~-

oer '/ear ldescrtbe 1,rms and condllionsl

[x] Yes n ND UND. describe and commenl on lhe ettacl on value and m,rk:labillf1.

L-

I Qdid igJ did nol analyze lhe condominium pro:e:I bud-Oal lor the cur.en! year. E,pl;in Iha r;sulls ol lhe analysis ol Iha ~udgel (adeQuacy of lees, reserves, eic.), ~r ·1my
lhe analv;\s was nol oertormed. No □ ralec~ budcet was cro.,ided ior the cor:dom inlum orol!:!Cl.

~

if;

~-

,••·

Are \here any olher fees (olher lhan reoular HOA clnrg,s) lor !he use sl lhe p1oiec1 lacililles?

I J Ye; I~ Na

IJ Yes, ,e~or1 I~! charges and describe.

~

~

n

• Comomd lo all;e; comoetilive moiecls or slmu,r cruallr1 and desion, Ir.a subiecl 1Jnil charae aooear:s
Hioh lx'l Averaoe □ Low II Hioh or l.Dw, descr.be
·-·· - ··.
.;, Are \here arr/ special or unusual charac1ert;1ics ol llii projecl (based on L1e condominium do~urnenis, HOA meellngs, -Jr olher lnlorrr.alionJ k~own lo the lppralsir7
~ ! Yes lxl No II Yes, dmnbe er;d exo!a'n lhe en eel on ·1alue md merkelabillr/.
';

--- -·-- -

n

I@

ill

oerveu AMual assessment ci1aroe ocr •1m oor souare lee\ al oms; Mno 2re3 = 5 a.4a
Unlt Charuc 5 800
oerrnomhX ;2 = i 9.oD0.00
;:;; Utililles inc!ided In L~e unil monthlv assmm,ra r l None f l Heat [ J Alr CondillarJno r 7 Elaclrici'I f 7 Ga; [2)Waler fX] Sawer IX] Cabla [ J O!her /descnb:\

~

f

B

:=::f:::;1;}¢t~~\-; ;AP.p11a~f~·:;~~:_·_-_·~;e:~:·:~i:•r~i:f.~:'&~I~t?.t~~-~'.s;;.:r-~~::~

ttJ~]~GI~~Tu!Jf~f¢t2!fClii',_½~:.¾~Itl.!DJ~Ii.C¥f~~~T~Ai5~1~.aJ§lC'.~rf_1li!f

l Nona
Car:iet n1e.Psr:io/VGIIXl Fir,olacels\ # 1
Rel~oeralor
i[)g Garage t J Covorad [ J Ooen
/Wail;
I[ J WoodSl0•1~f;I #
Range/Ov~n
t # of L~•,~!:i 1
G 11□ surnN-Good
noeckl?ilio
Undaromund
~ Heallno i'llJ: GFA Fuel Gas linrr/Fi"lsh Wood/1/eN Good
Dlso lx1 Microwave #ol CaG
De:k
I As; loned
10 Porc~1Ealc,ny
Olshwashar
I J Owned
~~Central AC f l lndlvioual AC J3,lh Wainscol HaNerv Good
!Door,
/n Olh,r
!PJMno Soace #
@IO Other /dm:lb:I
vvood/V~r, Good
lrn Wi;r.er/Drier
Unass1an~d
}
Ba,'lf;I
ij Finished Jl'ea abi:i·,a grade conialns:
1,482 Sou;rw F~el al Grns:i Uving AP.a 11.bov~Grad~
2 Sedrm;rns
5 Romm
1i! Ar~ lhe i'.ea!lno find caoftno for theindividual urii\s seoarat:111 m~ern~? n'/e; lx1 Mo II Mo, descn·oe Jnd corrmem on comcali□ ilit'I lo olher □roiecls In lt.e m3r,e1 ma.

E Fluor#

Two

IFloors

le

Common mel:!:rir.o is tvoical for tli2 ar~a.

~

Addlional lealur=s (soeclal en2rQ•1 efficien1 !lems. "1c.l

Tna subiacl is 2 bed 3 bath condo with unde,mound oari<:lna. ln!~lio; f2aiur3s lncluda -:anel -:,eroo
3nd ceramic rn: floor5. custom C3binel ar3nil3 ::!r\d t!la counl=r:;, wood oanellr.a. stainle5s sle-31 3aolianc:s.
No unusual □ hvsical d~oreciation or func:i□ i131 or
~ Oesc~be lhl condition or lhe onmnv fincludina nieded 1mus, d,l,norallon, r;novations. rcmcdefinQ. elcl
:!Xlernal obso!esc~nce obser,~d 3\ Hrna of insoection. Tne remainin □ =~anomic \ii2 is esllmated lo be 55~65 vears,

l'<

-"
-

Are ,~era 3ny phvslcal d,llclenc!as or ad,er;e cor.d:Uons Ir.al iMecl 111e f1•13biftly, ;our.dnes;, or ;lmclural inlegr.!1 ol lhe orooeny?

CJ 'le; IX1 No

II Yes. dmnbe

--

•.

Does Ille □ ro□eri'1 oenerall•1 cortcrm lo lhe nelohbornood /luncllonal uillir1. sl\lle. candill □n. use, conslrucUon, elc.l'

IXJ Yes nNo II No, describe

!;'

1li

~- I 15<3 did f l did nol ;emrch l',e ;ale or lr.msler hi;1cr1 ol !he ;ubiecl orooerw and cornoarible sales, II not exolaln

~!f.:

~- M·1

research I l oid ix\ did r.ol raml ,rr1 orior s,l;s or U;nslm ol Iha ;ubjecl orcoirt'/ lor lhe lhre, "ears prior lo !he eNecll•,e dale al lhi; aooraisal.
i',ILS
- Mv research O did 13] di! nol reveal arr1 oricr sales or tran;1m ol lhe Clr..,;arable sal2s lor lheyear prior lo lhe dale of saie ol lhe cornoarabla ,ale.
Dala source(sl MLS
Reoort lh, r;sulls al the remr:h and ana~sl; •JI lh, ortor ;;le or lrmsler hlslory of Iha subject 01oper1'1 and comparable sales lraoort addilional prtor sales on page 31.
SU3JECi
ITEM
COMPARABLE SALE #2
I CDMPARA8Lc SALE #3
I COMPARABLE SALE #1
I
Dale ol Pr1or 5a;,/Transler
INo orior sales 36 Mon"'" INo orior sales 12 monlhs \No orior sales 12 r.ionlhs INo orior ;;al:?S 36 months
:, ?rice of Prior Sa!a!Tran;lor
)MIA
)NIA
NIA
\NIA
Oala Sourca(sl
)MLS
\MLS
IMLS
MLS
EttecU~; Oale of Oala Source(,\
101111/2011
10111112011
10111 112011
l0111112011
_ .~r2!ys1:; of prkrr s::!~ ~, !rwsf~r history ol !h~ s!Jbjetl uon:r:y andcumoanb!:] sali:.s.
A !hr;,e vear Jis!ina hlslor, and sale; hls:orv for the s ublecl has baen

~

021a SOUIC,!S)

;.

.

oeriormed ;1s 02r USPAP :?nd State or Ut3h auidelina3. A 36 montt, sales hislorv of lhe comaar3bl~s W:!:S slso r~5:?arched In accordance with
· nor.nal buslnesa oracUces in lh3 U\3h W 3Btch P'mnt marl{=l;;. Sour:25 of this r~se:arch 3~ ML5 ,vslam throu □h th2 V-/asalch front MLS svstam
:-. and lnlei'1i:=1,•1S wiL') ovm~r3 when 3,:mlicable and/or av3nabl~. Tn3 aoor3i:.er notes lhat UL:!h ls a nondisdosur~ Stal~. Anv sal~5 dal3 and de\al!5 of
' salas ll'"'=ns3ctbns am not oart of t'i:? □ u~lic r2cord.

'

Fr:?ddie Mac far.-n ~6 5 March 2005
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naIv1
o m m1um n 1r .ppra1sa r ,.,
rtl,# SL□ 153J-K
corno;r.bii orao?lfie; curro,i!IY oif1Ied for ; a~ ln Lie sub!~:! n!lghbomtod ranolng In prtc2 from s N/A
to , NIA
~I frer~ ar? NI.-'. corr.ooGbla ;al:.; In ,i~;ublict n~Qh!>OJhO&d wilhln Ire .02SI rv1-:1e mcnlhs ranoln? In ;;Je orlci from ; N/A
lo l MIA
SUMC,
FcATI.:RE
COMPAAABLE SALE it t
CO~iPA?J.BLE SALE # 2
COMPARlBLE SA!£ # l
I
I
:,. Ad drm and 2550 Daer Valley Drive c ~J02 25:i'O Daar Valley Dr #202
74.'.7 R~yal Strael E #203
7447 Royal SLteel #210
Unll#
P3J".< Cl~,. UT d4060
Park Cl~t. Ulah /REOl
Park Citv. Ulan
Paf~ Cl~/. Utah
, ?ror,cl Nam! and Rad Slag Lodge
Red Stag Lodge
Blac, Baar Lodga
Slack Baar lcCga
Phase
1
1
1
1
r;:~r~~~5.:'i.:.:=..;;: 0.04 mila, ME
?11r.rirrnrv 10 Suil~ct
I us milas SW
/ 1.35 miles SW
Sale ?rice
!§..:-~::;;~~~g,~ s
Is
612.500I·,!J•·,.'f-2:;;'J;i,·~1>
625 ooo >;~:.-::s;,:e¥3:,'£•P.:E1S
61 5.000
.-~ Sal, Pnce/8oss Liv. A1ea
415.11 so. IIJ.f.:;J.0 5i,;:t;;f.t,::.:,;•/; 396.26 SQ. tt.r:f'~;;•~;1f.if:¥~_t,~
so. II.IS 426.53la. ILl,~~¥.•'";:ii,.~.;;,::i!.;:i,;; ;
15
Data Sourc,rsl
MLSl:9983809 Aoent Shoaf
lv1LS#99B06a 1 Aoant Soencar
MLS;/9982936 Act Aola
V<Ji ficatlan Sourcatsl
MLS Closed/lnsoact I \3 DO Ml I MLS Clo;ed/lnsoacl 1255 DOMl MLS Closad/lnsoecl I205D0Ml
'IALUE AOJUS TMEUTS
D,SCRll'ilON
DESCRIPTION
+H , Adjustlr.!111 DESCRIPTION +(-) ; Adjustlri nl I DE5CRIFTION I ti-\ , Miistmenl
'
" Sal,s r fir..nc!ng
Ccnvantlonal
Cash
IConvenlional
Conc,s.lom
None Noled
-10.000
Furnttur~
-1 0.000 F!...r.iitur:!
Dale of S,l;llime
' -12.300
05/20i20~0
-21 .435104/16/2010
-25.000 08/20/2010
I
' Location
I Lower Oa,ar Viv Lower Dear Viv
Uooer Deer Viv
Uooer Daer Vlv I
, L!ascl\old/Tue S\mole
Fee S l m □ le
~2::, SimoPI F•~ Simole
IFea Slmole
I
I
,; HOA Mo. Amssmenl
l aoo
600
lsas
I
1547
I
J
-, Common Bamenls
Common Gmds Col":'\mn Grnd 3
Cornman Gmd
JCommonGmdsl
J ind R:c. f ,cili\\a;
2):3rcisa Room Exerdsa Room
Pool, Ho! Tub
Pool.He! Tub
floor Loc,lion
lzr,d Ffoor
12nd Poor
I
2nd Floor
I
I 2r.d Floor
I
i,; '/iew
ResorJSir:i
!Resort
l1nierior 5%
+31 .250 Resort/Sim
I
'. Oeslon.ISM!l- -· - - •. ,_ /513:k;od,_, - . .IS1.3ckad
ls1aclrnd
I Slacked
I
--· .,
\Jg(v Good
: Ouarnv ol Con; lrn e1ian
\Ver, Good
Ver, Good
l 1/ar1 Gocd
I
I
.~ct!Jal Ao,
l9A<:t/4 " ii
9 Act/ Sim
l1 J Acl/Slm
112 Ac!/ Sim
I
I
•:onmUon
V~r,Gocd ·
Iver, Good ·
IVeNGood
lverv Good
I
I ieUI ladrm,.I 9,lhs TcUI lei:smd a,1,,
iotaJ lsmm,.t
I
W Abo•11 Gradi
I To!a/ /Sdlm;,I B,lh, I
'. Room Cll'Jlll
I 5 I 2 I 3 I 5 I 2 12.75
+2.000
5 I 2 I J I
I 5 I 2 I 2. 5 I
Gto;; Uvl;;a ftm
I
1.482 la. II.
1.430 ,a. IL
.1.4,000
1, 502 ; o. It.
M!I
1.552 ;a. It.I
-7.000
: 3mmanl & Fini;hed
j Mo 83sar.ient No Sa.; ~mant
No 3asamenl
\No Sasamenl
:;; R□•Jim s,~w G;ade
M/A
NIA
fl/A
MIA
F1r.cUonal UUHi'/
l,:weraoe
!.~v!:!r;:o:!
;.\vgr:3ae
!Averaa::?
I
I
I
,;; Hiatinq/"Caofino
I
IGFA / Canlral
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Individual Condominium Unit Apprai3al Report

far

West Bank

rill# SLC91 S3J•K

This report form is design2d lo ri!port an appraisal of a unit in a condominium project or a condominium unit in a planned·'
unit dev2Japrnant (PUD) . This raport form Is not designed to report an appraisal oi a manufactured hOme or a untt in a
cooper3tiv2 project
This appr3isal report is subiact to the following scope of work, intended use, intended user, definition of market value,
st3tement of as:;umptions and limiting conditions, and c:rtilications. Modifications, additions, or deletions to lhe intended
use, intended user, definition of market value , or assumptions 3nd limiting conditions are not permitted. The appraiser may
~xpand the scope of work to include any additional research or analysis necessary based on the complexity of this appraisal
assignment. Modincations or deletions to th2 certmcations are also not permitted. How2ver, additional cer1irications 1h31 do
not constitute material altar3tions to this appr3isal report, such 3S those r2qui1cd by law or those related to the appraise~,
continuing education or mambership in an 3ppraisal organization, are permitted.
SCOPE OF WORK: The scope of wor1< for this appraisal is defined by the complexity oi this appraisal assignment and the
reporting r2quirarnents of this appraisal r:1port form , including the following definition of market value, slatement oi
assumptions and limiting condiiions, and c2rtifications. The appraiser must, at a minimum: (1) perform a complete visual
inspection of the in~rior and exterior areas of the subject unit, (2) Inspect and analyze the condominium project, (3) inspect
the neighborhood, (4) inspect each of the compmble sales from at least the str2et, (5) research, verify, and analyi.2 data
irom reliable publi c amVcr pr~1ate sources, and (6) report his or her analysis, opinions, and conclusions In this appraisal
raport
INTEN DED USE: The lnt2nd2d use of this appraisal report is for th2 lender/client to e'1aluat2 the property that is the
subject of this appraisal for a mortgage finance transaction.
--- - - -.- -- - -::INJ:fiNQ~_Q.t.JS~fl:- -fne -jnt~nd.ed-u~~r--oi-t_hi~-~ppr~i~?l-r~port .is-th2.1ender/clienL ·---

-

- - - -.. - ----:---·-- - - - - i - - - - -

MARKET VALUE: The most prob3ble prica which a pro~erty .should being_ In 3 competiti'le · and open- ma'rkat under ·all
conditions requisite to a fair sale , ~~2 · buyer- and seller, each acting prudently,. knowledgeably and assuming Iha price is n·ot
affected by undue stimulus . Implicit in this definition Is the consummation ai a sale as oi a specified date and the passing of
title from sellar to buyer under condiaons wh21oby: (1) buyer and sellar a;e typically moti'lalad; (2) both parties are well
lniorrned or well ad,1ised, and each acting in what he or she considers his or her own best Interest; (3) a reasonable time is
allowed for exposure in the open r.iar,et; (4) payment is made in terms of cash in U. S. dollars or in terms oi financial
ar,angement:; comparable ther2to; and (5) the price represents tlle normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by
special or creative finar.c ir.g or s2l 2s concessions• grentsd by anyone associated with the ;ale.
' Adjuslrnent; to the comp2r2bles must be rmde for special or creative financing or sales concessions. Na adjusbnents are
necessar; for those costs which are normally paid by seller, as a result of tr.,jition or law in a ma1kat area; thasa cos s are
rea dily identifiable since the seller pays these costs in virtually all sales transacti ons . Special or creative financing
adjustments can b:: made to the cor:iparabla property !ly comparisons to financing terms offmd by a third part/ insiitutional
lender that is not alroady lnval•1ed in th e prop erty or transaction. Any adjustment should not be calculated on a mechanical
dollar for dollar cost of Hie financing or concession but the dollar amount oi any adjustment should approximate th2 mar'.1et';
reaction to the financing or concessions based on the appr:iiser'.; judgment.
STA tcMENT OFASSUMPT!ONS AND UM!TING CONDIT!ONS: Ti1e appreiser's certification in this r,port is
subject to the following assumptions and limiting conditions:
1. The appr:is~r will not be responsible for matters of a legal natura that affect either the propert/ being appraised or the
title to it. except for information that he or she became awara oi during the research involved in performing this appraisal.
The appraiser assumes t, at the title is good and marketable and will not render 3ny opinions about the title.

2. The appr,iiser has provided a sketch in this appraisal report to show the 3pproximate dimensions oi the improvements.
The sketch is included only to assist the reader in visuali,:ing \he properr; and underst3nding the apprJiser's determination
of i~ size .

3. The appr:iiser has examined the available flood maps Uiat ara provided by the Feder3I Emergency Management Agency
(or other data sources) and has noted in !his appralsal report whether any portion of the subject site is locat2d in an
identified Special Flood Ha!ard Area. Because the appraiser Is not a sur,eyQr, he or she makes no guar:mt22s, exprass or
implied, regarding this determination.

4. The appraiser will not gi•,e testimony or appear in court because he or she made an appraisal oi the property in question,
unles; spec·iic arrangements to do so have been made beforehand, or as otherNise requirnd by law.
5. Tne appraiser has noted in this apprais31 r~port any a1verse cond~Jons (such as needed repair;, deterioration, the
pre.sence of hazerdcus mstas, toxic sub stances, etc.) obsar,ed during the inspection of the subject proper!'/ or that he or
she became awm of during the research involved in periorming this 3ppr3isa!. Unless other.vise stated in this appraisal
report, the appraiser has no knowledge oi any hidden or unapparent physical deficiencies or adverse conditions of the
property (such as, but not limited to, needed repairs, dateriar3tion, the pres2nc2 of hazardous wastes, toxic substances,
adverse environmental conditions, etc.) that would rmke the property less valuable, and has assumed that there are no
such conditions and makes no guarantees or warranties, express or implied. The appraiser will not be responsible for any
such c □ nc!iti □ ns lhal do exist or for any engineering or testing that might be required to discover whether suc h conditions
exisl Because the appraise r is nol an ex~art in the field of environmental hazards, thi s appraisal report must not be
considerad as an an'lironrnenta! assessment ol the property.
6. ih2 appraiser has based his or her appraisal report and valuation conclusion ior an appraisal that is subject to

satisfactorJ completion , repairs, or alterations on the assurnplion that the completion. repairs, or ali2r;tlon s of the subject
properl'f will be periorr.ied in a proiessional manner.
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lnciiviclual Condominium Unit Appraisal Raport

ril~ # SLC9153J-K

APPRAISER'S CERllFICATIOM: The Appraiser c2riiries and agr~es that:
1. I have, at a minimum, developed and reported this appraisal in accordance with the scape of work requlr~menls state1 ln
this appraisal report.

2. I p2rformed a complete visual inspection oi the interior and e~:terior areas of the subject property. I reported the condition
of the improvements in factual, specific terms. I identified and reported the physical oefici2ncies lhat could affect tha livabili~.
soundness, or structural integrity of the property.
·

3. I periormed !his eppraisal in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Standards oi Professional Appraisal
Practice that were adopted. and promulgated by the Appraisal Standarns aoard of The Appraisal Foundation and that were in
place a! the time this appr3isal report was preparad.

4. I de'leloped my opinion of the marl<et value of !he real property that is the subject of this report based on the sales
comparison approach to v=lue. J h3•1e adequale comparable market data to develop a reliable sales comparison approach
for this appralsal asslgnmenL I further certify that I considered the cost and income approaches to value but did not develop
them, unless otherwise indic ated in this report.

5. I researched, verifi ed, analyz~d, and reported on 3ny current agreement for sale for the su bject property, any offering for
sale oi the subject property In the twelve months prior to the effective date of this appraisal, and the prior sales of the subject
property tor a minimum of three years prior to !he e:fectiv~ date oi this app~aisal, unless otherwise indicated in this reporl
6, I researched, verified, analyz~d, and reported on the prior sales of the comparable sales !or a minimum of one year prior
·- - -- - ··-- - - - - - - to.the. data_or_sale.of. the_compar:ab~_S.§@, unless otherNisa indicated in this report.

-- - -·· -

. --- -·--:,-:----1-- - - - -

7. I selectad and used comparable sales U1at ar~ I cationally, physically, and tuncbonally the most similar to the subject propert'j:

.

'

B. I have not used comparable sales that wern the result of combining a land sale with the contract purchase pric~ of a home that
has been built or will be buiil on !he land.

9. I ha•,e reported adjustments to the comparable sales that reflect the ma,~,et's reaction to the difierances bet.'leen lhe subject
property and the comparable sales.
10. I verified, lrom a disinlarested source, all inlarrnation i~ thls report that was pr□ 'lided by parties who ha.,e a financial intarnst in
the sale or fimncing of lhe subject property.

11. I ha•,e knowledge and experience in a~praising this ~Jpe

□i

property in \his mar~at area.

12. I 3m aware or, and hav9 acce ss to, the necessar; and appropriate public and priva!~ data sources, such as multiple fisting
ser,.ices, tax as.;essment records, public land r::cords and other such dat3 sources fer the ar,a in which the property is loc;ted.
13. I obtained the iniormation, estimates, and o~inions furnished by other parties and ex~ressed in this appr3is.l r=~ □rt from
reliable sources that I believe to be true and correcl
14. I hava taken inlo consider3tlon the fac to rs that have an impact □ n value with resp2ct to !/12 subject nei<;hborilood, subject
property, and the proximity oi the subject property to ad•1erse intluences in he development or my opinion oi ma(,1et value. I
have noled in this appraisal report any adverse conditions (such as, but not limited to, needed repairs, deterioration, the
presence oi hazardous wastes, toxic substances , adverse en•1iranment2I condrtlons, .etc.) obser,ed during the inspection of the
subject proparty or that I became awan oi during the research involved in perfonning this appraisal. I have considered these
ad.,erse conditions in my anal,sis oi the property value, and have reported on the effect oi the conditions on the value and
mar1(etabili~ of the su bject property.

15. I have not knowingly withheld any slgnificanl lnforrnatlon lrom this appraisal r~port and, lo lhe best of my lmowledgs, all
statament; and iniormation in this appraisal report ars !rue and correct.
16. I sta t:d in this appraisal r,port rny own personal, unbiased, and proies;lonal analysis , opinions, and conclusions, which
a;e subject only to the assumptions and limiting conditions in his appraisal report

17. I hav, no pr9sent or prospective Inters ;t in the property that is !he subject of t is report, and I ha,,e no present or
prospective personal interest or bias with rsspec t to the parJcipants In the transaction. I did not base, either par'Jally or
completely, my analysis and/or opinion oi mar'~et value in ttiis appraisal report on the 1"3Ce , color, religion, sex, age, marttal
statu;, handicap, familial siatus, or nation al ongln of etther the prospectiv~ owners or occupant; of the subject property or ol the
present owners or occupants of the properties in the vicinity ol the subject property or on any other basis prohibitad by law.
18. My employment and/or compensation for pertonni ng this appraisal or any fu\ura or anticipated appraisals was not
conditioned on any agre ement □ r understanding, written or otheruise, that I would report (or pr,sent analysis supporting} a
predetermined specific value, a predetermined minimum value, a range or dirsctlon In value, a value that favors the cause □ r
any party, or the attainment of a specific result or occur.ence of a specific subs:quent event (such as epproval of a pending
mcrtgage loan application).

19. I personally pr:pued all conclusions and opinions about the r:al estate that w:re set forth in this app r3i:;al report. If I
relied on significant real property apprai:;al assis tance trnrn any indi•,idual or individuals in the pertorrn:nce oi this appraisal
or the preparation of !his appraisal report, l ha·,a named such individual(s) and di;closed the specific !asr.s perfonned in this
appraisal report I certir; that any individual so named is qualified to pertann the tasKs. I have not aul~orized anyone to make
a change to any item in IJ is appraisal report; therefore. any change made to this appraisal is unauthorized and I will take no
responsibili'.y ior it.

20. I idenliiied the lencJer/cliem in !his appraisal report who is the individual, organiraiion , or agent for the organiaticn that
ordered and will re~eive this appr:iisal report.
Fr::C:Si? r,13c Farm 405 12ri:h 2005
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2L The ler,d;;r/clien l may disclose or disIribute this appraisal report to: U,e borrower; anolher lender al the requesl of the
bor;ower; the mortgagee or its successors and assigns; mortgage insurer,; gov~mment sponsored enterprises; other
secondary market participants; data collection or repor'Jng ser,ices; profes.;ional appraisal organizations; any depar'u11ent,
agency, or ins!rumenta!it'/ oi the Untted States; and any state, the Districl of Columbia, or other jurisdictions; wtthout having to
obtain !he appraiser's or super,iscr1 appraiser', (it applicable) consent. Such consent must be obtained before this appraisal
report may be disclosed or distributed to any other party (including, but not limited to, the public lhrough adver'Jsing, public
relations, new,, sale;, or other media).
22. I am aware !hat any disclosura or distribufion of this appraisal report by me or the lender/client may be subject lo certain
laws and ragulations. Further, I am also subject to the provisions oi the Uniform Standards of Profos,ional Appraisal Praclice
that pertain to disctosure or distribution by me.

23. The borrower, 3nolher lender al the request of lhe borrower, the mortgagee or its successors and assl9ns, mortgage
insurers, governmani sponsored enerprises, and other secondary mar'~at participants may rely on this appraisal report as part
of any mofigage iinance transaction that involves any one or more of lhase parties.

24. If this appraisal report was transmitted as an "electronic record" containing my "electronic signature, " as !hose terms ar~
defined in applicable federal andf,;ir state laws (excluding audio and video recordings). or a facsimile transmission oi this
ai:praisal repcrt containin g a copy or representaiion of my signature, the appraisal report shall be as effeclive, enforceable and
valid as II a paper vers ion of this appraisal report were delivered containing my original hand written signalure.

25. Any intentional or negligent mlsrepresentation(s) contained in !his appraisal raport may result in civil liability and,lor
criminal penalties Including, bul not limited to , fine or imprisonment or both under the provisions of Title 18. United Staes
Code , Section 1001 , et seq., er similar state laws:
- . ..
. .
. . . •·•• - · - -··-:.- · - - --- . .
SUPERVISORY AP.PRAISER'S CERTIFICATION: The _Super1isory Appraiser certifies and agrees !hat ·

-

1. I directly supervised the appraiser for !his oppraisal assignment, have read the appraisal report, and agree with the a~praiser's
anelysis, opinions, stalernents. conclusions. and the appraiser's certification.
2. I accept lull responsioility /or the contents Gt !his apprai~al repon ir.clueling, but not limited to, the appraiser"s analysis, opinions,
sial:mer,ls, conclusions, and the appraiser's certiiication.

3. Tiie appr:iiser identified in this appraisal repon is either a sub-contractor or an em~loye5 of the super,isof'/ appr:iiser (or ihe
appraisal firm), is qualified t•J pertorrn this appraisal, and is acceptabl, to perform this appraisal under Iha applicable state law.
4. This appraisal report complies with the Uniiorrn S!andards al Proiessior.al Appraisal Practic: that wera ad'Jptad and
promulgated by the Appr,i.al Stzncards Baard of The Appraisal Foundation and that were in place at !he Ume this appr~isal
repar- was prepared.
5. If this appraisal report was !ransmitled as an "electronic record" containing my "elect-unic signatur~." as !hose terms are
defined in applicable ·eceral and/er state laws (excluding audio and video recordings), or a facsimile transmission oi this
appr~lsal report containing a copy or representation of my signalure, the appraisal report shall be as 2ffe-:tiv2. enior:eable ,r.d
valid as if a paper version of this appraisal report were delivered containing my original hancl written sign2tur~.

APPRAISER

SUP~~VISDRY APPRAISER (ONLY IF REOUIR~O)

.kit'

Signatur,
Name Kavli"?...Aala
fR:::isor: AD!lrJisal S~r-,ic! . LLC
Cor71pany
C;impany Address ? .o. eax 980032, ?3r< Chv. UT 8409a

Slgnaturi
Name
Company Name
Comp2Jly Addre.;s

T,lephone Number (301 l 322-4o3a
:mail Address ka•1ln.w~sd®r~sor.ao0Gisal.cor.,
Dare of Signa ure and Report 05/2712011
rnective Oate al Appraisal 01/11I201 l
State Certification # 5•725~0-CRCO
or Stale License #
or Otr,er
Staie#
State UT
a/3 1120 12
E.xpi;ation Date of Certification or Licen.;e

Telephone Number
~mail Addre;;
Data ot Signature
State Certification #
or State License #
Sta~
Expiration Date or Certification or License

Name

ADDRESS OF PRO?:RTY APPRAISED
2550 Oe~r Valle,, DrNe E3st. t:. 302
?3r!(

CIN. UT B4060

APPRA\ScD VALUE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY S S::=-Above
LENOER/Cl!Ei'IT
N1.me
Corr.pany M2me R3V Qu inre 1 3nd Nebekar ?.C.
Company Address 3ii sou~'l Stale SL Suite 1400. P.O. Box:!.53.35.
1

S31! L3ke Citv. UT 34145

.SUBJECT PROPERTY
Did not inspect subject property
Did inspect exterior ol subject property irom streel
Date of lnspec tion
O Did in.spec I interior and exterior of subject property
Date of Inspection

O
O

COMPARABL: SALES
Oid not inspec t ext;;rior of cor>1parable sale s from s:reet
Did in.spec! exl~fior of comparable sales from ;lreet
Date of Inspection

O
O

Email Address
Freddie Mac f orm 465 Maren 2805

Page ii of

o

~-,, nm·, .,r,inl ;olt.vm bi, la mcde, Ir.,. -

Fannie Mae Form 1073 March 2005
-3u().,\L~)/ODE

- - - · ·· - · - - - ·

· - - - - - - - -~- -

· ·

►

- --

- ... _,.,,..

___ -~---- --....

!Main ~e Ng. SLC915JJ,Kl ?3pr,-: j

Far Wast Sank
Fil, rt sLcmJJ K

lnciividual Condominium Uni! Appraisal Rapor'i

RP.i\JP.E
SU!!.IECT
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I
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Lodgas a\ D2er Valley
1
·s,; Phm
1
1
\!,· ProximiiV loSIJ1>'2el
I.-/ -..,c~L,,- ,.,,-:lo.38 miles N
I t.22 rnilas NW
I0.25 m!as NE
€ Sale Plice
Is
/~~4-l~.f.:,-;;s~":;fa.:n
o39.75~E:~:.';-:=:,~,:=t.:::;~· ;
612,SOult,.;-.;tc:~;,.;,;~;;.ifs
575.000
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j

I
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1/ertllca!ionSource/s)
: VALUE A□Jusr.:a-rr,
~ - Sale; or Financing

MLS Closed./lnsoecl / 106 DOM)

OESCRIP110N

- Dal, ol Sal'!/llmi
LocaUon

• LeasaholdiFei Simple
HOA Mo. Amssment
0

I

f;-:! Common Eiemar,1;
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Fil~ No. SLCQ153J-I(
acr1ow;r/Ci~I NIA
Fm~~j AddfC-iS 255,J O!!:!f Vafey DM-.t~ East
Cllv
Park Ctr,
1 ~ru~r
P.a'I Qulnne'/ and Nebek:r P.C.

Countv Sunmil

Slit, UT

Zln Code 8406D

The appraiser prepared ~~Is r,,port using WinTolal. A la Mode, Appraisal Software. Using lhis sofiwar,, lh: appraiser can affix
lhe si1;nalura us ing s:curlt-; option wi th password protection . The a~pralser solely controls L'l is p.assword. If this rapcr1 ls
deli-,arad etectrcnically it is conver'.ad into PDF Format which cannot be changed or alte;ad :,y th: receiver.
Client
The Lender/Client named on the front of this appraisal report is Iha Client.
Appraisal ln ~nded User and Use
The Lender/Client i s the Intended User of this appraisal. Th= appraiser has nol ldenttned any other Intended User. . Should a
borrower or any other third ;,arty choose to rely on !hi; apprais,;i, they can only do so within Iha Scope of Won< agreed upon
and delineated be~11een the Ap?raiser and Client ior the lnt:nded Use of lhis report . II is further noted that simply because a
borrower or third party may recei ve a copy ni this report, ii does not me3n tha t the borrowar or third party ls an Intended Us:r as
this farm is defined in this ~par'~
Thi! Intended Use of this report is lo es!lrnala the ialr market value for the subject as or 09/16/2010. Tnis Intended Use is
subject lo the Scope of Work (as outlined), purpose of apprnlsal, appraisal report form repor1ing requirements , and Dannillon of
Mac<al Value.
·
- - - - - - - - - - - ·- -· -

-scope·oi'Wor~ - -

- ··- - - - - _..,_ · -- - - · - · - ···-- - - , - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - -- - - - - - -- -

Tna apprai;er performed a physical inspection a, daline21t:d above on the anaclive date o f the appraisal. Based upon
assignment irom the clien t the FNMA 1073 Form was used lo repor1 the appraisal ~sulls. The square footage w,;s taken frcrn
mea.;uri ng the hous2 3n.d/or floor plans. Jn the case of iloor plans the iquar~ footage 1Nas verified {hrough

physicar

mes3uramenl and/or 3ppr3isal :;kelc1 sort'-N3r.~.
Nola ID lnt!ndad Usar and/or Reader of this raper,, furl.her clarincatlon of Scopa oi 'No~< Included In thi3 r;eport:
This appr,,lsal Is based on an Interior and e:cterior in;psclion and I; prepared for L~e sole and axclusive use of Iha appraiset.;
client lo assist wilh !he mcn ~age tending decision.
This report Is net a "home Inspection,' A pro/ssslonal homa inspection has not been periorrned by the appraiser on Iha sub)acl
property. The appraisal inspection ~ericrmed by Iha appralsar !s iar the purposes of determining a value conclusion for L~e
property through lls mar.~ at -harc,clerislics (11am 2 in all3ched cer.ificallon). Tne aporai ser performed a visual inspection of the
3C~saibre and 1=3dlly ob3arJ:able 3f:?3S or th:! .s 1.Jbject. Scut'Je:; 3nd :1rLlc.s \~I:' not vfew::d. Snow cov~red ro0f3 ar:, not
reac ily obser,able. Thi. report :annol be rallad upon lo :Jisclose c::indilions andlor ,:lefa~ts In the subject property. In addition,
the ex1erio r finish (!.a. slucro, wood, and/or vinyl, etc.) appears to be In go~d condition, however, the appraiser Is not quarined lo
da l ecl problems which rray include moisturs, !iuild up, mold, pr~per C1"3inage, e!c. A proies3ional heme inspection or
:!nvironm2nl31 inspcc!lon is racomrnen::led to 3ddr:!S3 ;uch mati :!n. The 3pprals~r made a visual rooi inspection frcm lhe
,;round only, and appears to be in good condition, but was unable lo determine the amount or depr2clafion of the roof. No signs
ai curllng or misalng ;>ie,:e3 were nuted hcwev~r 3 pro re 5.sional roorinspaction and c:?rlificati::m would b=' r~cor.,mi?nded lo
address ~uch mar. ers. Th e appraiser is not a hor:,a Inspector, and does n □l guarantee Iha! Iha subject Is free of defecli:, nor
should !his re port be railed upon to disclose any conditions present in th: subject property. Tne appraiser periorms an
inspection or the visible and acces sible ars,as only. Mold , lead paint, 1"3don and a.sbes!os Issues are beyond !he ;ccpe of L'lis
appraisal inspection. A professional home or environmental ins;:,ecllon Is recommended lo address such mat::rs.
Sales in the subject ~,ojecl subs~uen l lo affective date.
PCMLS
PCMLS
PCMLS
PCMLS

#9S8a072: 2550 Deer Vallay D r /:2D1 Sold on D~/23/2011 for $470,0CO
#398i541 : 2550 Dear Vallay Or #302 Sold on 04/15/201 1 for $475,000
#9936435: 2550 Dee r va ney Dr t:502 Sold on 03/30/2011 for S475,000
~9966406: 2550 DeerVaney Dr ;;402 Said on 03/02/2011 for $4i 5,000

Jack Me!son Is a lie:nsed appraiser 3nd is :iualified lo panlclpala In the prgparallon oi repor'.s. H: 3;sisls in the phys'cal
inspect ion of the .Subject property Including measuring, laking photo,, Inspecting the compar3ble s ircrn the street and taking
photos of the com parables, assisting in Iha selection ~f comparables, and anterL~g the all :al3 into the ra;iort. Ha also
participates in making adjustments.
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15 LCR 536, *; 2007 Mass. LCR LEXIS 121, **

WILLIAM J. REIK III, individually and WILLIAM J. REIK III and WILLIAM J. REIK, JR., as trustees
of WILLIAM J. REIK, JR. RESIDENCE TRUST v. RON S. JANSSON, GAIL NIGHTINGALE, RICHARD
L. BOYD, RALPH COPELAND, DANIEL CREEDON, JEREMY GILMORE and SHEILA GEILER, as they
are the Members of the ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, and LENTE
FESTINA, LLC; JOHN G. DOHERTY, JR. and DAWN DOHERTY v. RONS. JANSSON, GAIL
NIGHTINGALE, RICHARD L. BOYD, RALPH COPELAND, DANIEL CREEDON, JEREMY GILMORE and
SHEILA GEILER, as they are the Members of the ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE TO WN OF
BARNSTABLE, and LENTE FESTINA, LLC
Misc. Case Nos. 311024, 311024 and Case No. 311121
MASSACHUSETTS LAND COURT
15 LCR 536; 2007 Mass. LCR LEXIS 121

October 11, 2007, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Affirmed by Reik v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2009 Mass. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 227 (Mass. App. Ct., Feb. 26, 2009)
CORE TERMS: variance, appraiser, diminution, privacy, zoning, ordinance, property values,
parcel, credible evidence, buyer, conservation, feet, lot size, credible, abutting, buffer,
neighborhood, proxi mity, rebutted, comparables, real estate, ownersh ip, vacant, comparable
sales, buy, board's action, vacant lot, person aggrieved', special permit, prospective buyer

HEAD NOTES

Variances-Standing-Diminution in Value-Loss of Privacy-Speculation-Inappropriate
Com parables
SYLLABUS

[** 1]
Weighing the testimony of three real-estate appraisers, Justice Keith C. Long found that the
Plaintiffs challeng ing a variance allowing the construction of a single-family home on a vacant,
nonconforming Hyannisport lot lacked standing to do so where they failed to prove any potential
diminution in property value and where any diminishment in privacy was irrelevant as buyers in
this neighborhood were attracted by the "villagy" feel of the area and were not seeking privacy
but entry into an attractive, engaging community .
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. , 0 , Bruce P. Gilmore, P.C. for the Plaintiff (Misc. 311024).

Stuart W. Rapp, Esq .....~ , Law Offices of Stuart W. Rapp for the Plaintiff (Misc. 311121).
Robert D. Smith·, Esq . .,.., Town Attorney for the Defendant (Misc. 311024 and 311121).
Julie P. Barry, Esq .

..-YJ , Nutter McClennen & Fish for the .Defendant(Misc. 311024 and 311121).

JUDGES: Keith C. Long .... , Justice.
OPINION BY: LONG .,..
OPINION

[*536] DECISION
Introduction
In these consolidated G. L. c. 40A, § 17 appeals, the plaintiffs William J. Reik III, individually, and
William J. Reik III and William J. Reik, Jr., as co-trustees of William J. Reik, Jr. Residence Trust
(the "Reiks") (Misc. Case No. 311024) and John G. and Dawn R. Doherty (the "Dohertys")
[**2] (Misc. Case No. 311121) see k annulment of a variance granted by the defendant Zoning
Board of Appeals of the Town of Barnstable (the "Boa rd") to the defendant Lente Festina, LLC
("Lente Festina"). This variance permits Lente Festina to build a single-family home on the parcel
it owns at 80 Hyannis Avenue in Hyannisport, Massachusetts (the "Property" or the "Lente Festina
Property"). Since Lente Festina chal lenged the plaintiffs' standing to bring these appeals, the
cases were bifurcated to address the standing iss ue first.
[*537] A_fter Lente Festina's motion for summary judgment on standing was denied, the
--standing issue was tried before me, jury waived, and included a view of the Property, the
plaintiffs' properties, the other properties nearby (includ ing the other abutters'), and the
Hyannisport neighborhood generally. At my request, the parties also filed post-trial briefs to
clarify what uses, if any, would be permitted on the Property if it was purchased by an adjacent
landowner. Based on the facts stipulated by t he parties in their joint pre-trial memorandum, the
testimony and exhibits admitted into evidence at trial, my observ.a tions at the view, and my
assessment of the credibility, [* * 3] weight and inferences to be drawn from that evidence, I ·
find and rule that the plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the variance granted to Lente
Festina because there is no credible evidence of any adverse impact to the plaintiffs' property
values res ulting from the Board's decision. The plaintiffs' claims are thus DISMISSED in their
entirety, WITH PREJUDICE.
Facts
Defendant Lente Festina owns the 0.35-acre parcel of land at 80 Hyannis Avenue in the
Hyannisport section of Barnstable. The parcel is currently vacant, and is located in a Residential
F-1 (RF-1) Zoning District. The Barnstable Zoning Ordi nance requires a minimum lot size of one
acre and a minimum lot width of 125 feet in the RF-1 Zoning District. Zoning Ordinance of the
Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts§ 240-13.E. (1990) [herein-after the "Ordinance"]. The Lente
Festina Property does not meet either of these requirements.
The plaintiffs own the abutting parcels to either side of the Lente Fest ina Property. The Rei ks own
the 0 .35-acre lot to the north (90 Hyannis Avenue) and the Dohertys own the 0.57~acre lot to the
south (70 Hyannis Avenue). 1 Both of these parcels are also located within the RF-1 Zoning
District [**4] and, like Lente Festina's, are undersized. The homes on them, however, are
"grandfathered " because they pre- date the zoning restrictions that make them nonconforming.
See G. L. c. 40A, § 6. The Reiks reside on their property on a seasonal basis. The Dohertys do not
reside on their property, but rent it out on a seasona l basis. Neither plaintiff owns or has ever
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owned any interest in the Lente Festina Property.
I
I

FOOTNOTES
1 The owners of the parcels abutting the rear of the Lente Festina lot have not challenged the
variance and are not parties to these cases.

All three parcels are located within the geographic boundaries of the Hyannisport Civic
Association, Inc. (the "Civic Association"). Membership in the Civic Association is limited to
property owners within those boundaries, with rare exceptions. Members enjoy valuable benefits,
including the opportun ity to apply for private membership in the West Beach Club and year-round ·
security services. Although a majority of the properties within the boundaries of the Civic
Association are small in size, they are in high demand due to the benefits of Civic Association
member-ship, the close proximity to the ocean, the availabil ity of private community facilities
[**5] (the West Beach Club), and the limited supply of homes for sale.
Lente Festina's application for a building permit to construct a 2,375-square-foot single-family
dwelling on the Property was denied because the lot does not meet the Ordinance's minimum lot
size and width requirements. Lente Festina then filed an appeal to the Board, requesting a
variance. On June 20, 2005, the Board granted the variance, with conditions. i In separate
actions, now consolidated, the plaintiffs appealed. the Board's decision under G. L. c. 40A, § 17,
claiming that it was "arbitrary, capricious, [and] exceeded the authority of the Board." They
allege that the variance will result in a diminution to the value of their properties if the Property is
developed. This alleged diminution, their witnesses say, would be due to the loss of privacy from
the elimination of the "buffer" provided by the Property. 3
FOOTNOTES
2 For the purpose of this decision, I need not, and do not, adjudicate the merits of the Board's
decision.

Mr. Thomas Garrahan, a real estate appraiser retained by the Reiks, testified that the Reiks'
property would decrease in value from $ 900,000 to $ 832,500 (a seven and one-half percent
reduction in value). [**6] Ms. Geraldine Hanrahan, a real estate appraiser retained by the
· Dohertys, testified that the Dohertys' property would decrease in value by$ 50,000 (a four
: percent reduction). Lente Festina's appraiser, Mr. James Toner, however, disagreed with their
: analysis and conclusions. Mr. James Toner testified that neither the Reiks' nor the Dohertys'
property would experience a diminution in value as a result of the variance.
, 3

----·-··-·•--,-·,.-•-·-·- · - -··-·--··-

•·

·-·- ··-····-··

.

-

·•• ·········-·- - - - -

·•-·---. ···-·--· -·--

•··

-------·----

•-·-·

other pertinent facts are included in the Analysis section below.
Standard .of Review
The sole issue in this trial was whether the plaintiffs have established standing. Standing is
jurisdictional under G. L. c. 40A, §17. "Only a 'person aggrieved' may challenge a decision of a
zoning board of appeals." Marash/ian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719,
721, 660 N.E.2d 369 (1996) (citing Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health and Retardation Ass'n.,
Inc., 421 Mass. 106, 107, 653 N.E.2d 589 (1995); Green v. Bd. of Appeals of Provincetown, 404
Mass. 571, 572, 536 N.E.2d 584 (1989)); Butler v. City of Waltham, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 435, 440,
827 N.E.2d 216 (2005). "A plaintiff qualifies as an [sic] 'person aggrieved' upon a showing that
his or her legal rights will be infringed by the board's action. To show an infringement of legal
[**7] rights, the plaintiff must show that the injury flowing from the board's action is special
and different from the injury the action will cause the community at large." Butler, 63 Mass. App.
Ct. at 440 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the injury must be "to a specific interest that the
applicable zoning statute, ordinance, or bylaw at issue is intended to protect." Standerwick v.
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Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 30, 849 N.E.2d 197 (2006) (citing Circle Lounge
& Grille, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 324 Ma ss. 427, 431, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949)).
Under G. L. c. 40A, an abutter is presumptively a "person aggrieved." G. L. c. 40A, § 11;
Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 721. However, a defendant may challenge the plaintiffs standing by
"offer[ing] evidence 'warranti ng a find ing contrary to the presumed fact."' Standerwick, 447 Mass.
at 33 (quoting Marinelli v. Bd. of [*538] Appeals of Stoughton, 440 Mass. 255, 258, 797 N.E.2d
893 (2003)). 4 Once the presumption has be en rebutted, the issue of standing is "decided on the
basis of the evidence with no benefit to the plaintiff from the presumption." Id. (quoting Barvenik
v. Aldermen of Newton, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132, 597 N. E.2d 48 (1992)); Marashi/an, 421
Mass. at 721.

II FOOTNOTES
I

! 4 The process of rebutting the [**8] presumption does not shift the burden of proof to the
defendant, ·however. Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 35. The burden of proving standing still
remains with the plaintiff. Id.
------------·-·-- -·- --- --·-·· ·----- ----·-·-·--- -·--- -- ------ -·--·------ ··--Whether a plaintiff has proved standing is a question of fact for the judge. Marashi/an, 421 Mass.
at 721; Butler, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 440. However, this "does not req uire that the factfinder
ultimately find a plaintiff's allegations meritorious." Marashi/an, 421 Mass. at 721. "Standing is
the gateway through which one must pass en route to an inquiry on the merits. When the factual
inquiry focuses on stand ing, therefore, a plain tiff is not required to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that his or her claims of particularized or special inj ury are true." Butler, 63 Mass.
App. Ct. at 440-4 1. As a resu lt, the plaintiff is only required to "put forth credi ble evidence to
substantiate his allegations." Marashi/an, 421 Mass. at 721 .
The court in Butler addressed what cons ti tutes "credible evi dence" in zoning cases.
Although decided zoning cases have not discussed the ingredients of "credible
evidence," cases discussing the same concept in other contexts have observed that
"credible evidence" has both a quantitative [**9] and a qualitative component. We
th ink the same approach is appropriate here. Quantitatively, t he evidence must
provide specific factua l support for each of the claims of particularized injury the
pla intiff has made . Qualitatively, the evidence must be of a·type on which a
reasonable person could rely to conclude that the claimed injury likely will flow from
the board's action. Conjecture, personal opinion, and hypothesis are therefore
insufficient. When the judge determ ines that the evidence is both quantitatively and
qualitatively sufficient, however, the plaintiff has established standing and the inquiry
stops.

Butler, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 441-42 (citations omitted).
Analysis

Defendant Lente Festina Has Successfully Rebutted the Plaintiffs' Presumption of Standing
In this case, the plaintiffs are abutters and, therefore, presumptively have standing. Their cla im
of aggrievement is based solely on their contention that the value of their properties will diminish
due to a reduction in privacy resulting from Lente Festi na 's proposed project. Both the diminution
of real estate values and a loss of privacy may be valid bases fo r a claim of standing in G. L. c.
40A, § 17 cases. Contartese v. Mount Washington, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 673, 2006 WL
4326671, at * 11 (Ma. Super. Dec. 12, 2006). [**10] If the plaintiffs In this case would suffer a
diminution in the value of their properti es, such an injury might be a specific interest that the
Ord inance intended to protect, sufficient to provide standing. Ordinance§ 240-2. (stating that
one of the purposes of the Ordinance is "to protect and conserve the value of the property within
the Town"). For purposes of this Decision, I assume t hat it is such an interest. However, Lente
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Festina has successfully rebutted the presumption that it would negatively be affected.
To challenge the plaintiffs' presumptive standing, Lente Festina submitted the testimony and
associated exhib its of James V. Toner III, an accredited and certified Senior Appraiser whom I
fi nd both expert and cred ible. Mr. To ner testified that the variance would not diminish the fair
market value of either of the plaintiffs' properties. s He based this conclusion on several factors
(discussed in greater detail below), incl udin g the limited privacy in this already dense
neig hborhood, the amenities within the area , the benefits of the Civic Association, the high
demand for properties in Hyannisport, and the potential that the Lente Festina lot could be
developed to one degree [** 11] or another in the future either by right, by special permit or by
variance. Indeed, he asserted that the plaintiffs' property values would actually increase because
the house that would be built under the variance was attractive and suitable in size and design for
the neighborhood (a known quantity) and removed the uncertainty that an alternative
development-- whether by right, by specia l permit or by variance--would not be as attractive or
sui tab le. 6
FOOTNOTES

s "Fair market value" is an objective measure of the price a willing buyer would pay for the
property in an arms-length transaction, and thus takes into account all factors that such a
buyer reasonably would consider, value, and rely upon.
s The proposed buildi ng would conform to all zoning requirements, with the exception of the
lot area and width requirements. Decision at 3. I n particular, the building would comply with
frontage, setback, and height requirements. Ordinance § 240-13. E.; Ex. 17, Statement of
Agreed Facts, P 4.

---- ·-- -~-- -~----·~- - -

·----- --·----··--·

____ __ -- ------ ____ __
,.

,

This evidence "warrant[s] a finding contrary to the presumed fact," i.e., that no diminution occurs
in the plaintiffs' property values as a result of the variance . Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 33
(quoting Marinelli v. Bd. of Appeals of Stoughton, 440 Mass. 255, 258, 797 N.E.2d 893 (2003)).
[* * 12] Since the plaintiffs rely solely on the diminution of their property val ues that all egedly
results from the granting of the variance, Lente Festina has thus successfully rebutted the
presumption that the pla intiffs have standing.
The Plaintiffs Have Not Produced Credible Evidence to Establish They Will Suffer an Injury as a
Result of the Board's Decision to Grant a Variance
·

Since Lente Festina has successfully rebutted the plainti ffs ' presumption, the burden is now on
the plaintiffs to show their standing through credible evidence. Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 35;
Butler, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 441-42. As previously noted, the pla intiffs' sole basis for their
standi ng is their claim t hat the Board's decisi on to grant the variance to Lente Festina will result
in a diminution of their property values. The plaintiffs offered testimony from two certified real
estate appraisers in support of this assertion, Ms. Geraldine Hanrahan regarding the Dohertys'
property and Mr. Thomas Garra han regarding the Rei ks '. ' Lente Festina offered the testimony of
Mr. James Toner III, also a certified appraiser, in opposition.
FOOTNOTES
1 Ms. Hanrahan gave her opinion of the impact of the variance on the Doherty property.
· [ **13] Mr. Ga rrah an gave his opinion of the impact of the variance on the Reik property.

-

-

- - - - - - -~---· ---

[*539] As noted In footnote five, the fair market value of a property is an objective measure of
what a wil li ng buyer wou ld pay for it in an arms-l ength transaction. The calculation of that va lue
depends upon the factors that such a buyer would reasonably consider, value, and rely upon. I
have eva luated the evidence from the perspective of that hypothetical buyer. A~er reviewing the
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evidence, I find that the plaintiffs did not produce credible evidence to substantiate their claim
that their property values will be affected by the variance. As a result, I find that the plaintiffs do
not have standing to challenge it.
1. Privacy, to the Exten t I t Is at Issue Here, Is Not a Factor That Affects the Value of Homes in
Hyannisport
The plaintiffs' standing case depends upon two cen tra l propositions, first, that the degree of
"privacy" at issue here s affects the value of Hyannisport homes, and second, that the Lente
Festina lot , without the variance, provides the Reik and Doherty lots with an assurance of such
privacy, for which buyers will pay. As the evidence showed, the former is doubtful, and the latter
is certainly [**14] not the case.
: FOOTNOTES

s The house permitted by the Lente Festina variance is a modest single-family home
· measuring approximately forty feet by sixty feet and is located approximately in the center of
· the lot (forty feet from the southern lot line and twenty feet from the northern lot line). It will
thus be more than thirty-five feet away from the closest of the plaintiffs' houses (the Reiks').

~~e ~~~~e

~e·=-~~-~-_I~-~~~se~-~~

~~:-~

f:_: t _~i~'.:..~-~--i_
! s. ~~r~~-~~st £~~n-~... __ _ __________ ·-· _ __

...

.. ...... _,_!

Buyers who want privacy do not purchase homes in Hyannisport. The lots are small in size and
houses are located close to one another. Indeed, that is a great part of Hyannisport's charm as
the closeness lends a "neighborhood" feel to the community. In addition, Hyannisport is a
vacation destination, with many tourists visiting during the summer. The Kennedy fami ly owns
several residences in Hyannisport and there are tour buses traveling throughout Hyannisport
during the summer. Even the Dohertys' appraiser, Ms. Ha nrahan, conceded the point, admitting
that people do not move to Hyannisport to get away from other people. The Reiks' appraiser, Mr.
Garrahan, conceded that even with the Lente Festina lot vacant the Reik property currently
[**15] has limited privacy.
As Mr. Toner testified, people buy homes In this section of Hyannisport for other reasons. They
buy because of its prox im ity to the ocean and its association with the Kennedy family . They buy
because it entitles them to membership in the Civic Association and the West Beach Club. They
buy because its close-toge the r homes give It the feel and texture ·of a village. The amount of
privacy derived from a smal l, vacant lot next door -- a vacant lot over which the prospective
home purchaser would have no right of supervision or control -- would not be a factor that a
willing buyer would pay a premium for or would reasonably consider. The plaintiffs' appraisers'
opinions to the con trary, for th is reason and the others set forth below, are not credible.
2. The Pla intiffs' Appraisers Incorrectly Assumed that the Lente Festina Property Is Unbuildable
Even if a prospective buyer would pay a premium for the amount of "privacy " at issue in this case
(the difference between having the Lente Festina lot vacant and having it occupied by the house
permitted by the variance), he would only pay for it if that privacy was assured. Such assurance
could only come if the Lente Festina lot [**16] was unbulldable and completely unusable . But
there can be no assurance since that is not the case here. Contrary to the assumption upon which
the pla intiffs' appraisers' testimony is based , the Lente Festina Property Is, in' fact, both usable
and buildable. It can be used for activities that do not Involve structures. It is bu ildable with a
variance. 9 And, most notably, if any of the abutting landowners purchased the Property, several
uses wou ld be permitted under the Ordinance as of right or with a special permit. Such uses
include accessory uses (e.g., a garage, pool, storage building, or tennis court), a horse stable, or
a wind turbine. See Ordinance§§ 240- 13, 240-43, 240-44, 240-11.B.(2). In addition, if one of
the abutting landowners purchased the Property, that owner might be able to use it to expand
their existing home. Ordinance § 240-92; see also Bransford v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 444 Mass.
852, 832 N.E.2d 639 (2005).
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I

. FOOTNOTES

The parties all agreed to th is fact in their "Statement of Agreed Facts." Ex. 17 P 2. The
.
Assessor's office cat~gorizes the property as "potentially developable" and taxes it as such. Id. •
at P 19.

. 9

In short, this is simply too popular a neighborhood for anyone to [**17] reasonably assume
that a vacant lot next door -- a lot in which they have no ownership or other interest and thus no
means of control -- will stay forever vacant. Thus, a potential buyer of either of the plaintiffs'
properties will not pay a "privacy premium" for them, and the plaintiffs' appraisers' testimony to
the contrary is not grounded on credible facts. As unfounded "conjecture, personal opinion, and
hypothesis," their testimony is insufficient for establishing the plaintiffs' standing. Butler, 63
Mass. App. Ct. at 441.
3. The Plaintiff Appraisers' Use of Properties with Excess Land or Conservation Restrictions as
Comparab le Sales Is Not Appropriate In Evaluating an Alleged Diminution In Value Under the
Circumstances of This Case
The plaintiffs'· appraisers' opin ions are further undercut by their reliance on inappropriate
comparable sa les. Ms. Hanrahan and Mr. Garrahan looked at properties with either excess land on
the parcel or with open land next to them and attempted to derive the value added by that excess
or open land. Extra la nd may add value to a property, to be sure. But, as Lente Festina's
appraiser, Mr. Toner, testified, it adds value in one of two situations -- if it [**18] can be used
by that person (in w hich case the va lue is largely derived from its use), or if it is deed restricted
from any development (e.g., conservation land ).
In the first situation, to be able to use land (e.g., for recreation, to build accessory uses, to keep
the land as a buffer from neighbors, etc.), one must either own it or have tights in it. The
plaintiffs have no such rights in the Lente Festina Property. The comparables upon which Ms.
Hanrahan and Mr. Garrahan based their testimony all involved properties in which the extra land
was in the same ownership as the main parcel. They are thus un-like the situation in this case
and cannot be used as comparables.

[*540] In the second situation, conservation land is restricted from development either
because it is government-owned or deed-restricted. There, value is added by the buffer because
it can be counted on to stay a buffer. But there are no such restrictions on the Lente Festina ·
Property; therefore, this analogy, and the resulting conclusion that the Property adds value to the
plaintiffs' properties, is improper. Absent enforceable conservation restrictions, a prospective
buyer could not reasonably assume that the Property would [**19] be restricted from
development. Thus, the conservation lands also cannot be used as comparables.
4 . The Plaintiffs' Claim of Diminution In Their Property Values Due to a Loss of Privacy Is Based
on Mere Speculation
The lack of credibility in the plaintiffs' appraisers' opi nions is further underscored by the
uncertai nty of their conclusio ns, showing that they were based on mere speculation. As stated
previously, diminution of property values may be a proper basis for standing; however, "the
showing of diminution [must be] based on more than mere speculation." Quigley, et al. v.
Mulhern, et al., 11 LCR 248, 250 (2003) (citing Tsagronis v. Bd. of Appeals of Wareham, 415
Mass. 329, 330, n.4, 613 N.E.2d 893 (1993); Marchese v. Desisto, 8 LCR 43 (Land Court Misc.
No. 258666) (2000) ). "Even if an expert has the requisite knowledge and experience, conclusory
statements as to changes in the value of land without explanation are not admissible." Ramey v.
D'Agostini, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 674, 2005 WL 3748465, at * 1 (Ma. Super. Nov. 9, 2005).
Here, in making their assessment of a diminution based on a loss of privacy, both of the plaintiffs'
appraisers relied on comparison sales for parcels within the same ownership or conservation
properties [**20] (see analysis above). Using various "adjustments," both Mr. Garrahan and
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Ms. Hanrahan found changes in property values they attributed to differences in lot sizes, rang ing
from six to twenty percent, twelve to twenty-two percent, and five to twenty percent. They
selected a diminution value on the lower part of this range (seven and one-half percent for the
Reik property and four percent for the Doherty property) to accou nt for the fact th_at the plaintiffs
had no ownership or other interest in the Lente Festina property, yet they had no real explanation
or credible factual support for their choice of these particular figures or, for that matter, any
particular figure. Even Mr. Garrahan conceded that "there's no good way to quantify" what portion
of the lot size value is attributed to privacy, 10 and that the comparable sales analysis did not help
him select the seven and one-half percent diminution fig ure. Rather, he stated it was simply his
opinion based on his training and experience. Likewise, Ms. Hanrahan also testified that her
diminution figure was based on her experience with wetlands and conservation land.
FOOTNOTES

i.

i

Trial Tr. vol. 1, 76, Oct. 31, 2006. Mr. Garrahan also stated that "[t]hings [**21] can
range from 5 to 50 percent to a hundred percent, depending on the extreme differences or
the differences in the quality -- lot size, views ... It's just . . . there's no good way to
quantify it except -- to explain it except that that seems a - reasonable, given the lot size
. di fferences and how that plays out through Hyannisport, the difference in lot values ." Id .
..__. ,._ --· . •·----- - - 10

But saying something is so does not make it so. Quia ego sic dico, without a sound basis, is not
an acceptable method of analysis, even for an expert. These percentage calculations -- indeed, as
shown above, any percentage calculation based on the pla intiffs' alleged comparables -- lack a
credible foundation.
Mr. Toner's testimony, which I cred it, was directly contrary to the plaintiffs' appraisers' testimony.
Based on his ana lysis of the proximity of abutting dwell ings in Hyann isport, "there was no direct
correlation between the proxim ity of abutting dwellings and build ings in [th e comparable] sales
and the sale price." 11 Therefore, Mr. Toner indicated that a "buffer" ( or lack of one) between
properties located in Hyann isport does not contribute (or diminish) to the sales price.
FOOTNOTES
11

Trial Tr. vol. 2, 333, Nov. 1, 2006.

Fo r [* * 22] all of th e foregoing reasons, I find that the plaintiffs' expert opinions are not credible
and can be given no weight. The evidence has not shown that a prospective buyer would pay
more for the plaintiffs' properties based upon an expectation of privacy from the "buffer" provided
by the Lente Festina Property. Nor has it shown that the plaintiffs will experience a diminution of
value if the Property is developed. Rather, the evidence shows that property values in
Hyannisport are based upon proxi mity to the ocea n, location within the borders of the Civic
Associa tion, the strong demand for houses with a correspondingly small supply of homes for sale,
private community facilities, and other amen ities. As a result, the plaintiffs have failed to produce
credible evidence (either quantitatively or qualitatively) to demonstrate they have suffered any
injury due to the Board granting the variance and, therefore, do not have stand in g under G. L. c.
40A, § 17.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the plaintiffs lack standing to cha llenge the variance granted
by the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Barnstable. The plaintiffs' claims are thus
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment [ **23] shall issue accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
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HUDA T. SCHEIDELMAN AND ETHAN W. PERRY, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent •

* Th is opinion supplements our previously filed opinion, Scheidelman v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2010-151, vacated and remanded, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012).
Docket No. 15171-08
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
T .C. Memo 2013-18; 2013 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 18; 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117

January 16, 2013, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Affirmed by Scheidelman v. Comm'r, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11941 (2d
Cir., June 18, 2014)
PRIOR HISTORY: Scheidelman v. Comm'r, 682 F.3d 189, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12272 (2d Cir.,
2012)
Scheidelman v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2010-151, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 186 (T.C., 2010)
DISPOSITION: [**1] Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United Sta tes Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated
the decision of the Tax Court find ing that petitioner taxpayers were not entitled to charitable
contribution deductions relating to the gra nt of a historic facade easement. The appellate court
concl uded that the appraisal relied on by the taxpayers was a "qualified apprafsal" for
purposes of I.R.C. § 170(f)(11) and remanded for a determination of the market value of the
deduction.

OVERVIEW: This case involved a claimed deduction for the taxpayers' grant of a historic
facade easement to an architectural trust. The appella t e court held that the appraisal the
taxpayers used was a "qualified appraisal" for purposes of I.R.C. § 170(f)(11), but remanded
for a val ue determination. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayers' evidence supporting
the value of the easement they donated was not cred ible. The appraiser determ ined value by
simply applying a mechanical discount percentage with no reliance on market data or
exam ination of the specific attributes of the property. A trial expert also was not credible
because he relied on outdated information rather than contemporaneous inspection and used
alleged comparables from outside the geographical area of the taxpayers' property. Because
the court could not accept t he taxpayers' evidence as credible, the burden of proof did not sh i~
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under I.R.C. § 7491(a). However, the.court concluded that regardless of the burden, the
preponderance of evidence supported the IRS position that the easement had no value for
charitable contribution purposes.
OUTCOME: The court determined that the taxpayers' charitable contribution of an easement
had no value for purposes of the claimed deduction.

CORE TERMS: easement, facade, appraisal, market value, historic, donation, preservation,
subject property, historic district, appraiser, conservation easement, valuation, conservation,
methodology, reliable, architectural, credible, donated, perpetuity, townhouse, estimate,
lender, buyer, deed, charitable contribution, tax benefits, qualified appraisal, market data,
property owner, rea_l estate
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taxpayers have satisfied their burden of proving the fair market value of a donated
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to incredible levels are rejected. An expert loses usefulness to the Ta x Court and
loses cred ibility when giving testimony tainted by overzealous
advocacy. More Like Thi s Headnote

COUNSEL: Fran k Agostino, Eduardo S. Chung ..., and Matthew Viera, for petitioners.

John V. Cardone, Marc L. Caine, and Marie E. Small, for respondent.
JUDGES: COHEN ... , Judge.

OPINION BY: COHEN ...
OPINION

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION
COHEN .... , Judge: This case is before us on remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012) [*P2] , vacating and
remanding T.C. Memo. 2010-151. The Court of Appeals vacated our decision, entered in
accordance with our conclusions in Scheidelman, that petitioners were not entitled to noncash or
cash charitable contribution deductions relating to the grant of a historic facade easement and a
cash contrib ution to the National Architectural Trust (NAT). The Court of Appeals held that the
appraisal petitioners relied on at the time their 2004 tax return was filed (Drazner report) was a
"qualified appraisal" for purposes of section 170(f)(ll) and that the disputed cash contribution
was deductible.
The case was remanded for a determ ination of the fair market value of the easement if we do not
accept respondent's other statutory and regulatory arguments, which relied on section 170(h)(5)
(A) (a contribution shall [**2] not be treated as exclusively for conservation purposes unless
the conserva tion purpose is prot ected in perpetuity) and section l.170A-14(g), Income Ta x Regs.
(requirements which must be met for the perpetuity requirement to be satisfied). See Kaufman v.
Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded in part, 687 F.3d
21 (1st Cir. 2012). Respondent no longer contends that the conservation deed and the annexed
lender agreement failed the requiremen ts of section 1.170A-14(g)(6), Income Ta x Regs., that the
contribution be protected in perpetuity.

[*P3] The appeal also involved respondent's challenge to our decision not to sustain section
6662(a) penalties against petitioners. Vacation of our decision mooted that portion of the appeal.
If we had been correct that the Drazner appraisal was not a qualified appra isal under the statute,
the case for penalties would have been stronger than it is now. See Evans v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2010-207, slip op. at 29. We see no reason to reconsider our prior conclusion with respect
to the penalties, and do not do so here.
The parties have agreed that th is case may be decided on remand on the evidence and
arguments already [**3] in the record. Unl ess otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code for the year in issue, and all Rule refe rences are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Background
For con venience, we repeat here portions of the findings of fact in our prior Memorandum Opinion
describing the relevant history of petitioner Huda T. Scheidelma n's donation of a historic facade
easement and the Drazner appraisal obtained in relation to that donation.
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On September 24, 1997, Huda T. Scheidelman (petitioner) purchased a property on Vanderbilt
Avenue within the Fort Greene Historic District in Brooklyn, New York, for $255,000 and became
the fee simple owner. The Fort [*P4] Greene Historic District Is desi gnated (1) a "registered
historic district" within t he meaning of section 47(c)(3)(B) by the Secretary of the Interior
through the National Park Service (NPS), a bureau within the U.S. Department of the Interior;
and (2) a historic district by New York City and its Landma rks Preservation Commission (LPC). In
New York City it is unlawful to alter, reconstruct, or demolish a building in a historic district
without the prior consent of the LPC. N.Y. City Admin. Code sec. 25-305 (2002) [**4] .
Sometime in the fall of 2002, petitioner received a postcard from the National Architectural Trust
(NAT), a section 501(c)(3) organization (that later became known as the Trust for Architectural
Easemen ts), announcing an upcoming meeting in the New York City area to provide information
regarding the donation of a facade conservation easement, including possible related tax benefits.
Petitioner was interested In preserving the historic facade of her house, particularly because she
observed real estate development increasing in and around Fort Greene. She also wanted to
obtain the tax benefits suggested by NAT.
On March 24, 2003, petitioner completed a facade conservation easement application for the
Vanderbilt property to be considered for a facade conservation easement donation to NAT. On the
application, petitioner identified two lenders that held mortgages on the property . I\JAT required a
deposit of $1 ,000 to be [ *PS] submitted with the application, which was fully refundable if the
necessary approvals for the facade easement donation could not be obtained . The application
stated that NAT's "operating funds come solely from cash donations made by persons donating an
easement . An [* *5] agreed-upon cash donation of 10% of the easement value is required at the
time the easement donation is accepted by* * * [NAT]".
In a letter dated April 2, 2003, the NAT Directo r of Operations informed petitioner that her
appl ication had been accepted and that processing would commence. The letter informed
petitioner that NAT:
will place significant effort to the processing of your application. Processing an
application is complex and t ime consuming. It Involves obtaining approvals from the
State and Federal Governments, and your lender. * * *

There is nothing required of you until al l approvals are received. NAT sought the approval of
petitioner's mortgage holders regarding the placement of a preservation restri ction agreement on
her Vanderbilt property. The two mortgage holders executed lender agreements that were
subm itted to NAT during the approval process.
On May 12, 2003, to comply with another component of t he approval process, petitioner executed
a Nationa l Park Service Form 10-168, Historic [*P6] Preservation Certification Application Part 1
- Evaluation of Significance, to request that the NPS certify the historic significance of the
Vanderbilt property. The NPS determined that petitioner's [**6] Vanderbilt property contributes
to the significance of the Fort Greene Historic District and is a "certified historic structure" for a
charitable contribution for conservation purposes in accordance with the Tax Treatment Extension
Act of 1980.
Late r in 2003, petitioner informed NAT that she had decided not to pursue the donation until
2004. Petitioner needed time to save the additiona l required cash due, as outlined in the
app li cation. By letter dated April 22, 2004, NAT informed petitioner that all of the necessary
approvals had been received and that she needed to order an appra isal. NAT provided in the
letter a list of appraisers "qual ified to do easement appraisals". Petitioner hired one of the listed
appra isers, Michael Drazner, formerly of Mitchell, Maxwell & Jackson, Inc. (MMJ), to perform an
appraisal of the Vanderbilt property.
Drazner and James Kearns, president of NAT, first communicated in December 2001 when Kearns
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contacted Drazner to inquire whether he would be able to prepare appraisals for homeowners who
were interested in donating facade easements to NAT. Kearns sent copies of reports to Drazner
that had been prepared by another appraisal firm outside of the New York [**7] City area along
with [*P7] some information regarding court cases that involved the charitable contribution of
facade easements.
Drazner completed an appraisal of the subject property on May 20, 2004. The Drazner report
states that the appraisal was completed in accordance with title XI of the Federal Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 and the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice. Drazner is a qualified expert in the field of real estate appraisal
and valuation.
Petitioner's Vanderbilt property was described in the Drazner report as:
an attached four story, three family townhouse located in the Boerum Hill
neighborhood of Kings County. The subject is physically and functionally adequate 'as
is' * * * [and] features a rear deck, patio, and clean tiled subcellar below the garden
level. This home also includes a wealth of turn of the century details that generate
strong demand for such homes in the area. These include wood mouldings, paneling
and wainscotting, volume ceilings, exposed brick walls, stained glass windows,
original wood planking, and fireplaces.

Drazner determined that the estimated market value of the property was $1,015,000 as of
[**8] the appraisal date. The Drazner report outlined the use of the three classic approaches to
value (sales comparison, cost, and income) that were considered to determine the market value
of the Vanderbilt property . The report stated that the sales comparison approach is the "most
applicable and has been given greatest weight in the determination of the final value * * * [and]
the cost [*PS] approach was given least weight due to the age of the subject property." The
stated purpose of the report was "to estimate 'as is' value of the subject property and to estimate
the impact on the subject property if granted an 'architectural facade easement."' The report
explained that
An easement is a particularly useful historic preservation tool in several respects.
First, it allows an individual to retain private ownership of the property and obtain
potential financial benefits. Second, an easement binds not only the current owner,
but all future owners as well, ensuring that the property will be -maintained and
observed by future owners. Third, easements are tailored to meet the needs of the
property owner, the individual resource, and the mission of the protecting
organization. * * *
If certain criteria [**9] are met, the owner also may receive a Federal income tax
deduction equivalent to the value of the rights given away to a charitable, or
governmental organization. * * * The deduction the taxpayer is entitled to is equal to
the fair market value of the easement, which is genera lly the decrease in fair market
value of the property caused by the restrictions placed on the property because of the
easement.

The Drazner report briefly discussed two cases involving easement valuation, Hilborn v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 677 (1985), and Richmond v. United States, 699 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La.
1988), and stated that
As these cases depict, it is extremely difficult for appraisers to estimate the probable
and possible impact on a property's value by the imposition of a facade conservation
easement that is granted in perpetuity. For most attached row properties in New York
City, where there are many municipal regulations restricting changes to properties

https ://vvww.lexis.com/research/retrieve? _ m=f4c33 bd6bc7d0cc0483df4d03a78e03 l &csv...

11/19/20 14

Get a Document - by Citation -T.C. Memo 2013-18

Page 6 of 11

located in historic districts, the facade easement value tends to be [*P9]
[**10] about 11 - 11.5% of the total value of the property . That figure is based on
the appraiser's experience as to what the Internal R~venue Service has found
acceptable (on prior appraisals).
The Drazner report further stated that
Th is facade easement can, and often does, have an effect on marketability and the
market value of a property. The measurement of this effect or impact is difficult to
quantify with any supported precision. Articles, periodicals, and books have been
written on the subject (measurement of the value of the historic easement).
However, in this market area, there is no measure or formula that is applicable for all
properties. The individual properties are so unique that each case must be evaluated
on its own. Add itionally, while there are accepted methods for measuring this effect,
on ly the market can provide the true test. Nonetheless, there are market measures
that provide sufficient data with which to bracket and support a reasonable market
ind icator.
Estimating the value of a property after the donation of a conservation easemen t is
very much like condemnation appraisal practice where easements or partial fee
interests are taken from property owners by a sovereign. [**11] Attempts must be
made to define what rights have been lost by the property owners and what elements
of damage (or enhancement) are involved in the loss. Beca use real estate is not
bought and sold in a vacuum, the appraiser has end eavo red to place himself in the
mindset of competent buyers and sellers and to examine considerations they have
actually had, or are likely to have, in the buying or sell ing of a property encumbered
by a facade easement.
* * * * * * *

It is now generally recognized by the Internal Revenue Service that the donation of a
facade easement of a property resu lts in a loss of value * * * between 10% and
15%. The donation of a commercia l property [*PlO] results in a loss of va lue of
between 10% or 12% or higher if development rights are lost. The inclusive data
support at least these ra nges, depending on how extensive the facade area is in
relation to the land pa rcel.
It is our opinion that the presence of the facade conservation easement would alter
the market value of the subject property. In the subject's market area, the appraiser
cannot precisely estim ate the extent to which this "loss in value" will result from the
facade easement due to the lack of market data. In this [**12] situation it is the
appraiser's conclusion that the val ue of the facade conservation easement * * * on
the subject property wou ld be estimated at $115,000, which is approximately
11.33% of the fee simple va lue of $1,015,000. This conclusion is based on
consideration of range of value that the I.R.S. has historically found to be acceptable
as wel l as historical precedents . Therefore, the presence of the historic facade
ea sement would decrease the fair market value of the property rights held by the
homeowner of the subject property to $900,000.

On June 23, 2004, Kearns signed the conservation deed on behalf of NAT. On September 21,
2004, the City of New York recorded the conservation deed of easement for the Vanderbilt
property. The deed of easeme nt for the subject property is considered to be only an architectural
facade conservation easement.
Petitioner attached Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions, to her 2004 Form 1040, U.S.
I ndividual"Income Tax Return, and reported a $115,000 gift to charity on line 16 of Schedule A,
Itemized Deductions. The Form 8283 filed had two versions of page 2, with one signed by the
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appraiser and president of NAT and the other lacking these signatures. [**13] Both reported
essentially the same information: [*P11] (1) a description of the donated property as a facade
easement with respect to the Vanderbilt property; (2) the overall physical condition being a
"Historic Preservation Easement Donation"; and (3) a stated appraised fair market value of
$115,000 for the donated property . On the executed page 2, Drazner signed the declaration of
appraiser section and identified the appraisal date as May 20, 2004, and Kearns, as president of
NAT, signed an acknowledgment of rece ipt of the contribution by NAT, as donee, on June 23,
2004.
Discussion
The Court of Appeals stated: "Our conclusion that Drazner's appraisal meets the minimal
requirements of a qualified appraisal mandates neither that the Tax Court find it persuasive nor
that Scheidel man be entitled to any deduction for the donated easement." Scheidel man v.
Commissioner, 682 F.3d at 199. In a case similar to this, the Court noted that HNl~"ordinarily any
encumbrance on real property, howsoever slight, would tend to have some negative effect on that
property's fair market value. Even a nominal encumbrance that is placed by the current owner of
the property would, at the very least, deprive a subsequent [**14] owner of the opportunity of
placing a similar encumbrance on that property." Evans v . Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-207,
2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 242, *18. In Evans, the Court found that the appraisal relied on by the
taxpayers was qualified but that the taxpayers had not provided sufficient [*P12] credible
evidence to shi~ the burden of proof to the Commissioner under section 7491(a) or to meet their
burden of establishing entitlement to their claimed charitable contribution deduction. 2010 Tax Ct.
Memo LEXIS 242 at *19, *38-39; see also Dunlap v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-126. We
reach the same conclusions here.
HN2 'i'There is no dispute that the "before and a~er" approach is to be used to determine the fa ir
market value here as it has been in numerous other cases. See, e.g., Hi lborn v. Commissioner,
85 T.C. 677, 688 (1985); Dunlap v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-126; Simmons v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-208, aff'd, 646 F.3d 6, 396 U.S. App. D.C. 133 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Griffin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-130, aff'd, 911 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1990).
As directed by the Court of Appeals, we analyze evidence In this case de novo to determine
whether petitioners have satisfied their burden of proving the fair market value of the donated
easement. [** 15] See Scheidel man v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d •at 193, 201. There is no dispute
about the qualifications of the witnesses. Therefore, we do not include in our discussion the
detailed training and background of each. To assist the Court the-testimony should satisfy the
standards of rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to wit, "(1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods rel iably to [*P13] the facts of the case."
Therefore we focus on the manner in which the value was reached, the reliability of the
methodology, and the persuasiveness as applied to the facts in this case.
The Drazner Report
Petitioner did not rely on Drazner at trial. Respondent called Drazner to explain his methodology
in anticipation of respondent's position that the appraisal did not satisfy the regulatory
requirements for qualification under the statute. (For subsequent years, the statute has been
amended. See sec. 170(f) (11) (E) (as amended by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-280, sec. 1219(c)(1), 120 Stat. at 1085, effective generally for appraisals prepared
[**16] with respect to returns filed a~er August 17, 2006, id., sec. 1219(e)(2), 120 Stat. at
1085-1086)). On brief, however, petitioner argues that the Drazner report is credible evidence of
value.
Respondent argues that Drazner's percentage methodology was simply part of a pattern of
appraisals NAT provided and that the Drazner report mechanica lly assigned the percentage and
incorporated language of a sample appraisal NAT provided. Respondent also presented evidence
that 91 reports MMJ prepared at NAT's request used almost identical language and percentages
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without rega rd to [*P14] specific facts and circumstances regarding the property subject to the
easement and preexisting restraints on changes to the property.
Th ere is no material dispute between the parties with respect to the value of petitioner's property
before the easement. Respondent's criticism of the Drazner report, with which we agree, focuses
on Drazner's purported determination of the value of petitioner's property after the easement was
granted. Drazner determined the value of the easement by applying an 11.33% discount to the
value of the property . His derivation of that percentage was not based on reliable market data or
specific [**17] attributes of petitioner's property, bu t rather on his analysis of what the courts
and the IRS had allowed in prior cases. As we said in Nicoladis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1988-163, 1988 Ta x Ct. Memo LEXIS 187, at *21, however,

+we do not mean to imp ly that a genera l "10-percent rule" has been established
with respect to facade donations. There was a fair amount of discussion by the
parties at trial about whether the Court had established a "10-percent rule" in
Hilborn. We did not there and do not here. Hilborn establishes as acceptable the
before and after method of valuation, and whi le under the circumstances of that case
a 10-percent figure was relied upon, valuation itsel f is still a question of facts and
circumstances. * * *
HN 3

Although the Drazner report set forth boilerplate standards for valuing property, it is apparent
that Drazner's bottom line was the equivalent of making a claim for "all [*P15] that the traffic
would bear." He opined that the value of the easement, the equivalent of loss in market value of
the subject property due to grant of the easement, was $115,000 . That conclusion was not based
on qual itative factors for the Vanderbilt property or the specific attributes of [* * 18] that
property but was based on mechanical application of a percentage with no demonstrated support
as to its derivation, other than acceptance of similar percentages in prior controversies. Thus the
report was not based on sufficient facts or data and was not the product of a reliable
methodology, and Drazner's methodology was not reliably applied to the facts of the case. For
those reasons, it was not credible.
Petitioners' Expert Evidence
Petitioners' expert at trial was Michae l Ehrmann, who also had the necessary qualifications to
appraise the easement but made factual and calculation mistakes, some of which he admitted,
that undermined the reliability of his report.
Ehrmann had prepared a market study for NAT's counsel that was attached to his report in this
case. The information that he relied on came from NAT through its counsel. He incorporated
material recommended by NAT's counsel, including earlier appraisals by his employer. Ehrmann
admitted that his report did not accurately describe the easement, stating that his description was
"a summary of my knowledge about the easement program that I've gotten over the years." He
[ *P16 ] relied on outdated information rather than contemporaneous [**19] inspection, used
alleged comparables from outside the geographical area of petitioner's property, and applied an
unsupported and unrealistic adjustment to petitioner's Brooklyn townhouse as compared to a
detached house in Evanston, Illinois. His methodology is undermined by these errors . See Evans
v. Commissioner, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 242, *15.
Petitioners argue that Ehrmann's appraisal should be accep ted in part because it relied on "the
cumulative results of MMJ's ninety-one facade easement valuations", which we reject as
unpersuasive for the reasons that we reject the Drazner appraisal. Ehrmann ignored studies
suggesting a contrary result and adopted those supporting his client's desired value. Ehrmann's
testimony had all of the earmarks of overzealous advocacy in support of NAT's marketing
program and, indirectly, petitioner's tax reporting. His conclusion that the easement should be
valued at $ 150,000 is unpersuasive and not credible.
HN4 ~Expert

opinions that disregard relevant facts affecting valuation or exaggerate value to
incredible levels are rejected. See Boltar, L.L.C. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 326, 335 (2011) (and
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cases there cited); Ch iu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734-735 (1985); Garrison v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo . 1986-261 [**20] (concluding that the taxpayers were "far too
aggressive In their [*P17] claimed value of* * * [the donated] property and in seeking to
profit from their 'good works' at the expense of Uncle Sam"). An expert loses usefulness to the
Court and loses credibility when giving testimony tainted by overzealous advocacy . Boltar, L.L.C.
v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 335-336. Ehrmann's conclusion does not help the Court because it
does not satisfy the standards of rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because we cannot
accept petitioners' expert's testimony as credible, the burden of proof did not shi~ under section
7491(a).
Respondent's Expert Evidence
Respondent's first valuation expert was Timothy Barnes . Barnes analyzed the terms of the
easement, zoning laws, and regulations of the LPC and concluded: "in highly desirable,
sophisticated home markets like historic brownstone Broo klyn , the imposition of an easement,
such as the one granted on June 23, 2004, is not a deterrent to the free trade of such properties
at fully competitive prices and does not materially affect the value of the subject property."
Barnes researched the geographic area of petitioner's property, contacting real estate brokers
[* * 21] and valuation professionals in the Brooklyn market to determine whether the imposition
of a facade easement affected the ma rketability of or ability to finance a townhou se within the
Fort Greene Historic District. The "uniform response" was [*P18] that such easements did not
negatively affect buyer interest, marketing time, or financing. He explained during his testimony
that the pool of prospective buyers within the five boroughs of New York City was a more reliable
measure of market effect than analysis comparing communities outside of New York City, which is
one of the reasons that Ehrmann's report was not reliable. Barnes also opined that a difference
between the controls available to LPC, which exercises a police power of the city, and NAT are the
placement of the burden on the homeowner to go to court and seek an exception, in the first
instance, and on the private party seeking to enforce the restriction to go to court, in the second.
Barnes also criticized Ehrmann's calculations, his sel ection of comparables, and particularly his
failure to account for differences in overall lot sizes and floor space of the allegedly comparable
properties. Although petitioners claim that the errors [**22] should be disregarded as
immaterial and that we should accept Ehrmann's subjective judgments, we believe that Ba rnes'
reasoned judgments are more rel iable.
Respondent also presented expert testimony by Stephen D. Dinklage, an engineer employed by
the IRS, who used an alternative approach based on condemnation techniques and determined
that the grant of the easement did not have a material effect on fair market value. Dinklage used
market data to divide [*P19] the value of the land from that of the building and then used a
modified cost approach to isola te that portion of petitioner's townhouse affected by the facade
easement. He concluded that because only the facade was affected by the easement and the loss
of utility was only to the facade, the restrictions would not have a material effect on the market
value of the whole property. Dinklage reasoned that a hypothetical buyer would not pa y less for
the Vanderbilt property because it was already restricted by the LPC regulations and the
easement did not make a difference. This conclusion is consistent with other evidence.
other Evidence
Respondent argues that the LPC created restraints on properties such as petitioner's so that the
NAT easement [**23] had no material effect. Petitioners contend that the LPC does not enforce
the restricti ons as effectively as NAT. That speculation is based on testimony of a representative
of NAT, is not supported by anything but anecdotes, and is contrary to evidence specifically
related to the Vanderbilt property.
The chai rman of the Fort Gree ne Association, which has as its mission preservation within the
Fort Greene boundaries, testified specifically with respect to the area in which the Vanderbilt
property is located. In his experience, the LPC provides guidelines to maintain the historic
integrity of facades in historic districts [*P20] in New York City. The LPC enforces guidelines
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and issues violation notices, but "the violation only takes effect and adds any value when the title
changes hands." Although he was called as a witness by petitioners, on cross -examination he
testi fied:

Q: You like being in the preservation district?
A: I like being in the preservation district. The preservation district actually has
created Fort Greene to what it is today. It's created - it's an economic engine for
Fort Greene.

Q: So you would consider the preservation district an effective agency for the city of
New York?
A: [ **24] The Landmark Preservation agency [is] an effective agency of the city of

New York, it does what it can do in its scope.
A logical inference from this testimony is that preservation of historic facades is a benefit, not a
detriment, to the value of Fort Greene property .
The conclusion that the easement did not materially diminish the value of petitioner's property is
also supported by petitioner's own testimony. Petitioner testified:
Wel l, I was primarily interested in preserving my house itself in light of the dramatic
development that was occurring in and around Fort Greene during those years and
still is. I was also intrigued by the tax benefit of preserving the facade which I had
intended to do anyway.

[*P21] I thought it wou ld be t he right thing to do for the house. I wanted to
preserve the historic facade of the house. I believe in that, I believe in doing that in
commun ities like Fort Greene. I also wanted to bene fit tax wise . I didn't know how
much I would benefit, but I wanted to benefit from what I was already intended to be
committed to doing.
We do not believe that petitioner would have granted the easement if she had anticipated a
substantial drop in the market value of her property [**25] as a result. It is even less likely that
she would have agreed to a restrictio n that red uced the value of her property by the re latively
large amount claimed, $115,000, or the even larger amount proposed by Ehrmann, $150,000 .
On review of all of the evidence, we conclude that the preponderance supports responden t's
position that the easement had no value for charitable contribution purposes. Respondent's
pos ition is the more persuasive, regardless of the burden of proof.
'vVe have considered the other arguments of the parties. They do not alter our conclusions.
To reflect the deductibility of petitioner's cash payment,
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
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